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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
The grounding of the bulk carrier Pasha Bulker on Nobbys beach, Newcastle 
in  June  2007  has  again  highlighted  the  risk  from  shipping  posed  to  Australia‟s 
extensive and environmentally  fragile coastline.
1 Whilst a pollution incident was 
averted in this case, spills from shipping in other states, such as the Nakhodka spill 
off Japan in 1997,
2 the Prestige spill off France in 1999,
3 the Erika spill off Spain in 
2003
4 and the Hebei Spirit spill of South Korea in 2007,
5 have required the constant 
monitoring and updating of the international regulatory regimes designed to prevent 
such incidents occurring and to provide compensation when they nevertheless do 
occur. Two recent additions to this international regulatory system are the Protocol 
on the Establishment of a Supplementary Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 2003
6 and 
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 
2001.
7  In  2008,  Australia  gave  effect  to  these  instruments,  enacting  the 
Supplementary Fund Protocol via the Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment 
Act  2008  (Cth),
8  while the Bunker Oil Convention is given effect through the 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 
                                                 
*   David Jackson Professor of Maritime and Commercial Law, Institute of Maritime Law, 
University of Southampton; Barrister, Quadrant Chambers, London. Although the writer 
attended many of the meetings and diplomatic conferences referred to in the text as a 
representative of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), the views expressed here are his own. 
   Senior Lecturer, Marine and Shipping Law Unit, TC Beirne School of Law, University 
of Queensland. 
1   See:  Australian  Maritime  Safety  Authority,  Pasha  Bulker  Grounding,  (2007) 
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/about_amsa/corporate_information/Recent_Events/Pasha_Bu
lker.asp>  at  12  August  2008;  Australian  Transport  Safety  Bureau,                        
Independent  Investigation  into  the  grounding  of  the  Panamanian  Registered  Bulk 
Carrier  the  Pasha  Bulker  on  Nobby’s  Beach,  Newcastle,  New  South  Wales,  (2007) 
<http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/MAIR/pdf/mair243_0
01.pdf> at 12 August 2008. 
2   See  Tosh  Moller,  The  Nakhodka  Oil  Spill  Response  (1997) 
<http://www.eumop.org/library/CASE%20STUDIES/ITOPF/6.pdf> at 17 August 2008.  
3   See  International  Oil  Po llution  Compensation  (IOPC)  Fund,  Erika  (2008) 
<http://www.iopcfund.org/erika.htm>  and  its  Annual  Report  2007 
<http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR07_E.pdf> at 11 August 2008. 
4   See:  Annual  Report  2007,  above  n  3;  IOPC,  Prestige  (2008) 
<http://www.iopcfund.org/prestige.htm> at 11 August 2008. 
5   In which 10,000 tonnes of crude oil affected 375 km of the western coast of the 
Republic of Korea. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
25 June 2008, 14 (Mr Dreyfus). 
6   Entered into force 3 March 2005, („Supplementary Fund Protocol‟). 
7   Entered into force 21 November 2008, („Bunker Oil Convention‟). „Bunkers‟ is a non-
technical marine description of a ship‟s fuel, rather than its cargo. That fuel might be, 
eg, diesel or heavy fuel oil (HFO). The Bunker Oil Convention has a wide definition: 
see art 1(5) and below Part III(C)(1).  
8   Which passed through the House of Representative on 25 June 2008.  104  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
(Cth),
9  and the  Protection  of  the  Sea  (Civil  Liability  For  Bunker  Oil  Pollution 
Damage) (Consequential Amendments) Act 2008 (Cth).
10 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  analyse  these  international  instruments, 
describe how they came about and explain the Australian implementation of them.   
 
A   Changes in the Focus of Maritime Liability Rules 
 
From the late 19
th century, the main driver to unify international maritime law 
was the Comité Maritime International (CMI),
11 a non-governmental organisation 
with representation from all aspects of the shipping industry, but mainly representing 
private  commercial  interests  rather  than  governments.  Most  of  the  focus  was 
therefore on private law issues which affected those interests and where uniformity 
brought simplicity and ease of enforcement. In private maritime law, justice and 
fairness  in  the  wider  sense  often  come  second  to  matters  such  as  commercial 
certainty. The primary focus has traditionally been on the commercial position of the 
shipowner, whether as carrier of goods under a carriage contract, or as a party liable 
for  collisions  or  other  incidents.  The  sinking  of  the  Titanic  in  1912  led  to  an 
increasing international focus on improving safety in order to protect the lives of 
crew and passengers.
12  
The biggest catalyst for international change was the creation after World War 
II of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
13 Since that time, two obvious 
influences can be discerned. First, that the  regulatory function has become a more 
significant driver than the commercial interests, creating public law obligations on 
states  to  enact  standards  which  are  usually  enforced  through  the  criminal  law. 
Secondly, this work has been motivated and carried out by states, not by private 
bodies or through self-regulation. That factor alters the dynamic because states will 
be more likely to think of victims rather than commercial interests. Nevertheless, 
shipowners  have  had  a  major  influence  at  IMO;    not  simply  because  IMO 
membership fees are payable by tonnage, but also because many states have, or wish 
to have, significant commercial fleets (whether for reasons of taxation, employment, 
prestige or general economic and political power). Debates at the IMO are heavily 
influenced by the impact of regulation on commercial shipping. 
The 40 years since the oil tanker Torrey Canyon sank in 1967
14 saw a further 
major change in the focus of international maritime law to protect a newer category 
of victim, the environment. Part XII of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
deals  specifically  with  this  new  „victim‟.    While  much  of  this  Part  is  naturally 
concerned with prevention issues and enforcement, rather than compensation, art 
235 imposes obligations on states to ensure that their legal systems offer recourse 
mechanisms, including prompt and adequate compensation. Article 235(3) obliges 
states to cooperate in implementing and developing international law on liability and 
compensation, and mentions the need to develop criteria and procedures for payment 
of adequate compensation including „compulsory insurance or compensation funds‟.  
                                                 
9   Act no. 77 of 2008 („Bunker Act‟). 
10   Act no. 76 of 2008. 
11   See generally, CMI, <http://www.comitemaritime.org> at 18 August 2008. 
12   New safety rules were promoted in a series of international instruments from 1914, 
usually referred to as SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) Conventions. 
13   A  specialized  agency  of  the  United  Nations  with  167  Member  State s  and  three 
Associate Members: see generally, IMO <http://www.imo.org/> at 28 September 2008.  
14   This was the first major casualty involving a large oil tanker, and the British and French 
governments were ill-prepared to deal with some 117,000 tons of cargo that was lost. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             105 
 
The latter reference is significant because not only does it reflect the reaction to the 
Torrey Canyon, but it also presages developments in the last 25 years, including the 
Supplementary Fund Protocol 2003 and the Bunker Oil Convention 2001.  
An important emerging principle in the protection of the environment has been 
the „polluter pays‟ principle.
15 While the concept has been used in the maritime 
context, its interpretation and application is not always straightforward. In the case 
of an oil tanker, for example, the polluter is not necessarily the tanker owner as it is 
very unusual for shipowners to carry cargo belonging to them. The ship is merely the 
mechanism  for  carrying  somebody  else‟s  pollutants,  and  in  the  debates  which 
followed the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967, the shipowners were keen to counter 
the simple assumption that shipowners alone should pay (especially in circumstances 
where they were held liable without fault).
16 
The development of the environmental principle of sustainable development
17 
has also had an impact on the resulting international regulatory regime applicable to 
marine pollution, as reflected in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development,
18 which was itself a series of compromises between environmental 
protection and economic development. 
The implementation of these emerging principles has been taken up within the 
IMO. Most of the activity of the IMO in protecting the marine environment has been 
focussed on the work of its Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC),
19 
and to some extent on its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).
20  The MEPC, in 
particular, has drafted a host of regulatory measures enforced by flag and coastal 
states through public law mechanisms (such as the criminal law).
21 Australia has 
played an active part in the drafting of such instruments and has ratified most of  
 
                                                 
15   For a history of the development of environmental law and the polluter-pays principle, 
see, Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2
nd ed 2003), 25-
69. See also, Louise De La Fayette, „New approaches for assessing damage‟ (2005) 20 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 167, 169. 
16   The solution adopted in the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage  (CLC),  1969  (entered  into  force  19  June  1975)  and  the  International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage  (IOPC Fund) 1971 (entered into force 16 October 1978), was to 
recognise that there was a shared liability. See below Part I(D). 
17   Sands, above n 15, 10-11, 252-83. 
18   Ibid 252-3. 
19   Louise  De  La  Fayette,  „The  Marine  Environment  Protection  Committee:  The 
Conjunction of the Law of the Sea and International Environmental Law‟ (2001) 16 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 155, 165.  
20   It has produced and revised general safety conventions such as SOLAS 1974, which 
protect the environment indirectly through the reduction of ship casualties. 
21   Examples of such conventions include: the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto 
(MARPOL  73/78);  the  International  Convention  on  Oil  Pollution  Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation (OPRC) 1990 (entered into force 13 May 1995) and its 
Protocol  on  Preparedness,  Response  and  Co-operation  to  pollution  Incidents  by 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000 (HNS Protocol) (entered into force 14 June 
2007); the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on 
Ships (AFS) 2001 (entered into force 17 September 2008); the International Convention 
for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (not yet 
in force). Australia is a party to all these instruments except the HNS Protocol and the 
Ballast Water Convention. 106  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
them.
22  It is probably fair to say that their introduction has been slow, cautious, and 
very often in reaction to actual disasters (rather than pre -empting them). The 9/11 
attack has added yet a further focus, that of maritime security, prompted by the US. 
The environment was sidelined somewhat as new regulatory rules were adopted to 
combat terrorism.
23 
The focus of this article, however, is on maritime  liability conventions, i.e. 
those that create legal liabilities for shipowners and others to pay compensation for 
losses. For convenience, these may be called „private maritime law conventions‟, in 
the sense that they are conventions creating liabilities for individuals and companies 
of an essentially private law type.  
 
B   IMO Conventions on Compensation for Damage to the Marine Environment 
 
It is the Legal Committee of the IMO, set up after the Torrey Canyon disaster, 
which has produced a suite of conventions and amending protocols dealing with 
liability and compensation issues,
24  including: 
 
  The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC), 1969 [and Protocols of 1976, 1992]
25 
  The  International  Convention  on  the  Establishment  of  an  International 
Fund  for  Compensation  for  Oil  Pollution  Damage  (Fund  Convention), 
1971 [and Protocols of 1976, 1992, and the Supplementary Fund Protocol, 
2003]
26 
  The Convention relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage 
of Nuclear Material (NUCLEAR), 1971
27 
  The Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their 
Luggage by Sea (PAL), 1974 [and Protocols of 1976, 1990 and 2002]
28 
  The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 
                                                 
22   Indeed, the Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth) gives effect to 
the  latest  amendments  to  Annexes  I,  II  and  IV  of  MARPOL.  This  article  will  not 
examine  these  public  law  measures,  but  see,  for  an  introduction  as to  their  effects, 
Explanatory  Memorandum,  Protection  of  the  Sea  Legislation  Amendment  Bill  2008 
(Cth) 2-3,17-21.  
23   Thus work on the Wreck Removal Convention 2007, opened for signature 19 November 
2007,  was  delayed,  understandably,  while  a  new  2005  Protocol  was  agreed  to  the 
Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  against  the  Safety  of  Maritime 
Navigation  (SUA)  1988  (SUA  entered  into  force  on  1  March  1992,  but  the  SUA 
Protocol is not yet in force).  
24   For the list of States Parties to IMO conventions generally, see above n 13.  
25   Australia is now a party to the CLC 1992, which is enacted in the Protection of the Sea 
(Civil  Liability)  Act  1981  (Cth).  These,  like  the  original  CLC  1969  (and  Fund 
Convention  1971)  deal  with  compensation  issues:  other  instruments  such  as  the 
International  Convention  relating  to  Intervention  on  the  High  Seas in  Cases of  Oil 
Pollution Casualties 1969 (entered into force 1969), dealt with public law issues. See 
also the Protection of the Sea (Powers of Intervention) Act 1981 (Cth).  
26   Australia is now a party to the Fund Convention 1992 which is enacted mainly in  the 
Protection of the Sea (Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) Act 1993 (Cth).  
27   Australia  is  not  party  to  this  Convention,  which  has  been  of  little  relevance 
internationally. 
28   Australia is not party to the Athens Convention 1974, but it did play a part i n the 
negotiation of the 2002 Protocol. The debates on terrorism defences are also relevant in 
the context of bunkers: see below Part III(C)(4).  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             107 
 
1976 [and Protocol of 1996]
29 
  The International Convention on Salvage, 1989
30 
  The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage 
in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by 
Sea (HNS), 1996
31 
  The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage (Bunker Oil Convention), 2001
32  
  The International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (WRC), 2007
33 
 
With the exception of the Athens Convention, dealing with passenger carriage, 
all of the above can have a greater or lesser impact on the protection of the marine 
environment. The way in which that is done is not through the imposition of 
regulatory  standards  aiming  to  prevent  pollution  disasters,  but  to  provide 
compensation mechanisms to try to eliminate or minimise the consequences of those 
disasters. The threat of large damage claims may well operate as some form of limit 
on environmentally risky activity, but from the shipowner‟s point of view these risks 
will usually be insured.  
It follows that the maritime liability conventions can only really protect the 
environment from a harm that has already happened, usually by a casualty involving 
a ship. From an environmentalist‟s perspective, they will usually be less significant 
than the regulatory conventions: as they deal with compensation there is not really a 
punitive element, nor is it likely that that the compensation will ever be enough to 
remedy  all  environmental  problems.  Nevertheless,  to  states  whose  waters  and 
coastlines are affected by marine pollution and to industries such as fishing and 
tourism, these conventions are a vital part of the armoury available to compensate 
for loss. Enormous technical  expertise in  handling oil pollution claims  has been 
developed through the mechanisms of the CLC and Fund Convention, in particular, 
and significant advances have been made in developing pollution compensation law.  
A further feature of the IMO work has been the development over nearly 40 
years of a set of standard principles, and specific article wordings, which have been 
taken as „boilerplate‟ text from one instrument to the next. Within the complicated 
and time-restricted dynamics of negotiations for international conventions
34 this has 
had the significant advantage of enabling agreem ent to be reached more quickly 
once fundamental principles have been settled. There is no need to spend a lot of 
time reinventing the wheel, for instance in the drafting of strict liability provisions 
and defences. In theory, the widespread use of standard  text should also help to 
create more international uniformity of interpretation. The incremental approach to 
developing compensation conventions has certain parallels with the common law 
system, but also shares one disadvantage, namely that it becomes harder to advocate 
radical changes which break with the established pattern of the law.  
                                                 
29   Australia is a party to the LLMC 1996, which is enacted in the Limitation of Liability 
for  Maritime  Claims  Act  1989  (Cth).  This  legislation  is  directly  relevant  to  bunker 
claims: see below Part III(E). 
30   Australia is a party to the Salvage Convention 1989, which is now contained in the 
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth), s 315 and sch 9.  
31   This Convention is not yet  in force, as a result of practical difficulties: see below Part 
III(A). 
32   Australia will ratify this convention: see below Part III(B).  
33   Australia‟s position on this Convention is not yet finalised.  
34   See, N. Gaskell, „Decision Making and the Legal Committee of the IMO‟ (2003) 18 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 155.  108  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
C   Australia’s Need for an Enhanced Marine Pollution Compensation Regime 
 
Australia‟s special vulnerability to marine pollution is well-known
35 and was 
particularly emphasised in the debates on the 2008 legislation and in the Explanatory 
Memoranda.
36 In fact, Australia appears to have been extraordinarily lucky in that it 
has avoided the sort of catastrophic pollution disaster with major consequences that 
has struck other industrialised states. Table 1 shows major oil pollution incidents in 
Australia.
37 
 
 
 
Table 1 Major Oil Pollution Incidents in Australia (t = tonnes) 
DATE  VESSEL  TYPE  LOCATION  OIL  
28/11/1903  Petriana  Tanker  Port Phillip Bay, VIC   1,300 t  
03/03/1970  Oceanic Grandeur  Tanker  Torres Strait QLD   1,100 t  
26/05/1974  Sygna  Bulk coal carrier  Newcastle, NSW   700 t  
14/07/1975  Princess Anne Marie   Tanker  Offshore, WA  14,800 t  
10/09/1979  World Encouragement   Tanker  Botany Bay NSW  95 t  
29/10/1981  Anro Asia   Container   Bribie Island QLD   100 t  
22/01/1982  Esso Gippsland   Tanker  Port Stanvac SA   unknown 
03/12/1987  Nella Dan   Supply vessel  Macquarie Island   125 t  
20/05/1988  Korean Star  Bulk carrier  Cape Cuvier WA  600 t 
28/07/1988  Al Qurain  Livestock carrier  Portland VIC  184 t 
21/05/1990  Arthur Phillip  Tanker/Bulk carrier  Cape Otway VIC  unknown 
14/02/1991  Sanko Harvest 
 
Bulk carrier  Esperance WA  700 t 
21/07/1991  Kirki  Tanker  WA  17,280 t 
30/08/1992  Era  Tanker  Port Bonython SA  300 t 
10/07/1995  Iron Baron  Bulk ore carrier  Hebe Reef TAS  325 t 
28/06/1999  Mobil Refinery  Offshore facility  Port Stanvac SA  230 t 
26/07/1999  MV Torungen   Tanker  Varanus Island, WA   25 t  
03/08/1999     Laura D‟Amato  Tanker  Sydney NSW  250 t 
18/12/1999  Sylvan Arrow   Chemical/Oil tanker  Wilson's Promontory VIC   <2 t  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35   See  generally,  Michael  White,  Australasian  Marine  Pollution  Laws  (2
nd  ed,  2007); 
Ships of Shame: Inquiry into Ship Safety – Report from the House of Representatives 
Standing  Committee  on  Transport,  Communications  and  Infrastructure,  December, 
1992. 
36   See, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 June 2008, 
7 – 34; Explanatory Memorandum, Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Bill 
2008 (Cth). 
37   This table is based on that published by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
(AMSA)  Major  Oil  Spills  in  Australia  (2008)  
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Major_Oil_Spills_in_Austr
alia/> at 17 July 2008, updated 17 August 2008. For the practical difficulties faced by 
AMSA,  see  R  Lipscombe,  „Australia‟s  Tyranny  of  Distance  in  Oil  Spill  Response‟ 
(2000)  6  Spill  Science  and  Technology  Bulletin  13.  For  statistics  on  oil  pollution 
disasters, see eg, the IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007, above n 3, Annex XXII, XXIII, 
and below Part III(A) for bunker pollution. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             109 
 
02/09/2001  Pax Phoenix   Bulk carrier  Holbourne Island, QLD   <1000 L  
25/12/2002  Pacific Quest   Container  Border Island, QLD   >70 km  
24/01/2006  Global Peace   Bulk coal carrier  Gladstone, QLD   25 t  
   
It is not necessary to analyse here each of these incidents, but the four largest 
spills have involved oil tankers, the Kirki, the Princess Anne Marie, the Petriana and 
the Oceanic Grandeur.  The Kirki was the largest of these, and lost 17,280 tonnes of 
a  total  cargo  of  82,650  tonnes.
38  Other incidents involved oil tankers, but the 
spillages were relatively small, either because there was relatively minor damage to 
the ship,
39 or because there were minor operational spillages, whether deliberate
40 or 
careless.
41  
By comparison with disasters elsewhere in the world, such as the  Braer, the 
Erika and the Prestige,
42 the amount of oil lost in each of these oil tanker incidents is 
relatively small; still, even small amounts of oil can be expensive to clean up
43 or 
can cause disproportionate damage in particularly sensitive areas. The key point 
about these oil tanker spills is that compensation would today be cover ed by the  
 
 
CLC 1992 and Fund Convention 1992 as enacted in Australia.
44 The Supplementary  
                                                 
38   The Kirki also had on board 1,800 tonnes of heavy fuel oil bunkers, 200 tonnes of gas 
oil, 100 tonnes of marine diesel and 35 tonnes of lubricating oil. The Princess Anne 
Marie sustained hull damage resulting in a loss of 14,800 tonnes out of a total oil cargo 
of 62,800 tonnes. The Oceanic Grandeur lost 1,100 tonnes of a total of 55,000 tonnes. 
The Petriana was a tiny tanker, (1,821 gt), and her total cargo was deliberately off-
loaded when she went aground. Where possible, all references in this article to ships‟ 
gross  tonnages  have  been  checked  with  Equasis  records.  See,  Equasis 
<www.equasis.org> at 18 August 2008. 
39   The Era was an oil tanker (apparently of 18,000 gt) and the spill was from bunker tanks 
ruptured by the bow of a tug during berthing.   
40   The Arthur Phillip was a tanker which discharged an oil/water mixture. 
41   The Laura D’Amato, a 54,962 gt crude oil tanker, lost 250 to 300 tonnes of cargo 
through  an  open  sea  valve  system  while  discharging.  Similarly,  the  oil  tanker  Esso 
Gippsland  lost  fuel  oil  cargo  while  loading.  The  Sylvan  Arrow  was  a  22,587  gt 
chemical/oil  products  tanker  which  discharged  an  oily  water  mixture  owing  to  an 
operational equipment failure. There was no casualty as such and no environmental 
damage.  See,  AMSA,  Major  Oil  Spills  in  Australia  
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/marine_environment_protection/major_oil_spills_in_australi
a/Sylvan_Arrow/index.asp> at 17 August 2008. 
42   For  further  information  about  th ese  and  similar  disasters,  see,  IOPC, 
<http://www.iopcfund.org/>, and Annual Reports, in particular the, 2007 Report, above 
n 3. Annex XXII gives a list of all major incidents under the Funds. See also, the 
International  Tanker  Owners  Pollution  Federation  Ltd  (ITOPF) 
<http://www.itopf.com/> at 11 August 2008 for detailed worldwide statistics of the 
number and amounts of oil spills, and information on causes.  
43   The World Encouragement was an oil tanker that lost oil cargo from a rupture to the 
hull. The Supreme Court of NSW awarded the Maritime Services Board A$209,557 
under  the  Prevention  of  Oil  Pollution  in  Navigable  Waters  Act  1960  (NSW),  as 
amended, which created civil liabilities prior to the enactment  of the CLC 1969 by 
Australia:  see,  Maritime  Services  Board  of  New  South  Wales  v  Posiden  Navigation 
Incorporated  [1982]  1  NSWLR  72.  In  the  Sylvan  Arrow  there  was  a  criminal 
prosecution under s 9 of the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) 
Act  1983,  as  with  many  of  the  reported  incidents,  but  the  fine  of  A$100,000  and 
investigation  costs of  $26,555.59  would  be relatively  insignificant  in  relation  to  the 
potential clean-up costs, or, where relevant, the costs of salvage.  
44   See below Part I(D).  110  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
 
 
Fund  Protocol  2003  is  directed  to  those  oil  tanker  cases  which  might  have 
catastrophic consequences.
45  
Of the other incidents listed in the table, it is significant  that all (bar two
46) 
involved  bunker  pollution  from  non -tankers,  usually  bulk  carriers.  It  is  these 
incidents that are not covered by the CLC 1992 or Fund Convention 1992, and for 
which the Bunker Oil Convention is designed.
47 The loss of bunkers was usually the 
result  of  grounding,
48  or  similar  incidents,
49  but  there  are  also  examples  of 
operational discharges, usually the result of illegal tank cleaning.
50  
A typical example is the   Iron  Baron,  a  21,975  gt  bulk  ore  carrier,  which 
grounded  in  1995  with  the  loss  of  325  tonnes  of  bunker  fuel  oil.  There  was 
considerable  environmental  damage.
51  The  ship  was  owned  by  a  Panamanian 
company, but on a 5 year demise charter to BHP Transport Pty.
52 Like the Erika 
disaster  in France,
53 there are certain advantages to claimants  if there is a local 
connection and BHP apparently committed itself to pay clean-up and research, the 
                                                 
45   See below Part II. 
46   The Torungen was a 52,525 gt crude oil tanker moored at an offshore loading facility, 
but while raising the loading hose from the seabed a subsea valve was damaged, causing  
a hole in the pipeline, resulting in a spill from the subsea pipeline (not the ship). There 
was no recordable environmental damage. The Mobil Refinery incident did not involve a 
ship,  but  a  leak  from  an  offshore  loading  connection.  These  would  not  have  been 
covered under the CLC and Fund Convention as the oil did not escape from a ship, 
although there may, for instance, have been liability in tort (and cf Caltex v. Dredge 
Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529), or possibly under the Protection of the Sea (Civil 
Liability) Act 1981 (Cth) (see below Part III(D)(1)).  
47   See  below  Part  III  for  how  these  incidents  wou ld have  been  resolved  under  the 
Convention.  
48   The Korean Star was a bulk carrier that went aground and lost bunkers. The Nella Dan 
was a supply vessel which went aground and lost 120t of diesel and 5t of lube oil. The 
Anro Asia was a container ship that lost 100 (of 1000) tonnes of bunkers when it went 
aground.  The  Sygna  was  a  bulk  coal  carrier  which  went  aground  losing  about  700 
tonnes (from a total of 2,136 tonnes of bunker oil and 163 tonnes of diesel oil). The 
Sanko Harvest was a bulk carrier that struck a reef and lost 700 tonnes of bunkers, and 
see, Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Investigation Report No. 27, 1991). 
49   The  Al  Qurain  was  a  livestock  carrier  which  struck  a  wharf  and  lost bunkers.  The 
Global Peace was a bulk coal carrier which lost heavy fuel oil after a tug collided with 
it.  This  was  Queensland‟s  worst  oil  spill  in  30  years.  See,  Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 June 2008, 10 (Mr Trevor). 
50   The Pacific Quest was a 31,403gt container ship and the slick was of fuel oil (there was 
a negligent or deliberate operational discharge of an oily mixture). The Pax Phoenix 
was a 28,021gt bulk carrier where again there was an operational discharge of an oily 
fuel mixture. 
51   See,  AMSA,  The  Response  to  the  Iron  Baron  Iron  Spill  (2005), 
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/National_Plan/Incident_and
_Exercise_Reports/Iron_Baron_Spill/index.asp> at 11 August 2008, for the Report of 
the Iron Baron Review Group, 21 December 1995. See also, Environment Tasmania, 
Oil Spill Environmental Impacts Report, <http://www.environment.tas.gov.au/ 
em_eppps_iron_baron_oil_spill_environmental_impacts_report.html>  at  11  August 
2008.  
52   See, ATSB Investigation, <http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/ 
1995/MAIR/pdf/mair83_001.pdf> at 11 August 2008.  
53   Where the French group Total was involved as seller and voyage charterer.  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             111 
 
total costs of which were estimated at one stage as A$30 million.
54 The ship was 
evidently a constructive total loss and was eventually dumped. In the ordinary case 
of such a ship owned by a single ship company, there may be great difficulties in 
finding a solvent defendant as its only asset no longer exists.
55  
There have also been instances of what might be described as „near-misses‟ in 
Australian  waters,  where  there  were  casualties,  but  no  bunker  pollution.
56  The 
Peacock was a refrigerated container ship which went aground in 1996 on Piper 
Reef with 600 tonnes of bunkers. No oil was spilled but response costs were some 
A$600,000.
57 Similarly, in January 2006, the oil tanker Desh Rakshak, owned by the 
Shipping Corporation of India, was holed while entering the heads of Port Phillip 
Bay inbound for Geelong. Fortunately only a ballast tank, rather than the cargo tanks 
or bunkers was holed and no pollution resulted.
58 Perhaps the most notable near-miss 
was the grounding on 8 June 2007 of the Pasha Bulker in a gale off Newcastle, New 
South Wales. She was a 40,042 gt bulk coal carrier in ballast. The official report into 
the safety aspects of the incident
59 does not give details of any environmental threat, 
but contemporary reports indicated that she had on board 700 tonnes of fuel oil, 38 
tonnes of diesel and 40 tonnes of lube oil.
60 None of the reports indicate that there 
were any oil spills, as there was no significant breach of the ship‟s inner hull, but the 
point is that there could easily have been a spill of bunker fuel.
61  
The source of an oil spill cannot always be identified. For example, an oil spill 
measuring seven nautical miles long by 200 metres wide was reported about seven 
nautical miles off Cape Otway lighthouse, Victoria. AMSA sprayed approximately 
                                                 
54   See, SOE case study, <http://soer.justice.tas.gov.au/2003/casestudy/a2/index.php> at 11 
August 2008. For Australian liability provisions introduced to deal with such casualties, 
see below Part III(D).  
55   Claimants would be forced to try to track any proceeds of the hull insurance.  
56   For example, on 2 November 2000, t he Bunga Teratai Satu ran aground on the Great 
Barrier  Reef,  while  carrying  more  than  1,300  tonnes  of  fuel,  oil  and  hazardous 
chemicals (see ATSB Investigation Report No. 162, 2001,1). No oil escaped, although 
there was „mechanical‟ (physical) damage to the reef and some possible effects of the 
ship‟s anti-fouling paint. See Peter Glover, „Marine Casualties in the Great Barrier Reef: 
„Peacock‟,  „Bunga  Teratai  Satu‟  and  „Doric  Chariot‟  (2004)  18  Maritime  Law 
Association of Australia and New Zealand Journal 55. 
57   Ibid. Lipscombe, above n 37. See also below Part III(D), for A ustralia‟s legislative 
response to this threat. 
58   Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 June 2008, 14 
(Mr Dreyfus). 
59   For details of the incident, see, ATSB Investigation Report No. 243, May 2008.  
60   See, Lloyd‟s List reports from 8 June 2007-20 July 2007 (in Fortunes De Mer: Maritime 
Law  <http://fortunes-de-mer.com>  at  11  August  2008);  a  round  figure  of  800t  was 
given  in  the  charterer‟s  press  release  of  8  June  2008  (see,  Lauritzen  Bulkers 
<http://lauritzenbulkers.com> at 1 July 2008). 
61   ATSB Investigation Report No. 243,1. The exact identity and status of those operating a 
ship is obviously important in order to target the correct defendants, and may not always 
be easy to discover given the complexities of ship ownership and  registration, For 
example, at the time of her grounding, the  Pasha Bulker was owned by Wealth Line, 
Panama (where it was registered), was on a long-term charter to Lauritzen Bulkers, flew 
the Danish flag and was managed and operated by Fukujin Kisen Company, Japan. Cf. 
the Lauritzen website, above n 60, which declared that the ship was owned by Fukujin 
Kisen Co and that Lauritzen had sub-chartered her to another Japanese company. It 
would not be unusual for Wealth Line to be a single ship company, all of whose shares 
were owned by, eg, Fukujin Kisen Co. It is the latter which is described as the Ship 
Manager in the official Equasis website at the time of the incident (and also after the 
ship was renamed „Drake‟ after the refloating): see Equasis, above n 38.  112  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
800 litres of dispersant over the slick. While an oil tanker registered in the Bahamas 
was sighted in the vicinity, the source of the spill was not definitively identified.
62 
 
D   Existing compensation regime for oil tanker pollution 
 
The CLC 1969 and the Fund Convention 1971 introduced a composite regime 
with a number of key features. Those features were retained when the CLC and 
Fund Convention were revised in 1992 and it is the CLC and Fund 1992 which are 
currently in force in Australia. It is only necessary here to provide an introduction to 
the CLC and Fund 1992 scheme so that the context for the 2008 legislation can be 
better understood.
63 As already noted the CLC and Fund 1992 have provided the 
model for subsequent maritime liability conventions designed to compensate for 
environmental damage. They have been enormously successful, with the CLC 1992 
having 120 Contracting States (with 93.66% of world tanker tonnage) and the Fund 
Convention 1992 having 102 Contracting States (with 96.31% of world tanker 
tonnage).
64  
The key feature of the CLC and Fund system is that it provides a degree of 
financial security to potential claimants, thereby avoiding the problem of the single 
ship company with no assets.
65 The security is achieved in the CLC by requiring the 
registered shipowner to carry insurance (or its equivalent) for liabilities created by 
the CLC. Moreover, there is the possibility of direct action by the claimant against 
the insurer, who can only rely on limited defences, including the wilful misconduct 
of the shipowner assured, but not insolvency or other policy conditions. The express 
CLC  direct  action  provision  is  particularly  important  where  the  shipowner  is 
insolvent as although states might have national direct action provisions
66 these may 
have limitations,
67 or may be difficult to enforce against a foreign insurer (even if the 
existence of a policy could be detected). States enforce the CLC requirements 
through a compulsory insurance certificate which ships need to leave or enter ports 
in contracting states. This has been very effective. An additional element of financial 
security is provided by the fact that the CLC 1992 is designed to operate in tandem 
with  the Fund Convention 1992.
68  CLC liabilities are limited to a first tier of 
liability, while the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund becomes   
 
                                                 
62   Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 June 2008, 26 
(Mr Cheeseman). 
63   Extensive treatment can be found in White, above n 35, 58 -68; Edgar Gold, „Liability 
and  Compensation  for  Ship-Source  Marine  Pollution:  The  International  System‟,  in 
Helge Ole Bergesen, Georg Parmann, and Øystein B. Thommessen (eds.), Yearbook of 
International Co-operation on Environment and Development (1999), 31–37;  Colin M 
De  la  Rue,    Shipping  and  the  Environment:  Law  and  Practice  (1998)  and  IOPC 
<http://www.iopcfund.org>. See also, Nicholas Gaskell, „Developments in International 
Maritime Law‟ (1998) 28 Environmental Policy and Law 165-170, for an earlier version 
of part of the overview given here. 
64   IMO above, n 13. As at 20 May 2008, there were still 38 states party to the CLC 1969. 
The 1971 Fund ceased to operate on 24 May 2002, although it still has certain run off 
obligations. 
65   The Torrey Canyon problem, and see discussion on the Iron Baron, above Part I(C).  
66   In Australia, see, Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 54. 
67   See eg,  UK Third Party Rights Against Insurers Act 1930 and The Fanti and The Padre 
Island [1991] 2 AC 1 where the House of Lords upheld a „pay to be paid‟ clause in a P 
& I Club cover. See also, Law Commission Report No 272 (2001).  
68   Although states are not required to be party to both. China, for instance, is party to the 
CLC 1992, but only applies the Fund Convention 1992 to Hong Kong.  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             113 
 
involved to a higher second (but aggregated) tier of liability where there are major 
incidents.  The  limits  under  the  original  1969  and  1971  Conventions  are  set  out 
below, along with those under the CLC 1992 and Fund Convention 1992, up until 
2003.
69 
 
Table 2: CLC and Fund Limits up to 2003 
1 19 96 69 9   C CL LC C   S Sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   L Li im mi it ts s   
   
1 13 33 3   s sd dr r
7 70 0   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $2 23 36 6] ]   p pe er r   t to on n   o of f   s sh hi ip p‟ ‟s s   t to on nn na ag ge e; ;   
u up p   t to o   a a   m ma ax xi im mu um m   1 14 4   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $2 25 5   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
   
1 19 97 71 1   F Fu un nd d   C Co on nv ve en nt ti io on n      L Li im mi it ts s   
   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m   [ [1 19 97 71 1] ]   3 30 0   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $5 53 3   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m   [ [f fr ro om m   1 19 98 87 7] ]   6 60 0   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $1 10 07 7   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
   
1 19 99 92 2   C CL LC C   S Sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   L Li im mi it ts s   
   
M Mi in ni im mu um m   s sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   l li ia ab bi il li it ty y   3 3   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $5 5. .3 3   m mi il ll li io on n] ]      
t th he en n   4 42 20 0   s sd dr r   p pe er r   t to on n   o of f   s sh hi ip p‟ ‟s s   t to on nn na ag ge e   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $7 74 47 7] ]      
   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m: :   5 59 9. .7 7   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $1 10 06 6   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
   
1 19 99 92 2   F Fu un nd d   C Co on nv ve en nt ti io on n   L Li im mi it ts s   
   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m: :   1 13 35 5   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $2 24 40 0   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
 
The CLC 1992 provides for the strict liability of a registered shipowner for oil 
pollution damage
71 with some restricted defences.
72 The owner is entitled to limit his 
liability according to the size of its ship (e.g. to A$106 million, above).
73 Liability is 
channelled to the shipowner alone,  who is not liable outside the Convention, for 
example, at common law. Other persons, such as employees, pilots and salvors are 
specifically exempted from liability.
74 The basis of liability of the Fund is the same 
as that for the CLC, i.e. strict liability, but apart from providing an additional tier of  
                                                 
69   For later increases in limits see Table 3, below Part II(A). 
70   The sdr is the special drawing right of the IMF. All figures in this article have taken a 
random conversion date of 14 January 2008, where the conversion rate was  1 sdr 
=A$1.7776:  see,  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  SDR  Valuation 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx> at 14 January 2008. Note that 
the rates will change daily. When originally enacted, the 1969 and 1971 Conventions 
were expressed in terms of golf francs: the sdr figures above are those which were 
inserted by the CLC and Fund Protocols of 1976. 
71   This is a restricted definition, see further below Part III(C)(1). 
72   See below Part III(C)(4).  
73   This limit is separate to, and higher than, that allowed under the general maritime law, 
see eg,  Limitation of  Liability for Maritime  Claims Act  1989  (Cth):  see  below  Part 
III(E).  
74   This has not stopped attempts by claimants to avoid the channelling provisions, eg, by 
suing in non-state parties such as the US (see eg, The  Amoco Cadiz litigation [1984] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 304), or persons not specifically listed in the exempted list, such as a 
classification society (see eg, one part of the Prestige litigation, Reino de Espana v. 
American Bureau of Shipping [2008] AMC 83). 114  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
liability (e.g. aggregated to A$240 million, above), there are circumstances where 
the Fund may have liability for all of a claim, for example, where the shipowner has 
a CLC defence, or is insolvent. In these cases the Fund‟s liability does not start at a 
second tier level, but may come down to the first dollar of liability. This is a very 
significant additional protection provided by the Fund. 
The CLC creates a regime of liability in respect of the ship that was actually 
involved in the spillage and that liability, in practice, is covered and handled by the 
normal liability insurers (usually a member of the International Group of P & I 
Clubs).
75 The second tier liability created by the Fund Convention 1992 is different 
in character. The defendant is a separate body with legal personality, the IOPC Fund 
1992. The Fund is contributed to by large oil importers in State Parties. This 
represents part of an international compromise, in that it is the shipowners who 
contribute to the first tier and the oil cargo interests who contribute to the second tier. 
Note that it is not the individual owners of cargo on the particular ship that 
contribute, but oil importers in  all  States  Party  to  the  Fund  Convention  1992. 
Payments made by the IOPC Fund will be financed through what is in effect an after 
the event levy paid by companies (not states), in the proportion to which their oil 
imports bear to the total imports of the global membership of the Fund system.
76 In 
practice,  this  means  that  states  in  the  developed  world,  which  are  the  major 
importers of oil, pay for the pollution caused by the transport of oil to their 
industries.
77 Unfortunately the largest importer, the US, is not party to this scheme of 
international co-operation,
78 nor is China (although it is party to the CLC). 
The  Fund  has  its  own  secretariat  which  processes  claims.  Contrary  to 
expectations at the time of the creation of the 1971 Fund, the Fund works very 
closely with the P & I Clubs who insure the first tier.
79 By comparison with the 
ordinary tort system, claims can be paid relatively quickly after incidents
80 and local  
 
 
                                                 
75   See, International Group of P & I Clubs <http://www.igpandi.org/> at 17 July 2008.  
76   A potential weakness of the system is that it depends on the administrative honesty and 
efficiency of states to report fully on oil imports so that contributions can be raised. The 
oil market is such that it is difficult to „hide‟ large imports, but there has been consistent 
non-reporting  from  a  number  of  states.  In  practice,  this  is  probably  not  hugely 
significant, as these are mostly small or failing states, or those where the imports are 
likely to be very low in any event (and see Annual Report 2007, above n 3, 164).  
77   These contributions are mainly from a relatively small number of states. The IOPC 
Funds Annual Reports for 2007 and 2006 show the following contributions by national 
importers as percentages of the total (2006 in brackets): Japan 17.38% (18.27%), Italy 
9.39% (9.81%), Republic of Korea 8.44% (8.32%), India 8.54 (7.52%), Netherlands 
7.08%  (7.49%),  France  6.85%  (7.17%),  U.K.  4.91%  (3.82%),  and  Australia  1.96% 
(2.33%). By contrast the Annual Report 1997 had a similar order of states, with the 
exception of India, as the only major contributor from the developing world, which then 
came in at 3.61%. 
78   It has its own system in the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (101 H.R. 1465, P.L. 101-380). 
79   Even so, there is a potential trap for victims (or their lawyers), in that there is a time bar, 
usually three years, under the CLC and Fund Convention 1992; and it is not sufficient, 
to stop time runn ing against the IOPC Fund, for claims to be brought against the 
shipowner under the CLC. The Fund must be formally notified. 
80   Cf. the 2008 US Supreme Court decision on the Exxon Valdez disaster, Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008), 21 years after the incident. But the result in US law 
was that Exxon spent US$2.1 billion in clean up, settled a civil action to the US and 
Alaska of US$900 million, paid another US$303 million to private parties, and was 
made to pay punitive damages of some $507.5 million. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             115 
 
claims offices have been regularly established. Claims handling is assisted by a clear 
code of jurisdictional cooperation where claims occur in more than one State Party.  
Although legal disputes under the conventions fall for decision by the courts of 
State Parties, the Executive Committee of the Fund
81 has, in effect, developed a 
body of precedent as to the type of claims that are „admissible‟,
82 i.e. which it will 
pay  in  principle  if  quantum  is  proved.  The  practice  of  the  IOPC  Fund  has 
consistently been to make payments to economic loss claimants in certain defined 
circumstances, for example, where the claimant‟s business is closely related to the 
activities of the sea or coastline, such as through tourist hotels or fishing. In this 
sense,  the  Fund  is  achieving  the  aims  of  the  governments  which  established  it, 
namely to pay claims not to resist them. Where the Fund has opposed claims in 
principle, it has usually been upheld by national courts.
83   
 
 
II   SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 2003 
 
A   Need for Supplementary Fund 
 
When  the  CLC  1969  and  Fund  Convention  1971  were  agreed,  the  parties 
assumed  that  the  limits  of  liability  then  settled
84  would be sufficient to cover 
disasters like the Torrey Canyon of 1967. History has shown that the limits have 
become out of date very quickly. There are a number of reasons for this. Inflation 
has been higher than expected, but it is the size and expense of incidents that is the 
biggest factor. It seems as if each major disaster has provided evidence that the 
                                                 
81   The Executive Committee (and to some extent the Assembly) resembles both a tribunal 
and the board of an insurance company. It is not a court in any formal sense, although in 
practice it takes decisions (very often, final) on claims presented by pollution victims. 
The Executive Committee is like the board of directors of a P & I Club because it may 
decide which claims will be paid, knowing that its decisions will have a financial impact 
upon its own interests (in the Fund‟s case, its member states‟ own oil importers). The 
crucial distinction from an insurance company is that the Fund was established by states 
in order to pay claims, rather than to avoid payments where possible. It is a victims‟, not 
a defendants‟, Convention (see Gaskell, above n 63, 165). 
82   The Fund practice was effectively codified in 1994, see the  IOPC Annual Report 2007, 
48 and the 1992 Fund Claims Manual (at <http://www.iopcfund.org/publications.htm> 
at  11  August  2008).  Although  not  legally  binding,  this  Manual  is  an  extremely 
authoritative document, being based on decisions of the IOPC Executive approved by 
the Assembly. Costs of preventive measures are assessed on objective grounds, and do 
not include social or political reasons (eg, where a Government feels bound to take 
measures to meet media and public concern, but which are not justified on grounds of 
reasonableness). See also below Part III(C)(5). 
83   See eg. Landcatch v IOPC Fund [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 316, P & O . Braer [1999] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 534 (the Braer case in Scotland); Algrete Shipping Co Inc v IOPC Fund 
[2003]  1  Lloyd's  Rep.  123  (the  Sea  Empress  case  in  Wales),  where  the  underlying 
reasoning of the courts was probably more restrictive than the normal principles applied 
by the Fund in relation to economic claims (for which see IOPC Annual Report 2007, 
above n 3, 83-84). It is arguable that Australian tort law is closer to the Fund practice 
than that of English law (see, Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law (3
rd ed, 
2004) 581). It is submitted that courts ought to have regard to the principles applied by 
the  Fund  in  interpreting  the  Convention,  particularly  as  an  example  of  developing 
international practice.  
84   See Table 2, above. 116  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
existing limits are not high enough; but when the limits are eventually increased, a 
further disaster shows that the new limits are also inadequate.
85  
It may well be that the level of limits set at any conference, as part of a political 
compromise, will always be conservatively low, but there is another factor at play – 
a  form  of  „claims  creep‟.  As  the  IOPC  Fund  reacts  to  each  disaster,  slowly 
expanding  the  list  of  admissible  claims,  it  seems  that  there  is  a  corresponding 
increase in expectations, and new types of claim emerge. The most significant factor 
has been an increase in the level of economic loss claims, by comparison with pure 
environmental claims (for example, for clean up or restoration). What has happened 
is that a convention system established ostensibly for environmental reasons has 
been  submerged  by  a  tidal  wave  of  claims  by  economic  interests,  for  example, 
relating to tourism, fishing and aquaculture. The size and type of claims received 
seems to grow immediately after each disaster such as the Braer, Erika and Prestige. 
This has had a number of consequences which were largely unforeseen in 1984-1992 
when the present CLC and Fund 1992 system was created. First, the Braer showed 
that a single industry (salmon farming) could itself create losses and claims that 
exceeded the then limits. Secondly, the Erika and Prestige showed that pollution 
over several hundred kilometres of coastline could have widespread effects on an 
entire tourist industry (e.g. on the west coast of France). Thirdly, within a short time 
of such disaster, the claims received (and apparently admissible) tended to exceed 
the available limits. The Fund would then be obliged to stop paying claims in full, 
and to make pro rata payments until the total claims picture could be clarified. In 
practice this would only become clear when the three year time bar expired.  
This pro rating was naturally extremely unpopular, but also led to two further 
consequences.  One  was  that  Governments  felt  reluctant,  for  national  political 
reasons, to submit their own clean-up claims if the effect would be to use up the 
available funds and diminish the total pot. The UK Government, with Braer, and the 
French Government with Erika, actually agreed to postpone their own claims within 
the limitation funds, i.e. to put themselves at the end of a list of citizen claimants.
86 
The irony here is that the very clean-up claims for which the CLC 1969 and Fund 
1971 were established are now being left to the end of the queue or unpaid. The 
other consequence was that many perfectly genuine claims were being delayed or 
reduced because other claimants were making wild or unrealistic economic loss 
claims. There will always be exaggerated claims,
87 but there seems to be a wider 
social phenomenon in play. It is an expectation that Governments will arrange for 
citizens to be compensated economically for any misfortune that affects them, not 
only oil pollution disasters, but natural disasters such as floods or cyclones,
88 as well 
as economic disasters such as banking collapses. The broader question is how far   
 
 
                                                 
85   The increases in limits indicated in Table 2 above, and Table 3 below, can usually be 
traced back to a particular incident. Thus, the Amoco Cadiz sinking in 1978 showed that 
the  original  1969/1971  limits  were  inadequate  and  that  led  to  increases  in  1984 
Protocols  to  the  CLC  and  Fund.  Those  Protocols  never  entered  into  force,  mainly 
because of the unexpected refusal of the US to ratify after Exxon Valdez; but the same 
figures from 1984 were used in the 1992 Protocols, which were in substance identical. 
86   See IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007, above n 3, 48.  
87   The Fund insists on ob jective documentary evidence and has much experience when 
claims for fishing losses diminish once evidence is required of average earnings from 
previous tax returns. 
88   In Australia this might be seen in the calls for assistance after the Queensland floods  in 
2008.  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             117 
 
such expectations can be met, in particular by a compensation system such as that in 
the CLC and Fund where there can be liability without fault. 
It is generally accepted that unlimited liability of a shipowner is not achievable, 
either politically (shipowner states would oppose it), or economically (insurance or 
re-insurance cover might not be obtainable);
89 and states like Japan which provide 
the largest contribution to the Fund are not going to agree to unlimited Fund liability 
as this would be in effect an open ended tax on their oil importers. States such as 
France and the UK which have been victims of big incidents have therefore been 
obliged to press for increases in limits of liability. The figures in Table 3 below show 
how the limits have been increased from 2003. It would have been possible to keep 
increasing the CLC/Fund 1992 limits indefinitely, but there is another factor at play. 
States in the developing world did not see why they should pay (through extra Fund 
contributions) for the particularly high costs of remedying spills in the developed 
world. The existing limits might be perfectly adequate for compensation in the 
developing states, especially where labour is cheap.  
The CLC and Fund 1992 have their own mechanism for increasing limits 
without the need for a new Protocol.
90 Following the Erika disaster in 1999, the IMO 
Legal Committee agreed in 2000 to increase the CLC and Fund limits, as from 2003, 
to those set out below.  
 
Table 3: CLC and Fund Limits from 2003
9 91 1 
1 19 99 92 2   L Li ia ab bi il li it ty y   C Co on nv ve en nt ti io on n   S Sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   L Li im mi it ts s   [ [f fr ro om m   2 20 00 03 3] ]   
   
M Mi in ni im mu um m   s sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   l li ia ab bi il li it ty y: :   4 4. .5 51 1   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $8 8   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
t th he en n   6 63 31 1   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $1 11 12 22 2] ]   p pe er r   t to on n   o of f   s sh hi ip p‟ ‟s s   t to on nn na ag ge e   u up p   t to o   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m: :   8 89 9. .7 77 7   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $1 16 60 0   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
   
1 19 99 92 2   F Fu un nd d   C Co on nv ve en nt ti io on n   L Li im mi it ts s   [ [f fr ro om m   2 20 00 03 3] ]   
   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m: :   2 20 03 3   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A$361 m mi il ll li io on n] ]      
 
Meanwhile, there were extensive debates about whether a more radical reform 
was necessary or possible. France pressed for EU action after the sinking of the 
Erika and the Prestige.  There were proposals within the EU in 2000 for a new 
regime,  known  as  COPE  (Compensation  Fund  for  Oil  Pollution  in  European 
Waters), with a quite different liability regime from that in the CLC/Fund.
92 
In April 2000 the IOPC Fund established a Working Group to reconsider the 
adequacy of the CLC and Fund regime. Amongst the proposals were short term 
revisions (including the possibility of a new third tier Fund) and longer term 
revisions, which might involve major amendments to the CLC/Fund 1992 texts. The 
Supplementary Fund Protocol 2003 was the first stage of that reform process and 
was recognised to be a short to medium term solution to the relatively low overall 
                                                 
89   In theory, the ship owner‟s CLC limits could be broken if there  were deliberate or 
reckless conduct (see Art V(2) CLC 1992), but if there is wilful misconduct this may 
remove the insurance cover (see below Part III (E)(2) and Part III (C)(9)).  
90   See eg, art 15 of the CLC Protocol 1992. 
91   Amendments adopted 18 November 2000, to have effect from 1 November 2003. 
92   This might have had different definitions and liability rules than those in the CLC/Fund, 
with limits possibly set at €1 billion (but much more easily breakable). 118  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
limits available under the CLC/Fund (at least as perceived by some states, such as 
France).
93  
 
    B   Supplementary Fund Protocol Provisions 
 
The Supplementary Fund Protocol 2003 is a very short Protocol to the 1992 
Fund Convention. Its title accurately describes its purpose, namely to supplement the 
Fund Convention 1992. It provides a third tier fund, contributed to by oil receivers 
only. 1992 Fund states can choose to join the Supplementary Fund, or do nothing 
and stay with the 1992 Fund alone. The Supplementary Fund provides an increase in 
limits to a compromise figure, close to the €1 billion proposed within the EU. The 
new third tier limit (i.e. aggregated with CLC and Fund 1992 limits of 203 million 
sdr) is set out in Table 4, below.
94  
 
Table 4: Supplementary Fund 2003 limits 
S Su up pp pl le em me en nt ta ar ry y   F Fu un nd d   P Pr ro ot to oc co ol l   2 20 00 03 3   
   
M Ma ax xi im mu um m: :   7 75 50 0   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $1 1. .3 3   b bi il ll li io on n] ]   
 
The Supplementary Fund Protocol entered into force on 3 March 2005. As at 
31 October 2008 there were 21 States Party to the Protocol. With the exception of 
Japan and Barbados, these states were from the EU.
95 It remains to be seen whether 
the limits of liability are sufficient, or whether they will yet again be tested by a 
major disaster with large economic consequences.  The burden of such a disaster 
will obviously fall on a smaller number of participants,
96 but that is the price they are 
prepared to pay – almost as a form of insurance against a big disaster. The advantage 
for such states will be that if there is a big disaster, it is likely that most admissible 
claims will be paid in full from the start, thereby avoiding unpopular pro-rating. 
The Supplementary Fund has its own administrative organs, e.g. an Assembly 
composed of all States Parties to the Protocol, and this met first in October 2005. In 
practice, although legally separate from the 1992 Fund, the Supplementary Fund is 
administered jointly by the same Director and secretariat as the IOPC Fund 1992. 
There  have  been  no  claims  against  the  Supplementary  Fund  since  its  creation, 
although levies have already been taken to cover advance administrative expenses. 
 
C   Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Act 2008 
 
The 1992 Fund is implemented in Australia by the Protection of the Sea (Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund) Act 1993 (Cth) (OPCF Act).
97 It gives effect to the  
 
                                                 
93   See 92FUND/A.6/4, 10 August 2001, 92FUND/A.6/4/1 14 September 2001,  Annual 
Report 2003, 32.  
94   Conversion of 1 sdr =A$1.7776, as at 14 January 2008: see above n 70. 
95   While Australia has not yet ratified the Convention, it is anticipated that this will occur 
in early 2009. Marine Order 16/2008, 3 September 2008.  
96   In the latest year for which contribution statistics are available (2005), the percentages 
of contributing oil were: Japan 28.91%, Italy 15.63%, Netherland s 11.77%, France 
11.39%, UK 7.9% and Barbados 0.03%. These figures can be compared with those 
under the 1992 Fund (see above Part I(D) and n 77). 
97   For  an  introduction,  see,  Commonwealth,  Parliamentary  Debates,  House  of 
Representatives, 25 June 2008, 7 (Mr Thomson) and Davies and Dickey, above n 83, 
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compensation regime, including the requirements that oil importers keep records of 
relevant cargo receipts  and  make corresponding contributions to the  Fund.  The 
Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth) (2008 Amendment 
Act) amends, amongst a number of instruments, the OPCF Act, giving effect to the 
Supplementary Fund Protocol, paving the way for Australia to become a party.
98 
Recognising that two funds will thereafter exist, the amendments to the legislation 
includes a change in its title, altering the term „Fund‟ to its plural so as to read 
Protection of the Sea (Oil Pollution Compensation Funds) Act 1993 (Cth).
99 
The Supplementary Fund Protocol is incorporated into the OPCF Act, via the 
amendments made in the 2008 Amendment Act, as   directly as possible without 
actually incorporating the Protocol itself, or including it as a Schedule or Annex.
100 
Thus, while some sections provide that certain provisions of the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol will have the force of law in Australia,
101  others  incorporate the 
relevant sections of the Protocol as amended and appropriate for Australia, found 
generally throughout a new Chapter 3A of the OPCF Act.
102    
Importantly, s 46A provides that the „purpose of the Supplementary Fund is to 
provide compensation to a person who has established a claim for compensation for 
certain oil pollution damage and who has not been able to obtain full and adequate 
compensation for the claim from the 1992 Fund, because the damage does or may 
exceed the compensation limits for that Fund.‟ This compensation regime is then 
largely incorporated directly into the OPCF Act,
103 with only some adjustment to 
allow for cross vesting of jurisdiction between Federal and State and Territory 
Supreme Courts.
104  
In the same manner as the 1992 Fund system, the Supplementary Fund 2003 
requires two types of national administrative action. First, there is a need to ensure 
that the appropriate oil importers contribute to the Supplementary Fund when 
required. Secondly, for those importers to be sent bills, the state has an obligation to 
collect statistics in order to report to the Fund which contributors have imported 
more than 150,000 tonnes of oil in the appropriate period.  
The first of these objectives in dealt with in the new Part 3A.5, Division 1  of 
the OPCF Act. Because s 55 of the Australian Constitution provides that laws 
imposing taxation must deal only with taxation, that part of the Fund 1992 dealing 
with financial contributions (in effect levies or taxes) is not dealt with directly in the   
                                                 
98   The 2008 Amendment Act addresses a number of other protection of the sea issues; that is, 
to amend the OPCF Act to give effect to MARPOL amendments (schedule 2), and to 
amend a range of acts that address shipping and marine navigation levies (schedule 3). The 
amendment of the OPFC Act is to take effect on the day the Convention comes into 
force for Australia. The Minister must announce this date by notice in the Gazette. 2008 
Amendment Act, s 2.   
99   The original, and singular, title will be used throughout this article.  
100  2008 Amendment Act Sch 1, s 17 refers to the Australian Treaty Series which contains 
the protocol itself: see Australian Treaty Series [2005] ATNIF 21. 
101  Protection of the Sea (Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) Act 1993 (Cth), s 46E (as 
inserted by Protection of the Sea Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth), Sch 1). 
102  The UK enacted the CLC and Fund Conventions  in the worst way, namely by 
redrafting  the  carefully  weighed  convention  language  into  the  straight -jacket  of 
parliamentary  drafting;  this  has  made  the  UK  provisions  difficult  to  follow,  by 
comparison  with  the  simple  order  of  the  original.  See  generally  N.  Gaskell,  „The 
Interpretation of Maritime Conventions at Common Law‟, in J. P. Gardner (ed.), United 
Kingdom Law in the 1990s (1990) 218, 220. 
103  OPCF Act s 46E.  
104  OPCF Act ss 46F and H. 120  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
OPFC  Act,
105  but  in  three  separate  Acts  relating  exclusively  to  customs  and 
excise.
106 Nevertheless, it is by way of the amendment to the OPCF Act that s 10 of 
the  Supplementary  Fund  Protocol,  which  deals  with  the  liability  to  make 
contributions to the Supplementary Fund, is incorporated by reference to the extent 
that it applies to ports and installations in Australia.
107 Since the liability to make a 
contribution to the Supplementary Fund is imposed on persons in receipt of more 
than 150,000 tonnes of oil, the risk arises that entities will dissociate themselves in 
order to disaggregate the amount of oil imported. The solution provided in art 10 of 
the Protocol is to determine this threshold import quantity by reference to an 
aggregated quantity received by any „associated person‟, which is defined to mean 
„any subsidiary or commonly controlled person‟, though this is to be determined be 
reference to the national law of the State Party. Importantly, this, the amendment to 
the OPCF Act directs, is to be by reference to s 50 of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth).
108  As to the method of calculating the contributions to be made to the 
Supplementary Fund, the legislation merely incorporates directly art 11 of the 
Protocol as applicable.
109 Contributions, including late payment penalties,
110 are to 
be paid to the Commonwealth; all of which is then payable to the Supplementary 
Fund.
111  The  Supplementary  Fund  itself
112  may  recover  contributions  and  late 
payments  directly,  on  behalf  of  the  Commonwealth  as  a  debt  due  to  the 
Commonwealth; though it will not be able to recover any cost or expenses incurred 
in such an action from the Commonwealth.
113     
The second objective is achieved by the new Part 3A.5, Division 3, which 
enables regulations to be made which impose an obligation on parties  to report 
relevant matters allowing for the determination of liability to make contributions.
114 
AMSA  will  be  the  designated  authority  for  the  purposes  of  collecting  this 
information, as already occurs in respect of the existing Fund contributions.
115 An 
offence  of  strict  liability  is  imposed  for  a  failure  to  provide  the  necessary 
information, or to provide false or misleading information.
116 Strict liability was 
considered appropriate not only because the importer of oil is to be expected to be 
fully  aware  of  th e  requirements  of  the  legislation,  including  the  reporting 
requirements, but also because of the detrimental consequences of non compliance, 
including the possible unequal sharing on the burden of costs in the event of an oil 
                                                 
105  OPCF Act s 46J(2).  
106  See: Protection of the Sea (Imposition of Contributions to Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund—Customs) Act 1993 (Cth); Protection of the Sea (Imposition of Contributions to 
Oil  Pollution  Compensation  Fund—Excise)  Act  1993  (Cth);  Protection  of  the  Sea 
(Imposition of Contributions to Oil Pollution Compensation Fund—General) Act 1993 
(Cth); explained in Davies and Dickey, above n 83, 555, 591. 
107  OPCF Act s 46J(1). 
108  OPCF Act  s 46J(3)(b). The  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 50 provides that where a 
body corporate is: (a) a holding company for another body corporate; or (b) a subsidiary 
of another body corporate; or (c) a subsidiary of a holding company or another body 
corporate; the first mentioned body and the other body are related to each other‟.  
109  OPCF Act s 46K. 
110  OPCF Act s 46M. 
111  OPCF Act s 46N. 
112  The Supplementary Fund has the same legal personality as a company  incorporated 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). OPCF Act s 46C. 
113  OPCF Act s 46P. 
114  OPCF Act s 46S. 
115  OPCF Act ss 46R and 43, Sch 1, art 15 .  
116  OPCF Act ss.46T and 46U. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             121 
 
spill  and  a  potentially  detrimental  lack  of  confidence  in  the  oil  industry.
117  The 
existence of strict liability does not, however, mean that no defence is available, and 
defences available to an accused, such as the defence of honest and reasonable 
mistake, are still available.
118 
  
D   More Radical Reform? 
 
Although the Supplementary Fund Protocol was agreed in 2003 and entered 
into force in March 2005, the nine meetings of the IOPC Fund Working Group 
between 2000 – 2005 considered potentially more radical changes to the CLC/Fund 
system. A group of seven States, including Australia, France and the UK, identified 
a rather longer list of possible reforms.
119     
It may be helpful to give an outline indication of the range of issues that were 
canvassed before 2005, as these will give an insight  into the defects identified by 
some States in the current CLC/Fund system.   
 
a)  Should  changes  be  made  to  the  liability  scheme  of  the  CLC/Fund 
System?
120  
b)  Should it be made easier to „break‟ limitation?
121 
c)  Should the channelling protection of the CLC 1992 be removed?
122 
d)  Should individual cargo owners (or charterers) be made liable if they use 
substandard ships? 
e)  Should there be compulsory insurance for all oil tankers?
123 
f)  Should the definition of „ship‟ be changed?
124 
                                                 
117  Explanatory  Memorandum,  Protection  of  the  Sea  Legislation  Amendment  Bill  2008 
(Cth) 15-16. 
118  Ibid 16. 300 penalty units are imposed for a failure to give information or oil import 
returns to AMSA, and 500 penalty units imposed for the intentional lodgement of false 
information or returns. These are in line with those that alread y exist under the OPCF 
Act ss 45 and 46. 
119  See eg, 92FUND/WGR.3/5/1, 26 February 2001. 
120  For example an extension to the somewhat restrictive definition of environmental 
damage in art I(6) (see below Part III(C)(5)); or an express terrorism defence for 
shipowners post 9/11, even though the system has been in operation since the 1971 
Fund Convention (see Part III(C)(4)).  
121  For example, so that the shipowner‟s right would be lost if there was a „substandard 
ship‟;  or  if  there  was  misconduct  of  servants  or  agents  (and  not  only  the  senior 
management of the shipowner); or if a gross negligence test was used as in the EC 
Directive on Ship Source Pollution 2005/35/EC (instead of recklessness). Cf below Part 
III(E)(2). 
122  For example by reverting to the CLC 1969  which did not specifically exclude the 
liability of salvors or charterers. The latter, in particular, might be worth targeting as 
they might be hiring substandard ships cheaply. It makes no sense to make salvors 
liable, as that would only deter responders  who could reduce pollution (Cf below Part 
III(C)(8)).  
123  The CLC only requires insurance certificates for tankers actually carrying  more that 
2000 tonnes in bulk. Increased certification would impose additional burdens on States 
and there was little evidence that tankers did not already have cover, see eg. with a P & 
I Club. Cf below Part III(C)(9). 
124  The CLC covers oil tankers, in a very complex definition in art 1, but there have been 
uncertainties about categories of „vessels‟ that may be used for oil storage services, for 
example where wastes are stored in a permanently moored „tanker‟. There have also 
been debates about FPSOs (Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessels), see eg, 
when they are in transit. These are the sort of technical legal issues that can probably be 
agreed by the Executive Committee, or ultimately by national courts. 122  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
g)  Should the mechanism for increasing limits be changed?
125 
h)  Should other miscellaneous „house-keeping‟ changes be considered?
126    
 
All of these issues were reasonable debating points, but their very diversity 
meant that it would become almost impossible to achieve unanimity – while at the 
same time there  was a threat that the established system (with its  strengths and 
weaknesses) could be undermined. One of the EU Commission criticisms was that 
the focus was too much on compensation rules, but that there was no deterrent to the 
actual  polluter.  It  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  shipowner  could  rely  on  virtually 
unbreakable liability limits and that cargo owners had no direct liability and were 
covered in a sense by the IOPC Fund. The Commission response was to assert that 
there was a need for greater criminal sanctions,
127 but the EU debate goes beyond 
this article.
128  But a crucial question concerned the purpose of any legislative 
change: was it to benefit victims, or to rebalance liabilities as between ship and cargo 
interests?  
For at the same time as the debates about radical changes, mainly to increase 
liabilities, there was a dispute between the two sides of the industry as to who should 
be paying for any such increases. The oil industry saw in the introduction of the new 
Supplementary Fund an increase in their contributions to a third tier, and sought a 
better balance with the shipowner interests (whose liabilities were not increased by 
the Supplementary Fund Protocol). This balance was at the heart of the 1969/1971 
compromise.  
An IOPC study
129 showed that there had been 5,802 incidents in the period 
1978-2002 (excluding the USA). Of these, the shipping industry paid 45% of costs 
and oil cargo interests paid 55% of costs. The study also showed that where the 
tanker was under 20,000 gt the effect of the CLC limits was that cargo interests paid 
proportionately more than shipowners. For tankers between 20,000 – 80,000 gt, the 
burden  was  borne  equally.  For  tankers  over  80,000  gt  shipowners  paid 
proportionately more.
130 Moreover, if one inflated these old costs to 2002 and 2012 
monetary values, there was an overall increase in cargo contributions by comparison 
with shipowners. Various complicated alternatives were suggested to achieve a 
rebalancing, including a four tier system, a split third tier, and a shared (not staged) 
third tier.  
 
                                                 
125  For example by revising the „tacit amendment procedure‟ in art 15 of the CLC Protocol 
1992  to  allow  for  automatic  uplifts,  rather  than  requiring  a  lengthy  process  for 
proposing and agreeing new limits. There are constitutional implications here for some 
states in allowing another body to determine financial figures. 
126  For example on quorum, or sanctions on states which did not provide regular reports to 
the Fund on oil imports: see above n 76. 
127  In July 2005 two measures were agreed, an EC Directive on ship source pollution and 
the  introduction  of  sanctions  for  infringements  (2005/35/EC)  and  an  EC  Council 
Framework Decision (2005/667) 
128  Eventually, the EU agreed not to enact measures conflicting with the CLC/Fund system 
and the EC Directive on Environmental Liability 2004/35/EC Art 4(2) now contains 
exceptions so that it does not affect rights under international agreements on civil 
liability: Annex IV excludes the IMO Conventions on CLC, Fund, HNS, and Bunkers. 
In October 2008, the EU Council agreed to withdraw  civil liability provisions from 
another controversial draft directive (COM/2007/0674 final), so that it only dealt with 
issues such as compulsory insurance of shipowners: see, press release no. 276 13649/08. 
129  92FUND/WGR.3/22, 14 May 2004.  
130  As a result of the sliding scale on which limits are calculated according to the tonnage 
of the ship: see Table 3, above. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             123 
 
The P & I Clubs (the main payers of the first tier) agreed at the 2003 diplomatic 
conference to produce a voluntary scheme in which they accepted higher limits for 
small  ships.  This  was  called  the  Small  Tanker  Oil  Pollution  Indemnification 
Agreement (STOPIA). Under this the Clubs promised to indemnify the IOPC Fund 
for all claims up to 20 million sdr [about A$36 million] if the CLC 1992 limit was 
lower (e.g. for ships under 29,548 gt). STOPIA was to apply to pollution damage in 
Supplementary Fund states (from 3 March 2005 when the Fund entered into force). 
This concession was to apply in those states, even if the Supplementary Fund was 
not needed (i.e. if the 1992 Fund limits were sufficient).  
It was not clear if this would be enough to satisfy the oil industry, which really 
wanted shipowners to contribute to the third tier Supplementary Fund. There were 
industry negotiations about how to meet this demand, and eventually in 2005 the 
Clubs proposed an alternative to STOPIA, namely TOPIA (the Tanker Oil Pollution 
Indemnification  Agreement).
131  Under  this,  the  Clubs agreed to indemnify  the 
Supplementary Fund for 50% of amounts paid by the Supplementary Fund. This was 
part of a bigger aim to head off any more radical changes to the CLC/Fund system, 
and (somewhat naively) stated that the TOPIA offer was conditional on there being 
no further convention revisions.
132  
The IOPC Working Group, in its final meeting in March 2005, was unable to 
reach agreement on whether to revise the conventions, or to accept t he voluntary 
proposals in STOPIA or TOPIA.
133 It decided to leave final decisions for the IOPC 
Fund Assembly which was due to meet from 17 -21 October 2005 to consider the 
way forward. The Working Group, however, put two questions back to the Clubs: 
would they be prepared to extend STOPIA to  all 1992 Fund parties (not simply 
those who were also parties to the Supplementary Fund 2003), and would the Clubs 
implement both STOPIA and TOPIA?
 134 
Before the Fund Assembly meeting, a „Group of 11 States‟
135 accepted that 
some of the more radical proposals for change were not acceptable
136 but continued 
to press for limited revisions in six areas,
137 while expressing concern about the 
nature of voluntary agreements by contrast with convention revisions. Shipowner 
states, such as Greece, had consistently opposed the revisions – partly out of a fear 
that the CLC limits themselves would be revisited. There was also a recognition that 
there were nearly 100 Fund Member States who were party to a system that was 
working, and that revisions could undermine it. 
On 14 October 2005 there was a dramatic last minute submission by the Clubs. 
They  offered  to  extend  STOPIA  to  all  1992  CLC  States,  and  to  share  in  the 
Supplementary Fund through TOPIA.
138 The submission also addressed four other 
concerns.  
 
(i)  The recognition of the legal status of STOPIA and TOPIA as contractual 
documents, rather than as international instruments.  The Clubs agreed to 
give notice if for any reason they wanted to withdraw. Most tankers in the 
 
                                                 
131  See 92FUND/WGR.3/25/2, 4 February 2005. 
132  Such a negotiating ploy, appropriate in commercial negotiations, was not calculated to 
be well received by sovereign states addressed by an NGO. 
133  See the final report of the Working Group, 92FUND/A.10/7, 10 May 2005. 
134  Ibid, para 6.14. 
135  Including Australia, New Zealand, France and the UK: see 92FUND/A.10/7/5, 16 
September 2005. 
136  For example increasing the limits and changing the test for breaking limits. 
137  Including compulsory insurance for all ships, and the definition of „ship‟. 
138  92FUND/A.7/3/1, 14 October 2005. 124  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
 world would be covered through automatic STOPIA entry (there were 
already 5,460 entered).
139 The Clubs would also supply to the IOPC Fund 
a monthly „Entered List‟ of tankers.  
(ii)  There would be a reconsideration of the ship/cargo liability balance in 
2010. 
(iii)  The Clubs also agreed to revise the 1980 Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Clubs and the IOPC Fund on the handling of claims. 
(iv)  A Working Group should be established to address ship standards from 
the insurance perspective. 
 
In the debates at the Assembly,
140 States were divided on whether the limited 
revisions proposed by the Group of 11 should proceed. The EU stated that it wished 
to preserve the  global character of the existing system,  but that if there  was 
fragmentation,  the  EU  would  look  to  „regional  solutions‟.
141  There  was  a  slight 
majority for the Greek view and not sufficient support for that of the Group of 11. 
The conclusion was that it was agreed to terminate the Working Group, that the 
revision of the CLC/Fund system be removed from the Agenda, and that terms of 
reference be set out for a Working Group on the Safety of Navigation. The Clubs 
agreed to revise the wording of their proposals for the 2006 Assemblies of the 1992 
and Supplementary Funds.  
Revised  versions  of  STOPIA  and  TOPIA  were  agreed  in  February  2006, 
entered into force on 20 February 2006
142 and a memorandum of understanding was 
signed on 19 April 2006 between the Funds and the Clubs concerning claims 
procedures.
143 Under STOPIA 2006 the minimum tanker liability is as set out in 
Table 5: 
 
Table 5: STOPIA limit 
S ST TO OP PI IA A   2 20 00 06 6   
   
S Sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   m mi in ni im mu um m   l li ia ab bi il li it ty y: :   2 20 0   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   l li ia ab bi il li it ty y   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $3 36 6   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
 
STOPIA 2006 applies to all parties to the 1992 Fund (not only to the parties to 
the  Supplementary Fund Protocol). STOPIA 2006 provides an  indemnity by the 
shipowner involved to the difference between the limitation amount applicable to the 
ship under the CLC 1992 and the total amount of the admissible claims or 20 million 
sdr, whichever is less. It is given to the 1992 Fund, and does not give rights to 
claimants,  but  will  be  reviewed  after  10  years.  STOPIA  2006  is  probably  a 
recognition  that  the  minimum  CLC  1992  limit  of  4.51  million  sdr  (about  A$8 
million) is inadequate. The Clubs were probably prepared to make the concession 
because an amendment to the CLC by a new Protocol would almost certainly have 
                                                 
139  In 2007/8 there were 4,540 tankers entered in STOPIA (and 361 which were not), a 
92.6% coverage: See IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007, above n 3, 43.  
140  See, 92FUND/A.10/37, 21 October 2005, 92 FUND/A/ES.10/13, 1 February 2006, para 
5.5.  
141  See, 92FUND/A.10/37, para 8.25. 
142  See, 92FUND/A/ES.10/3, 1 February 2006 for the text of the agreements and the 
summary in the IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007, above n 3, 42-44. See also, P & I Club 
information, see eg, „STOPIA and TOPIA 2006 – What, why and when?‟, 182 Gard 
News, 9 (at <http://www.gard.no> at 17 July 2008),         and            West of England P 
&  I  Club  Notice  to  Members  No.  13  2005/2006 
(<http://www.westpandi.com/WestPandI/NoticesToMembers> at 17 July 2008). 
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raised the net liability costs, or resulted in a fracturing of the system with consequent 
uncertainties. 
Under TOPIA 2006, the shipowners (in practice, the P & I Clubs) agree to 
indemnify the Supplementary Fund for 50% of claims falling on the Supplementary 
Fund. It applies to all sizes of tankers and will again be reviewed after 10 years. 
The upshot of all this activity is that when Australia accepts the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol it does so as part of a larger compromise package that does not appear 
in  the  Protocol.  The  STOPIA  2006  and  TOPIA  2006  agreements  do  not  affect 
individual claimants.
144 They will, however, affect the levies that may be borne by 
oil importers in the states affected.  
 
 
III   BUNKER OIL CONVENTION 2001 
 
A   Need for further Pollution Conventions? 
 
After the CLC 1969 and Fund Convention 1971, it was recognised that there 
needed to be further protection from pollution other than by oil cargoes. The other 
obvious sources of pollution were chemical and other hazardous cargoes, and the 
fuel oil (bunkers) carried in practically all ships.
145   
When the CLC and Fund Convention were revised in 1984, following the 
Amoco Cadiz sinking off France in 1978, a number of delegations tried to include 
bunker pollution generally (i.e. from non-tankers) within the CLC regime. This was 
resisted, mainly by shipowners, but also by oil importing interests who did not see 
why they should contribute to pollution incidents caused, e.g. by the operation of 
large dry bulk carriers. In retrospect this was perhaps unfortunate. Even so, it was 
agreed to include within the CLC/Fund regime the bunkers carried in oil tankers 
(even when the tanker was in ballast).
146  
It was recognised that the decision not to include bunker spills (from all ships 
generally) in the CLC/Fund regime left a gap in environmental protection, but after 
1992 the more serious need was to cover the possibility of a major disaster from a 
ship carrying hazardous and noxious cargoes other than oil. This was addressed in 
the HNS Convention 1996.
147 In effect, the HNS Convention will provide CLC and 
Fund type protection (but in a single convention) for pollution incidents involving 
hazardous and noxious substances other than oil: in other words, pollution from the 
cargoes  of  chemical  carriers,  LPG  and  LNG  carriers,  and  dangerous  cargo  on 
container ships. Unfortunately, there have been huge practical difficulties in finding 
a way to implement the second tier HNS Fund contribution system, largely because 
                                                 
144  Unlike the TOVALOP and CRISTAL voluntary agreements, which ceased to operate in 
1997  (see,  IOPC,  Brief  History  <http://www.iopcfund.org/history.htm>  at  6  October 
2008). 
145  Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) is amongst the most damaging and persistent of bunker fuels. 
According to ITOPF heavy fuel oil is in Category 4 (of 4) for specific gravity, and lacks 
volatility  and  viscosity,  which  precl udes  evaporation  and  dispersion:  see  ITOPF 
Handbook 2008/09, 12, and <http://www.itopf.com/uploads/itopfhandbook2007.pdf> at 
30 September 2008. As a relatively low value refined product HFO may well be carried 
as cargo in cheaper and older ships eg, the Erika. See also below Part III(C)(1).  
146  See, art I (5) CLC 1992. 
147  The Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996 (the HNS Convention) 
(adopted 3 May 1996, not yet in force). 126  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
of the number and variety of the potential contributors.
148 A majority of states has 
apparently concluded that these difficulties cannot be resolved with the present text 
of the HNS Convention 1996. The Assembly of the IOPC Fund 1992 established an 
HNS Focus Group which produced a Draft Protocol to the Convention. This  was 
put before the 94
th Session of the IMO Legal Committee in October 2008.
149 There it 
was agreed that packaged HNS should not contribute to the HNS Fund, but that 
liability  caused  by  such  cargo  would  still  be  covered,  albeit  with  “moderate” 
increases in shipowners‟ limits of liability in such cases. The draft Protocol will be 
finalised at a diplomatic conference in 2010. This will fix the new packaged HNS 
limits, although the existing HNS 1996 limits of liability (Table 6, below), will not 
be altered, even though they now seem low by comparison with the Supplementary 
Fund.  
 
Table 6: HNS Convention 1996 limits 
H Ha az za ar rd do ou us s   a an nd d   N No ox xi io ou us s   S Su ub bs st ta an nc ce es s   C Co on nv ve en nt ti io on n   1 19 99 96 6   
   
S Sh hi ip po ow wn ne er r   1 1
s st t   t ti ie er r   m ma ax xi im mu um m   l li ia ab bi il li it ty y: :   1 10 00 0   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r      [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $   1 17 78 8   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
H HN NS S   F Fu un nd d   2 2
n nd d   t ti ie er r   m ma ax xi im mu um m   l li ia ab bi il li it ty y: :   2 25 50 0   m mi il ll li io on n   s sd dr r   [ [a ab bo ou ut t   A A$ $   4 44 44 4   m mi il ll li io on n] ]   
 
In the negotiations which led to the HNS Convention, there were proposals to 
include bunker spills within that regime, but the Legal Committee was divided from 
the earliest discussions.
150 One fear was that if bunkers were to be included within 
the scope of the HNS Convention,  all  ships  would  need  HNS  certificates  even 
though they would never carry hazardous and noxious substances. This was a fear 
related more to practicality than substance, as many were concerned about the need 
to bring an HNS Convention into force as soon as possible and any widening of its 
scope  might  have  created  even  more  delay.  The  65th  Session  of  the  Legal 
Committee in  September 1991 established a  small Working Group of Technical 
Experts  on  Bunker  Fuel  Oils  (for  non-tankers),  but  it  was  not  able  to  reach  a 
consensus.
151  Most delegations favoured the inclusion of bunker fuels within an 
HNS regime.
152 The Legal Committee noted the differences of opinion, but  there 
was support for the view that there should be no contribution to a second tier HNS 
Fund by such cargoes in any event. At the 67th Session of the Legal Committee in 
September 1992 an indicative vote was held as to whether bunker fuel oil should be 
included in the HNS Convention. 20 delegations were against and 11 in favour of   
 
                                                 
148  The  IOPC  secretariat  has  identified  three  key  issues  inhibiting  entry  into  force: 
contributions to the separate LNG account (the HNS Fund is unfortunately divided into 
contribution sectors for different pollutants); the concept of „receiver‟ (i.e. who will 
contribute);  and  the  non-submission  by  States  of  reports  of  cargo  which  could 
potentially contribute to the HNS Fund (especially packaged HNS): see the Report of 
the 93
rd Session of the Legal Committee (LEG 93/13, 2 November 2007, 8, et seq.). For 
draft  text,  see,  ITOPC  Fund  Doc.  92FUND/A/ES.13/5/3,  24  June  2008    (IOPC, 
<http://docs.iopcfund.org/ds/engframeset.html> at 17 July 2008).  
149  LEG 93/13, 2 November 2007, paras. 6.4, 6.5. See also the Report of the 94
th Session, 
LEG  94/12,  31  October  2008,  para  4.1-4.71  and  Annex  2;  and 
<http://www.hnsconvention.org> at 22 July 2008.   
150  Nicholas Gaskell, „The Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage 
Resulting from the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances‟ in P. Wetterstein, 
and A. Beijer, (eds.) Essays in Honour of Hugo Tiberg (1996) 225, 251. 
151  LEG 65/8, 11 October 1991. 
152  Ibid, para 13. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             127 
 
inclusion (with four abstentions). The Committee decided, therefore, to leave bunker 
fuel oils outside its further work on hazardous and noxious substances, and the HNS 
Convention  1996  does  not  therefore  cover  bunker  pollution.
153  However, it was 
agreed that separate consideration was needed to deal with bunkers. 
Many delegations at the IMO Legal Committee debates in the late 1990s 
recognised that bunker spills were a great source o f pollution and there was an 
assumption that they accounted for a significant number of pollution incidents. 
Statistics on oil tankers provided by ITOPF
154 show that the number of large spills 
has declined considerably in the previous 36 years. Bunkering spi lls (i.e. during 
loading of bunkers) were only 2% of causes of spills of up to 700t, with accidents of 
various kinds being the largest cause (these could include bunker loss), but the 
biggest cause of large tanker spills was groundings (34%) and collisions  (28%) – 
both of which could equally apply to ordinary cargo ships carrying bunkers. An 
ITOPF paper in 1996 noted that although comprehensive data on bunker spills did 
not exist, the available evidence pointed to the number of bunker spills, government 
responses and claims sometimes coming close to or exceeding those for tankers. 
AMSA  figures  then  showed  that  oil  tankers  were  responsible  for  only  22%  of 
significant  spills  requiring  some  form  of  response  and  that  the  Government‟s 
average response costs for the 12 largest spills was five times as much for non-
tankers (mostly for HFO), than for tankers.
155 It was for these reasons that, in the 
1990s, states like Australia and the UK pressed for action on bunker pollution, 
particularly as they were concerned with the problem of uninsured vessels.
156 While 
the spills might be relatively small, recovery of damages was potentially expensive, 
difficult or impossible  –  especially  where  the  ship  was  owned  by  a  single  ship 
company.
157  
 
B   Bunker Oil Convention Negotiations 1995-2001 
 
Once  it  was  decided  that  the  bunker  question  needed  dealing  with  in  an 
instrument separate from the CLC 1992 and HNS Convention, the question arose as 
to how this was to be done. One indirect way of achieving international agreement 
had been suggested by Australia back at the 72nd Session of the Legal Committee in 
April 1995, namely by the introduction of a requirement for compulsory insurance 
for ships calling at its ports.
158 The issue of compulsory insurance (generally) then 
                                                 
153  LEG 67/9, 13 October 1992, para 45. An attempt to reintroduce bunker oils was rejected 
at the 72nd Session in 1995. 
154  The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd (ITOPF) is one of the main 
consultancies used by the 1992 Fund to assess the technical and environmental effects 
of  spills  and  is  recognised  internationally  as  being  hig hly  authoritative  (and 
independent,  despite  its  title).  See,  ITOPF  Handbook  2008/09,  10-12 
<http://www.itopf.com/uploads/itopfhandbook2007.pdf>  at  30  September  2008.  See 
also above, Part I(C). 
155  See LEG 74/4/2, 9 August 1996, Annex. 
156  Recommendation 13 of „Ships of Shame‟ (1992) called for compulsory insurance for 
ships visiting Australia. The UK suffered an increasing number of small bunker spills 
off its coasts, eg. from the Borodinskoye Polye, off Shetland in 1993, an uninsured fish 
factory ship. Another spill involved the small container ship Cita off the Scilly Isles in 
1997. In both instances there were expensive clean up operations (of over £100,000).  
157  For further details of the experience of individual states, see, LEG 75/5/1, 17 February 
1997. 
158  See, LEG 72/8/3, 27 February 1995, reiterating an earlier paper MEPC 36/21/6, 8 
August 1994. At  a national level compulsory insurance was introduced as Part III of the 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth) by the 2000 Act, see below Part 
III(D).     128  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
became firmly on the agenda of the Legal Committee after the agreement of the 
HNS Convention 1996. 
At the 73
rd Session of the IMO Legal Committee in October 1995 it was agreed 
that liability for bunkers was to be the top priority in future work,
159 and by 1996 
Australia took a leading role in presenting a draft free-standing convention.
160 By 
1997, there were still states that did not see the need for a new convention
161 but all 
agreed that work was to continue. By the 76th Session in October 1997 the agenda 
still included consideration of bunkers, but there was also parallel consideration of 
the question of compulsory insurance for ships‟ liabilities generally. This involved 
the possibility of  creating a general instrument to provide for compulsory insurance 
and direct action. Later this became more focussed on the need to provide „evidence 
of financial security‟
162 for particular types of victim. A paper was put forward by 
five states, led by Australia, which included the text of a free standing Bunker Oil 
Convention and an alternative text in the form of a Protocol to the CLC 1992.
163  
At the 77th Session of the Legal Committee in April 1998 the Australian 
proposal was presented in more detail.
164 Most delegations were in favour of a free-
standing Convention and it was agreed to proceed  on that basis, with the CLC 
Protocol solution being a „reserve‟ if the Convention alternative was found to be 
unworkable.
165  It was agreed that the draft should be based on a strict liability 
regime for pollution damage from bunkers (and not for other damage   such as 
explosions). In general it was agreed that the limits of liability should be tied in some 
way to those under the LLMC 1996.
166 There was support for a US proposal (based 
upon its experience under its Oil Pollution Act 1990) that liability be channelled to a 
limited number of persons, rather than to the registered shipowner alone. There was 
less agreement as to whom the responsible person or persons should be and whether 
to include owners and operators (such as bareboat charterers). There was discussion 
as to the form of any compulsory insurance provision, with the P & I Clubs pointing 
to certificates of entry as satisfactory evidence. 
The question of compulsory insurance cut across many areas, including bunker, 
passenger and wreck liabilities. In particular, it seemed anomalous that there were 
compulsory insurance requirements for some pollution liabilities at sea (under the 
CLC  1992  and  the  HNS  Convention),  but  not  others.  The  debates  centred  on 
whether  to  have  a  single  free-standing  convention  on  compulsory  insurance 
generally,  or  (for  bunkers,  sea  passengers  and  wreck)  by  separate  liability 
conventions or protocols.  
 
 
 
                                                 
159  Following  submissions  by  Australia  on  the  need  for  compulsory  insurance,  and  the 
tabling of the earliest draft of a free-standing convention put forward by five other states 
in LEG 73/12/1, 12 September 1995.  
160  LEG 74/4/1, 9 August 1996.  
161  LEG 75/5/1, 17 February 1997. 
162  The wider expression was meant to indicate that there may be other types of acceptable 
security, such as bank guarantees, although there is little evidence that these are used in 
practice.  A  Correspondence  Group  on  Pr ovision  of  Financial  Security  had  been 
established which had produced a general report on claims covered by P & I Clubs: see, 
LEG/76/3/1, 9 September 1997. 
163  See, LEG 76/4/1, 8 August 1997.   
164  See, LEG 77/6/1, 13 February 1998. 
165  See, LEG 77/11, 28 April 1998, 16-20. 
166  This was a crucial decision, see below Part III(E).  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             129 
 
For those opposed to any new general convention on compulsory insurance 
(especially shipowners and the P & I Clubs), it made sense to dilute such an attack 
by resolving particular problems, presented by the absence of insurance, through 
separate legal instruments. The work of the Legal Committee became fragmented 
because of the continuing juggling for priority of the bunkers, passenger and wreck 
proposals. Priority was ultimately given to the work on bunkers, probably because 
work on that  was considered simpler and more advanced. This was in no small 
measure due to the lead taken by Australia in the drafting work. That work continued 
from 1998-2000
167 and culminated in the Bunker Oil Convention 2001.
168 
This article will first analyse the key liability provisions of the Bunker Oil 
Convention, and then consider the Australian implementation legislation, including 
some of the particular ancillary provisions introduced in that legislation. 
 
C   The Regime of the Bunker Oil Convention 
 
The Bunker Oil Convention was eventually adopted in London on 23 March 
2001.  The  diplomatic  conference  had  very  little  time  available  to  make  any 
substantive changes to the draft that had emerged from the Legal Committee,
169 and 
the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the diplomatic conference was able 
to achieve a compromise package on the three main outstanding political issues.
170 
The shipowner states fought a rearguard action by proposing relatively high entry 
into force requirements in art 14, probably in the hope that this might delay entry 
into force (maybe indefinitely).
171 The attitude of the EU states individually and as a 
block was always going to be highly significant both in negotiations
172 and in  
                                                 
167  See  eg,  LEG  78/5/2, 14  August  1998;  LEG  78/11, 2  November  1998,  15-19;  LEG 
79/6/1, 12 February 1999; LEG 79/11, 12 April 1999;  14-18; LEG 80/4/1, 13 August 
1999; LEG 80/11, 25 October 1999, .12-17; LEG 81/4, 21 January 2000; LEG 81/11, 12 
April 2000,  4-15. The final draft agreed in April 2000 was issued as LEG/CONF.12/3, 
14 August 2000.  
168  Other  financial  security  issues,  concerning  passengers  and  wreck  removal,  were 
resolved by the Athens Convention 2002 and the Wreck Removal Convention 2007.  
169  LEG/CONF.12/3, 14 August 2000.  
170  Namely the minimum tonnage threshold for compulsory insurance, the conditions for 
entry into force and the possibility of excluding ships on purely dome stic voyages: see 
LEG/CONF.12/CW/WP.2, 21 March 2001 and below Part III(C)(9), Part III(C)(2).  
171  Under art 14, the Convention was to enter into force one year following the date on 
which 18 states including 5 whose combined gross tonnage is not less than 1 million gt, 
had ratified it. The tonnage requirement is one more usually found in the IMO public 
law Conventions and is justified on the basis of trying to achieve compliance by a large 
part of the world fleet. This argument has some force where it is s ought to have 
insurance certificates issued for a large number of ships, but it might be thought that the 
Bunker Oil Convention 2001 was driven by the needs of  coastal states, rather than flag 
states. By comparison with other IMO liability conventions the figure of 18 states was 
also high; the later Wreck Removal Convention 2007 art 18 reverted to a more normal 
10 states requirement with no tonnage factor. 
172  There had been problems in the negotiations owing to the ever-widening competence of 
the EU as an institution. Under Council Regulation 44/2001, the EU now has exclusive 
competence  on  matters  of  jurisdiction  and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of 
judgments (now in art 9 and 10 of the Bunker Oil Convention 2001). A very late attempt 
to  introduce  a  provis ion  preserving  the  EU  Commission‟s  competence  over 
jurisdictional issues (see, LEG/CONF.12/CW/Wp.3, 22 March 2001) failed at the 2001 
diplomatic conference, although similar text later found its way into the Athens Protocol 
2002 (on passenger liabilities).  130  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
achieving  ratification.  In  September  2002  a  European  Council  decision
173  was 
agreed to authorise EU member states to ratify or accede with a deadline, if possible, 
of 30 June 2006. In fact, it took Sierra Leone‟s ratification in November 2007 for the 
necessary number of ratifications to be achieved, so that the Bunker Oil Convention 
entered into force on 21 November 2008.
174 
In many ways the Bunker Oil Convention follows the CLC regime.
175  It 
provides for the strict liability of shipowners, and some others, for pollution caused 
by bunker oils, requires the registered shipowners of ships over 1,000 gt to maintain 
insurance, and allows claimants to sue the insurer directly. 
The Bunker Oil Convention is different from the CLC/Fund model as: 
 
  it has a different definition of oil; 
  there is no second tier „Fund‟;  
  claims are not channelled only to the registered shipowner; 
  there is no civil responder immunity; 
  it sets out no limits of liability of its own; 
  the compulsory insurance requirement is set at 1,001 gt and not to ships 
carrying a minimum of 2,000 tonnes of oil cargo. 
 
1  Scope of ‘Bunker oil‟ 
 
„Bunker oil‟ is defined in art 1(5)
176 to mean: 
 
[a]ny hydrocarbon mineral oil, including lubricating oil, used or intended to be used 
for the operation or propulsion of the ship, and any residues of such oil. 
 
The definition therefore goes beyond the normal meaning of bunkers as fuel, in 
order to cover lube oil, and unlike the CLC there is no reference to „persistent‟, so it 
covers HFO and lighter fuels such as marine diesels. The term „residues‟ is not 
further defined, and does not appear in the CLC definition of „oil‟, but when used in 
the CLC art I(1), it seems to refer to cargo remaining in a tank after discharge (e.g. 
the  unpumpable  cargo  which  solidifies  in  a  hold  or  clings  to  a  tank‟s  walls). 
Transposed to the Bunker Oil Convention, that could cover HFO in a nearly empty 
fuel tank. There seems no reason why it should also not apply to the remains of such 
bunker oils in other contexts, e.g. after sea action has caused them to become a 
mousse, or they have dried out into tar-like remains on a beach.
177 It would also 
seem that the definition would cover cases such as the Pacific Quest,
178 where a  
 
                                                 
173  2002/762/EC (at the Environmental Council).  
174  As at 31 October 2008, there were 22 States Party, having 28% of the world tonnage. 
175  See  above  Part  I(D)  and  M.  Tsimplis,  „The  Bunker  Pollution  Convention  2001: 
Completing  and  Harmonising  the  Liability  Regime  for  Oil  Pollution  from  Ships?‟ 
(2005) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 83. 
176  The definitions section (s 3) of the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) does not include this specific definition of „bunker 
oil‟, even though it reproduces other definitions in art 1 (see below Part III(D)). As a 
matter of construction of the Act it is necessary to use the Convention definition when 
interpreting  the  expression  when  it  is  found  in  other  provisions  of  the  Convention 
applied by s 11.  
177  In fact, the CLC practice treats such remains and wastes as being within the CLC 
definition of „oil‟, even without mention of residues. 
178  See, above n 50.  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             131 
 
cargo ship makes an operational discharge of a fuel oil/water mixture, e.g. from 
bilges or tank cleaning, even when there is no casualty. 
Article 4(1) addresses the question of overlap with the CLC 1992.
179 
 
This Convention shall not apply to pollution damage as defined in the Civil Liability 
Convention, whether or not compensation is payable in respect of it under that 
Convention. 
 
The effect of this is to exclude claims which are within the CLC
180 – even if 
compensation is not payable under the CLC.
181 Bunker pollution from oil tankers is 
therefore still covered by the CLC.
182 
Both the CLC 1992 (art IV) and the Bunker Oil Convention (art 5) have a 
provision for joint and several liability (unless damage is severable) where two ships 
cause pollution.
183 These provisions are designed for circumstances where the same 
Convention applies to both ships (i.e. two tankers, or two container ships), but do not 
apply directly where there is an incident involving a „hybrid spill‟, e.g. an oil cargo 
spillage from an oil tanker and also bunkers from, say, a container ship. Here there 
may be difficult questions as to which Convention will apply.
184 There seems to be 
no reason in principle  why  damage  which  is clearly separable should not be 
apportioned to the specific Convention,
185 but this possibility is highly unlikely in 
most spillages where the oils will be mixed. Courts will be aware that, for claimants, 
it will generally be better for the CLC to apply, as there are higher limits of liability 
and the Funds exist as a second and third tier. The premise of art 4(1) of the Bunker 
Oil Convention is that one looks first to the CLC and the better solution in practice 
would be for this Convention to apply unless it can clearly be said that some part of 
the damages is separable and applicable to the Bunker Oil Convention. The Bunker  
                                                 
179  States  also  need  to  ensure  there  is  no  overlap  with  national  legislation.  For  the 
Australian position, see below Part III(D). 
180  The wording of art 4.1 does not refer to „claims‟ within the CLC, but to „pollution 
damage as defined‟ in the CLC. However, the CLC definition refers to pollution damage 
by contamination „resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship‟, which in 
turn refers back to the CLC definitions of the ship (i.e. a tanker within art I(1)) and oil 
(which under art I(1) is that carried as cargo or bunkers in such a ship).  
181  This example would not be relevant to Australia but might apply to a state which was 
party to the 2001 Convention but not the CLC. 
182  Provided the tankers fall within the CLC art I definition, which covers tankers (i.e. ships 
„constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo‟) even when in ballast 
and not carrying cargo. The CLC definition has a proviso dealing with circumstances 
where a tanker carries oil and other cargoes, eg, an OBO (Oil/Bulk/Ore carrier), which 
might carry oil and ore, or a products carrier which carries oil and chemicals. It is clear 
that the CLC will only apply to clean-up of the oil, not eg the chemicals (for which the 
HNS  Convention  1996  will  be  needed).  The  wording  of  the  proviso  is  notoriously 
difficult to understand, but it probably means that even after an oil carrying voyage is 
completed the CLC may still apply if there are oil cargo residues on board (and the CLC 
would apply to bunker spills from that ship). Thus, it must not automatically be assumed 
that the Bunker Oil Convention will apply where bunkers are spilled from a ship that is 
not at that moment carrying a cargo of oil. If it has carried oil cargo previously, and 
there are residues left, the CLC will apply. 
183  See also art 8 of the HNS Convention.  
184  For  an  earlier  analysis,  see  N.  Gaskell  „Lessons  of  the  Mont  Louis:  Part  Two: 
Compensation for Hybrid Accidents‟, (1986) 1 International Journal of Estuarine and 
Coastal Law 269. 
185  With its own limits of liability. 132  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
Oil Convention art 3(6)
186 preserves a shipowner‟s rights of recourse and the policy 
ought to be to let the commercial parties fight it out between themselves, after the 
pollution claimants have been paid. 
 
2   Ships covered  
 
There were major debates at and before the 2001 diplomatic conference about 
whether the Convention should apply to all craft, including those that were very 
small.  In  the  end,  a  distinction  was  made  between  the  liability  rules  and  those 
concerning compulsory insurance. The Convention definition of „ship‟ is very wide 
and, under art 1(1),
187 means „any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type 
whatsoever‟. 
The effect of this definition is highly significant as, unlike the CLC, it applies 
the liability regime to any ship (e.g. bulk carrier, passenger ship, container ship, tug, 
fishing vessel, launch etc), whatever its size provided that it is seagoing.
188 There is 
extensive case law on the meaning of the word „ship‟ in national maritime laws,
189 
but some care needs to be taken with this as the word has to be interpreted in the 
context of the international convention and its object (as set out, for instance, in the 
preamble).  Thus  a  liberal  (or  wide)  interpretation  should  be  given  taking  into 
account the need to „prevent, reduce and control pollution‟.
190 There is no particular 
need to require, for example, that it be applied only to commercial craft.  Some 
international  liability  conventions  (e.g.  the  Athens  Convention  1974/2002)  apply 
themselves only to international voyages, leaving it to national law to regulate ships 
on domestic voyages, but the pollution conventions are more widely drafted, partly 
because the effects of pollution may be felt in neighbouring states, but also because 
the parties want to ensure that the international compulsory insurance provisions can 
also apply in their waters.  
The  main restriction built into the Bunker Oil  Convention definition is the 
reference to „seagoing‟.  The expression is perhaps the least helpful of those used by 
the IMO and might have a number of meanings.
191 Courts have been unwilling to 
accept a wholly theoretical interpretation,
192  but although it would probably not 
cover a vessel which never in practice left a port or harbour (whatever the vessel‟s 
physical or legal abilities),
193 it ought to extend to recreational craft which leave the 
shelter of harbours and inland waters.
194   
                                                 
186  Like the CLC 1992 art III(5).  
187  As applied by s 3 of the  Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage) Act 2008 (Cth). See below Part III(D).  
188  Under art 4(2) the Bunker Oil Convention does not apply to warships, and see s 9 of the 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) 
and s 3 defining „Government ships‟, in effect to apply the Convention to state-owned 
ships used for commercial purposes.  
189  See eg, Steedman v Scofield [1992] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 163; R v Goodwin [2006] 1 Lloyd‟s 
Rep 432; Gibbs v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd (2003) 199 ALR 497. 
See further Davies and Dickey, above n 83, 1-12. 
190  Convention Preamble, Recital No.1. 
191  For example, it might mean a vessel that is physically capable of going to sea, or one 
that is legally entitled to go to sea, or one that in practice goes to sea (and if so whether 
a period is required), or a combination of these.  
192  R v Goodwin [2006] 1 Lloyd‟s Rep 432. 
193  The Salt Union v Wood [1893] 1 QB 370. If there are craft in this category which do 
have bunker fuel, eg, those operating solely in Sydney Harbour, or on the Brisbane 
River, then it would seem that any liability could fall under Parts IV and IVA of the 
Protection  of  the  Sea  (Civil  Liability)  Act  1981  (Cth),  or  may  be  caught  by  state 
legislation. See Gibbs v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd (2003) 199 ALR Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             133 
 
Even if the liability rules apply widely, the compulsory insurance provisions 
only apply to ships over 1,000 gt,
195 but in practice all commercial shipowners will 
probably need insurance.
196   
 
3   Strict liability 
 
Under art 3, there is strict liability of the shipowner
197 for pollution damage 
caused by anyone on board the ship. The normal liability will arise from spillages 
resulting from groundings,
198 collisions,
199 or operational discharges.
200 The absence 
of a need to prove fault was one of the key innovations of the CLC 1969 but, by 
2001, its extension to bunkers hardly raised a murmur.
201 The consequence is that, 
for instance, a bulk carrier may be damaged in a collision with a tug, entirely caused 
by the tug, but it is the bulk carrier which will be liable for bunker pollution under 
the  Convention.
202  The  liability  extends  to  pollution  damage  from  bunkers 
„originating from the ship‟. The latter might be relevant if barrels of fuel oil or lube 
oil are washed overboard, but where the ship is unharmed. However, the Convention 
would not apply to cases where a ship damaged an undersea pipeline and, say, heavy 
fuel oil leaked from that.
203 
 
4   Defences 
 
The liability under art 3 is not absolute, as there are standard defences (in art 
3(3) and (4)) based on the CLC. Under art 3(3), the shipowner must prove that:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
497. See further M. Ashford, „A Jet-Ski: Vessel, Boar or Ship: R v Goodwin [2006] 1 
Lloyd‟s Rep 432‟ (2006) 20 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Maritime Law 64, 
67.  See below Part III(D). 
194  Note that once a vessel is a „ship‟ under the Convention, the liability extends to damage 
anywhere in the territory, including the territorial sea of the state: see art 2. 
195  See art 7(1), and below Part III(C)(9). 
196  States may, under art 7(15), declare that they will not apply the compulsory insurance 
provisions of art 7 to ships operating exclusively within their own territorial sea. This 
option is designed for ships engaged on wholly domestic voyages. A last minute attempt 
at the diplomatic conference to extend the option to the EEZ failed, partly because of 
the fears of neighbouring states, but also because of the desire to create uniformity. 
Australia decided not  to exercise the option: see, national interest analysis   [2006] 
ATNIA 9, para 24. 
197  For issues as to channelling and the person liable, see below Part III(C)(7).  
198  Australian examples include the  Korean Star, Nella Dan, Sanko Harvest, Iron Baron 
and Pasha Bulker: see above Part I(C).    
199  Australian examples include the Al Qurain and Global Peace: see above Part I(C). 
200  Australian examples include Pacific Quest and Pax Phoenix: see above Part I(C). 
201  At one stage Australia had doubts about whether str ict liability was needed (see LEG 
73/12, 12 July 1995) but it was inevitable that, once it was decided to opt for a free -
standing convention, such an instrument would use the same liability principles as the 
CLC. 
202  The bulk carrier may then make a recourse claim against the tug, but the latter will be 
able to limit its liability based on its size under the LLMC 1996 (see below Part III(E)). 
203  Cf the Torungen incident, above n 46.  134  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
(a) The damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, 
or  a  natural  phenomenon  of  an  exceptional,  inevitable  and  irresistible 
character; or  
(b) The damage was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to 
cause damage by a third party; or  
(c) The damage was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of 
any  Government  or  other  authority  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of 
lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of that function.  
 
These  defences  are  largely  self-explanatory,  but  were  intended  to  be  very 
limited in scope. Thus, the „natural phenomenon‟ defence in the final phrase of art 
3(3)(a) is much more tightly drawn than a traditional common law „act of God‟, or 
„perils of the sea‟ defence. A shipowner would need very compelling evidence if it 
wanted to show that heavy seas, short of events such as a tsunami, were within the 
defence.
204 Article 3(3)(c) would cover state faults, e.g. in respect of charts or other 
navigational aids.
205 
There is no specific reference to terrorism as the Convention was agreed before 
the „9/11‟ events in 2001. There have been many debates since, particularly in the 
context of the Athens Convention 2002 on the carriage of passengers, about whether 
terrorism is in fact covered by art 3(3)(a) or (b). The „war‟ part of art 3(3)(a) is not 
entirely apt to cover the modern acts of terrorism which do not involve conflicts 
between states. Article  3(3)(b) would cover sabotage and most acts of terrorism, but 
the words „wholly caused‟ have given rise to shipowner fears that minor security 
lapses on their part might preclude the defence. In the passenger context, the entry 
into force of the Athens Convention 2002 (with identical defences) has been delayed 
as the P & I Clubs threatened not to issue insurance certificates over doubts about 
whether reinsurance was available for terrorism risks.
206 There does not appear yet to 
have been a problem with the CLC and none have specifically been raised in respect 
of the Bunker Oil Convention (where the applicable exposure is likely to be much 
less than after the sinking of a large passenger ship).  
There is a further defence (under art 3(4)), where the shipowner proves that the 
pollution damage was caused intentionally, or by fault of the victim. This is not 
likely in most bunker pollution incidents, although it might be relevant where (i) 
there is contributory fault of an oil terminal while bunkering a ship which results in 
bunkers overflowing from the bunker tanks;
207 and (ii) the actions of a Government 
in not maintaining navigational aids was not a complete defence under art 3(3)(c) in 
circumstances where there was also navigational error on the part of the ship.   
 
 
                                                 
204  The  shipowner  in  the  Nakhodka  sinking  in  1997  sought  to  bring  evidence  that 
exceptional and unexpected wave heights had been experienced in the Sea of Japan, but 
the case was settled without any final determination of the matter.  
205  As happened in the  Antonio  Gramsci  case  in  Sweden‟s  highly  sensitive  Stockholm 
archipelago in 1979. 
206  Somewhat delicate negotiations took place at the IMO,  embarrassingly after the 2002 
Protocol was agreed and a face saving solution was adopted through a set of „Guidelines 
for Implementation‟ adopted by the IMO Legal Committee in 2006 (see IMO Circular 
Letter 2758, 20 November 2006). In effect, this is an amendment to the 2002 Protocol 
dressed  up  as  guidelines  whereby  states  can  ratify  the  2002  Protocol  but  make 
reservations as to the insurance cover acceptable for certain war and terrorist risks. 
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5  Bunker pollution damage 
 
Article  1(9)  defines  the  pollution  damage  recoverable  under  art  3  in  a 
substantially similar way to the CLC 1992 and the HNS Convention (but with the 
substitution of „bunker oil‟ in art 1(9)(a)). It provides that:   
 
„Pollution damage‟ means: 
(a)  loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the 
escape or discharge of bunker oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge  may  occur,  provided  that  compensation  for  impairment  of  the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited 
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken; and 
(b)  the  costs  of  preventive  measures  and  further  loss  or  damage  caused  by 
preventive measures.   
 
Article  1(9)  will  apply  to  claims  by  both  public  and  private  claimants.  It 
certainly  covers  basic  clean  up  costs  caused  by  contamination;  it  allows  for 
reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment (actual not hypothetical); 
and it recognises that there may be recovery of economic losses in the form of loss 
of profit from impairment of the environment. Unlike  the HNS Convention, the 
Convention only covers pollution damage; it does not specifically cover death and 
personal injury, although it is accepted that injury actually caused by contamination 
would be covered.
208 Like the CLC, so-called „threat removal costs‟ are also covered 
within the expression „preventive measures‟ in para (b).
209 Thus, in a case such as 
the Bunga Teratai Satu
210 there would be compensation for pro-active mobilisation 
of  equipment,  even  though  no  oil  actually  leaked  from  the  ship.  However,  the 
Bunker Oil Convention would not have provided compensation for reinstatement of 
the Great Barrier Reef caused by physical contact only, or for environmental impact 
assessments of damage caused by anti-fouling paint. Nor would it cover incidents 
where  a  ship  damaged  a  shore  loading  pipeline  and  the  leakage  came  from  the 
pipeline, rather than the ship.  
The  definition  in  art  1(9)  was  developed  as  the  result  of  a  series  of 
compromises concerning the CLC. It is not entirely clear in its wording, but in the 
context  of  environmental  claims  generally  is  rather  conservative.  This  is  in  part 
because the origins of the CLC were in simple clean up operations and  
                                                 
208  The IOPC Fund Executive Committee accepted the advice of its Director, in the light of 
discussion at the 1969 conference, that inhalation of oil vapour and skin complaints 
caused by contact with oil could be covered as „damage‟ within the CLC/Fund: see eg, 
Fund/Exc.37/3,  para  4.2.11,  Annual  Report  1995,  65.  In  the  Braer  case,  the  Fund 
rejected claims for psychological damage (eg, for stress at the destruction of livelihood) 
and these were ultimately  withdrawn before trial: see  Annual Report 1999, 61. The 
Bunker Oil Convention was intended to replicate Fund practice: see eg, LEG 78/5/2, 14 
August 1998, LEG 77/11, 28 April 1998. 
209  This is because that expression means (under art 1(7)) reasonable measures to prevent or 
minimise [bunker] pollution damage taken after an „incident‟. The latter as defined in 
art 1(8) refers to an occurrence which causes pollution damage „or creates a grave and 
imminent threat of causing such damage‟. This was one of the amendments introduced 
by  the  1992  CLC  to  the  1969  CLC,  as  a  result  of  the  experience  of  states  being 
uncompensated  for  efficiently  mobilising  equipment  after  a  casualty,  before  any  oil 
leaked and where none in fact leaked. See also Part IVA of the Protection of the Sea 
(Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth) and above Part I(C).  
210  See above n 56. 136  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
environmental  recovery  and  reinstatement  practices  and  policies  have  developed 
much in the last 40 years.
211 The narrow definition has long been defended by the 
shipowner and insurer interests, obviously to reduce their exposure, but also because 
of fears that open-ended definitions might be incapable of objective control and 
possibly uninsurable.  
Attempts in the last 10 years have been made to amend the definition, which 
looks dated by comparison with other instruments, e.g. the 1999 Ba sel Protocol
212 
and the EU Environmental Liability Directive 2004,
213  and that under US  Oil 
Pollution Act 1990.
214 The latter provides a much more satisfactory enunciation of 
natural resource damage, although its principles on quantification of theoretical 
contingent valuations of environmental loss have been criticised. There is no doubt 
that there could be more appropriate legal definitions and one was proposed for the 
CLC in 1999,
  215  but  states  preferred  to  keep  the  vagueness  and  perhaps  the 
flexibility of the  existing  system. This has  allowed  for incremental changes and 
adjustments in the IOPC Fund practice as the cases are thrown up by experience – a 
pragmatic approach similar to common law techniques. Both the wording and the 
practice of CLC claims handling have emphasised commercial interests, where the 
available funds have been swamped by economic loss claims in a system that was 
designed originally for environmental protection.
216 This has meant that far more 
attention has been paid to compensating the touris t industry than in developing 
principles of environmental reinstatement. 
The IOPC Claims Manual has become a statement of international practice and 
should be directly relevant to the Bunker Oil Convention. While states were less 
keen in 1999 to amend the formal definition, there was scope to make the Manual 
more specific in some of the greyer areas, including reinstatement costs and the costs 
of  undertaking  scientific  studies.
217  Japan  and  South  Korea  proposed  some 
clarifications which now appear in the April 2005 Edition, approved by the IOPC 
Assembly in 2004. In effect this is soft law, but it is immensely useful and highly 
influential. For example it states that:
218 
 
Compensation  is  payable  for  the  costs of  reasonable reinstatement  measures 
aimed at accelerating natural recovery of environmental damage. Contributions 
may  be  made  to  the  costs  of  post-spill  studies  provided  that  they  relate  to 
damage  which  falls  within  the  deﬁnition  of  pollution  damage  under  the 
Conventions,  including  studies  to  establish  the  nature  and  extent  of 
environmental damage caused by an oil spill and to determine whether or not 
reinstatement measures are necessary and feasible.  
 
 
                                                 
211  Louise De La Fayette „New Approaches for assessing damage‟ (2005) 20 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 167.  
212  Protocol to the Basel Convention on the Control of  Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 1989. Its definition is more specific on „measures 
of reinstatement; De La Fayette, ibid,191. 
213  EC  Directive  on  Environmental  Liability  2004/35/CE,  art  2(1)  of  which  has  the 
emphasis on environmental issues such as the need to protect habitats and species. 
214  De La Fayette, above n 211, 172. 
215  Ibid  186; LEG 79/6/3, 18 March 1999 and see above Part II(D).  
216  See above Parts II(A) and III(A). 
217  De La Fayette, above n 211, 208.  
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Later  sections  spell  out  in  much  greater  detail  the  type  of  claims  that  are 
allowed (admissible) and Section III gives guidelines on environmental damage and 
post-spill studies:
219 
 
In addition to satisfying the general criteria for the acceptance of claims for compensation 
set out in Section II, claims for the costs of measures of reinstatement of the environment 
will qualify for compensation only if the following criteria are fulﬁlled: 
•   The  measures  should  be  likely  to  accelerate  signiﬁcantly  the  natural  process  of 
recovery. 
•   The measures should seek to prevent further damage as a result of the incident. 
•   The measures should, as far as possible, not result in the degradation of other habitats or 
in adverse consequences for other natural or economic resources. 
•   The measures should be technically feasible. 
•   The costs of the measures should not be out of proportion to the extent and duration of 
the damage and the benefits likely to be achieved. 
 
The choice of the CLC definition of „pollution damage‟ in the Bunker Oil 
Convention was therefore somewhat inevitable, given that the majority of delegates 
had taken part in debates on the revision of the CLC and indeed on the operation of 
the IOPC Fund‟s governing bodies. Had the Bunker Oil Convention been drafted in 
another  forum  it  is  likely  that  other  principles  would  have  been  agreed,  so  the 
significance of the practices of the IOPC Executive Committee and the IMO Legal 
Committee is in the continuity of their membership.
220  
 
6  Place of damage 
 
The Bunker Oil Convention art 2 has the same geographical scope as the CLC, 
so as to apply to pollution damage both within the territorial sea (12 nm) and that in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or equivalent area up to 200 nm. The damage 
has to have occurred in a State Party for the Convention rules to apply.
221  
 
7   Channelling: who is liable?  
 
The  CLC  1992  channelled  liability  to  the  registered  shipowner,
222  and this 
model was followed in the HNS Convention. Thus, bareboat charterers and other 
„operators‟ are not liable under the CLC. There are two essential justifications for 
this channelling. First, it simplifies claims handling and reduces costs to have one 
clearly  defined  defendant  who  has  compulsory  insurance  cover.  Secondly,  oil 
pollution claimants under the CLC are given the additional protection of the second 
tier of liability provided by the IOPC Fund, and now the third tier Supplementary 
Fund.
223 The Bunker Oil Convention is a one-tier convention; this is a necessary 
consequence of it being a stand-alone convention, not allied with the CLC or HNS 
Convention, and where there is no recognisable industry body which could finance a 
second tier. For this reason, most states were in favour of allowing claims against a 
wider category of defendant, including charterers or operators
224  and this view 
                                                 
219  Ibid, 30 et seq. 
220  Gaskell, above n 34, 155.  
221  See below Part III(D)(2). Note also above n 196, art 7(15).   
222  See above Part I(D). 
223  The same is broadly true of the HNS Fund, and it can be seen that the difficulties in 
starting that Fund are fundamental to the whole scheme of protection (see above Part 
III(A)).  
224  At one stage there had been four options for the definition of shipowner (see LEG 
78/5/2, 14 August 1998) although this was reduced to two, with the final single 138  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
prevailed at the diplomatic conference. Article 1(3) therefore defines „shipowner‟ to 
mean: 
 
The  owner,  including  the  registered  owner,  bareboat  charterer,  manager  and 
operator of the ship.
225 
 
These categories of person could all expect to have an interest in how the ship 
is run (as opposed, usually, to a time or voyage charterer). A „ship manager‟ does not 
refer to an individual  employed as a  manager by the registered shipowner; it is 
usually either an associated company to the single ship-owning company to which 
all the operational management functions are devolved, or a separate professional 
ship management company which operates for many owners. Either category could 
now be liable for pollution damage caused entirely by the negligent navigation of the 
master employed by the shipowner.
226 There is no separate definition of „operator‟ in 
the Bunker Oil Convention. The concept is apparently more familiar in the civil law 
systems than in the common law,
227 but it is submitted that it is permissible to refer 
for guidance to art 1(9) of the Wreck Removal Convention 2007 which was drafted 
in effect by the same Legal Committee and which attempted to clarify the meaning 
of the word in a comparable environmental liability convention.
228 
It is assumed that independent managers and operators would want to cover the 
new liability through contractual undertakings from the shipowner and this right of 
contractual recourse is preserved by art 3(6).
229  Article 7(1) only obliges the 
registered shipowner to take out insurance under the Convention, but in practice any 
bareboat  charterer,  manager  and  operator  would  probably  want  some  form  of 
insurance cover in case of insolvency of the registered shipowner. It may be that  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
selection being made in 1999 prior to the diplomatic conference (see, LEG 80/11, 25 
October 1999, 13).  
225  Again, Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 
(Cth) s 3, gives no separate definition of „shipowner‟ and it is necessary to look to the 
Convention definition directly: see below Part III(D). Note also that ss 28 and 29 deal 
with the treatment of partnerships and unincorporated associations in Australian law. 
226  It might be necessary to examine quite closely the commercial relationships between the 
various entitles in a corporate structure, eg, for managers to see if there is a ship 
management contract. This may not be easy to do.  
227  It was used in art. 1(2) of the LLMC 1976/1996, which is also relevant here (see be low 
Part III(E), Part III(F)). See also, above n 61 about the chain of management of the 
Pasha Bulker.  
228  It  provides  that  „operator  of  the  ship‟  means  the  owner  of  the  ship  or  any  other 
organization or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed 
the responsibility for operation of the ship from the owner of the ship and who, on 
assuming  such  responsibility,  has  agreed  to  take  over  all  duties  and  responsibilities 
established  under  the  International  Safety  Management  Code,  as  amended  (see  the 
International  Management  Code  for  the  Safe  Operation  of  Ships  and  for  Pollution 
Prevention, adopted by the Assembly of the IMO by resolution A.741(18), as amended). 
The key words are, it is submitted, those which have been emphasised. It is arguable 
whether  in  the  context  of  the  Bunker  Oil  Convention  it  is  legitimate  to  regard  the 
additional reference to the ISM Code as an essential part of the definition, but there 
seems no doubt that a person which also had the ISM functions would certainly be an 
„operator‟.  
229  Noting that although this provision has the same wording as art III(5) of the CLC, the 
wider definition of „shipowner‟ in the Bunker Oil Convention would allow all those 
within that definition to have rights of recourse. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             139 
 
some form of joint cover (or P & I Club entry) could be arranged, or for cover to be 
expressly extended to these others.  
The departure from the CLC pattern is understandable up to a point, but in our 
opinion was probably unnecessary. Although under art 3(2) the liability of each is 
joint and several, the fact is that the registered shipowner is liable and must have 
insurance,  so  what  is  the  point  of  adding  other  defendants?
230  In the Australian 
context, all these other persons would be entitled to limit in the same manner as the 
shipowner to an aggregated amount, so there would be no question of recovering the 
same losses several times over from each defendant. The additional liability might 
conceivably be relevant where the registered shipowner and its insurer are insolvent, 
or  where  there  is  intentional  or  reckless  conduct  by  one  defendant,  but  not 
another.
231 
The CLC channelling system also aims to ensure that claims can only be made 
against the registered shipowner under the CLC. Article III(4) of the CLC 1992 
achieved this by precluding a suit for pollution damage outside of the CLC (e.g. in 
tort, or for criminal compensation) and this provision is repeated in art 3(5) of the 
Bunker Oil Convention.
232 This should stop most attempts by claimants to avoid the 
art 3 defences, or the art 8 time bar. The protection applies equally to all the persons 
within the category of shipowner as defined above (e.g. managers and operators).  
However, the bar to actions outside the Convention only applies if these are claims 
for „pollution damage‟, as defined in the Convention. If there is a category of loss 
which falls outside this fairly narrowly defined concept
233 but which is recognised by 
national law, then there is no b ar. An obvious example is where a person suffers 
psychological injury after contamination, but it might also apply to the extent that 
Australia tort law recognised a wider category of environmental reinstatement or 
economic loss claims than normally accepted in the IOPC Fund practice under the 
equivalent CLC provision.
234  
 
8  Channelling defences 
 
Another  fundamental aspect of the  CLC art III(4) channelling system is to 
provide  specific  exceptions  from  liability  for  persons  other  than  the  registered 
shipowner, both „under the Convention or otherwise‟ (e.g. in tort). The justification 
was  the  same  as  that  explained  in  Part  III(C)(7)    above,  i.e.  such  claims  were 
unnecessary  and  channelling  to  one  person  makes  the  obtaining  of  insurance 
coverage clearer.  
The  CLC  1992  actually  tightened  up  the  protection  so  that  it  extended 
expressly to servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew, pilots, any 
charterer (however described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or operator, 
persons  performing  salvage  operations  with  the  consent  of  the  owner  or  on  the 
                                                 
230  Claims settlement could be delayed as the defendants may all have different insurers: 
see, LEG 80/4/2, 8 September 1999, 3. 
231  The additional defendants cannot take the place of the Fund when, in oil tanker cases, its 
liability extends down to cover all of a claim where there is a defence under art 3 for the 
registered shipowner. But see below, Part III(E)(5). 
232  It is for this reason that Sch 1 item 5 of the  Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability For 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) (Consequential Amendments) Act 2008 (Cth) ensures 
that there is no overlap with Part III of the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 
1981 (Cth) (See below Part III(D)).  
233  See above Part III(C)(5). 
234  An attempt to close this loophole was rejected: see, LEG 80/4/2, 8 September 1999; 
LEG 80/11, 22 October 1999, 15. 140  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
instructions of a competent public authority; any person taking preventive measures, 
and all servants or agents of persons in the last three categories.  
The debates about whether to follow the CLC were highly contentious during 
the drafting of the Bunker Oil Convention. Early drafts copied the CLC provision 
into  art  3(5)
235  but the bulk of it was deleted at the 79
th  Session  of  the  Legal 
Committee in 1999. The reason was that exclusion for liabilities was not justified as 
there was no second tier fund available to claimants. The result is that the final text 
of art 3(5) of the Bunker Oil Convention only contains the shipowner provision cited 
in Part III(C)(7) above. There is no equivalent of the remainder of the CLC art III(4) 
and  so  there  are  no  specific  exceptions  of  liability  for  crew  members,  pilots 
charterers and salvors. They are not liable under the Bunker Oil Convention as they 
are  not  within  the  term  „shipowner‟,
236  but  they  could  be  sued  outside  of  the 
Convention e.g. in tort. The only concession for those in these categories (e.g. if a 
time charterer were sued in tort for ordering a ship to an unsafe port), was that 
decision  to  simplify  the  direct  action  and  compulsory  insurance  provisions  by 
making it  only the registered shipowner  who  would be required to  maintain the 
compulsory insurance. 
One consequence of the decision not to follow the CLC was that the principle 
of „responder immunity‟ was undermined, as there is no protection from civil suit for 
persons such as salvors and those performing clean-up operations. But it has long 
been recognised
237 that salvors and other responders should not be hesitant to take 
action because of the threat of civil claims or criminal prosecution. This is a very 
real possibility, as is shown by the arrest of salvage tugs in the Tasman Spirit case in 
Pakistan  in  2003.
238  Although the introduction of a limited form of responder 
immunity was strongly pressed for at the 2001 diplomatic conference,
239 art 3(5) 
remained un-extended  even for this category of defendant. This was a serious 
mistake. 
 
9   Compulsory insurance  
 
Article 7 sets out the provisions on „evidence of financial security‟, which are 
borrowed largely from the CLC 1992 and HNS Convention. There are two essential 
aspects: first, the compulsory nature of the cover as demonstrated by a convention 
insurance certificate;
240 and secondly, the ability of a claimant to sue the insurer 
directly.  
 
                                                 
235  See, LEG 79/6/1, 12 February 1999. 
236  See above, Part III(C)(7). 
237  See eg, „Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas‟: the report of Lord Donaldson‟s Inquiry into the 
prevent of Pollution from merchant Shipping, 17 May 1994, CM. 2560. 
238  See, Edwinton Commercial Corp v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and Towage) Ltd 
(The Sea Angel) [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 517 for some of the legal consequences for the 
salvor.  The  Pakistani  authorities  arrested  salvage  vessels  after  the  Tasman  Spirit 
casualty as part of a mechanism to put pressure on insurers to provide large financial 
guarantees (Pakistan was not a party to the 1992 CLC and Fund until 2005). It can be 
assumed that professional salvors will hesitate long before working again in Pakistani 
waters. 
239  See eg, LEG/CONF.12/8, 12 January 2001. 
240  Alternative financial security is possible, such as a bank guarantee, but it seems unlikely 
that these will be used except perhaps for state commercial vessels. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             141 
 
State  Parties  are  obliged  to  ensure  that  ships  flying  their  flags  carry  a 
convention certificate of insurance for bunker pollution damage.
241 Experience has 
shown that port state control is more reliable than flag state control. So the more 
important power is that provided in art 7(12) which requires a State Party to ensure 
that ships over  1,000 gt shall have a convention certificate in force whenever 
entering or leaving a port in its territory, or arriving at or leaving an off -shore 
facility
242 in its territorial sea. As a matter of international law, a coastal state cannot 
stop a foreign flagged ship to inspect certificates if she is merely exercising the right 
of innocent passage to transit national waters. This poses a risk for Australia, e.g. 
where ships pass through the Torres Strait, or past the Great Barrier Reef, en route to 
another state. The hope is that the Bunker Oil Convention will become sufficiently 
widely ratified that a ship will in practice need a certificate wherever it travels. 
Australia may need to provide considerable political encouragement to get the 
developing states to its north to ratify; for there may well be ships such as fishing 
vessels which have only a limited regional trading pattern, and if the home port is 
not a State Party then such ships would not need insurance if they never called into 
an Australian port.   
It is the registered shipowner alone who must have the insurance cover, and 
only for ships of over 1,000 gt. There was extensive debate about this threshold at 
the diplomatic conference as some states wanted the threshold to be very low, such 
as Australia (400 gt)
243 and the UK (300 gt). China and India wanted it at over 
10,000 gt (and for ships actually carrying 1,000 tonnes of bunkers).
244 States like 
Indonesia and the Philippines wanted the threshold at 5,000 gt, as they were worried 
that with lower figures  many of their smaller inter -island craft might have been 
obliged to pay for cover.
245 Japan wanted it at between 500-1,000 gt. The diplomatic 
conference eventually agreed to compromise on 1,000 gt as part of a larger final 
package bound up with the relatively high entry into force requirements of art 14.   
The amount of the financial cover is supposed to be an amount equal to the 
limits of liability under the applicable national or international limitation regime, but 
in all cases, not exceeding an amount ca lculated in accordance with the LLMC 
1996.
246  
A fundamental protection for the claimant is that it may bring a direct action 
claim against the insurer under art 7(10).
247 The insurer can rely on the defences 
                                                 
241  In  the  form  set  out  in  the  Annex  to  the  Convention,  issued  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions of art 7. 
242  For example an off-shore terminal. These are normally places where oil tankers pick up 
cargoes via pipelines to subsea storage facilities, and it is the CLC that would apply to 
such craft. The Bunker Oil Convention could apply to supply vessels that visit, eg, for 
maintenance or to offload equipment.  
243  See,  LEG/CONF.12/6,  18  January  2001.  This  was  in  line  with  existing  national 
legislation: see, Part III(D)(1). 
244  In LEG/CONF.12/7, 18 January 2001 these states presented a study showing that many 
ships of under 2,000 gt used diesel oil, not HFO, and that ships of 6,000 gt, 10,000 gt 
and 20,000 gt had average bunker capacities respectively of 530 tonnes, 1,000 tonnes 
and 2,000 tonnes. The data was, however, for limited types of ships, excluding fishing 
vessels.  
245  The Philippines also wanted to extend the insurance opt -out for domestic craft in art 
7(15): see above, n 196. 
246  The calculation of those limits will be dealt with in Part III(E)(1) ; see also below Part 
III(E)(2) et seq. 
247  The extent to which direct actions are possible and enforceable varies between states. 
Even where there is a national statute (eg, the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 54) 
its effectiveness in practice may be limited when it is sought to be enforced against an 
international insurer.  142  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
(under art 3) and limits of liability (as allowed in art 7) which were open to the 
shipowner  itself  –  even  in  the  event  of  intentional  or  reckless  conduct  by  the 
shipowner.
248 However, in the latter case there may well also be a complete defence 
under the insurance policy of „wilful misconduct‟.
249 This is the only policy defence 
allowed to an insurer sued on the basis of the certificate.
250   
A key practical issue for states is that there may be an increased administrative 
burden in issuing and checking certificates. The effect of the Convention will be that 
virtually all ships trading internationally will now require an official state -issued 
certificate, whereas previously this was confined to tankers.
251  The Convention 
system relies on the State Party which is a flag state to issue certificates, but 
recognises that ships registered in non-State Parties will need to obtain certificates. 
Registries with a reputation for efficient administration may find that they are 
swamped  by  applications  from  shipowners  flagged  in  non -State  Parties.  Most 
Convention states were apparently willing to issue certificates to ships visiting that 
state, but by August 2008, there were apparently only three states (UK, Liberia and 
Cyprus) willing to issue certificates to ships irrespective of their port of call.
252 Yet 
there were reportedly something like 40,000 ships which might need certificates by 
21 November 2008, the date of entry into force. By the end of September 2008, the 
UK had processed over 1,000 applications, was receiving 100 emails a day and was 
anticipating that it would not b e able to process all the expected last minute 
applications by the deadline.
253  
The administration of a State Party is bound under art 7(9) to recognise 
certificates issued in other State Parties, even if the insurer is completely unknown 
and not a member of the International Group of P & I Clubs.
254 The unspoken fear 
has always been of undercapitalised insurers entering the market and attaching   
 
 
 
                                                 
248  See below Part III(E)(2). 
249  See the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth) s 61(2)(a) and note The Eurysthenes [1977] 
QB 49.  
250  The bankruptcy or winding up of the shipowner is not a defence. 
251  Australia has required relevant insurance certificates to be carried by ships of 400 gt or 
over since the 2000 amendments to the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 
(Cth)  Part  III,  but  this  obligation  could  presumably  have  been  satisfied  by  the 
production of a satisfactory P & I Club certificate issued by the insurer. Now, AMSA 
and equivalent authorities in other states will have to issue certificates themselves, or 
under art 7(3) authorise another institution or organisation to do so. See below Part 
III(D)(2). 
252  Clubs have been alive to the practical certification problems  for shipowners hastily 
seeking certificates, and a series of circulars has addressed this, as well as the problems 
posed  by  mobile  offshore  units.  See  eg,  the  G ard  circulars  at 
<http://www.gard.no/pages/GardNO/ 
Publications/Circulars/CircularsPI?MainMenuID=10&SubMenuID=74&p_d_i=-
203&p_d_c=&p_d_v=13&p_rowcount=1> at 30 September 2008. 
253  Information from UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 3 October 2008. During 
negotiations,  proponents  of  the  Convention,  such  as  Australia,  played  down  the 
administrative impact: see, LEG 77/6, 13 February 1998: see also, [2006] ATNIA 9. 
Additional problems might be caused by the existence of bareboat registries, separate 
from those  for the registered shipowner, where there are uncertainties as to which 
administration is to issue certificates: see LEG 94/12 31 October 2008, para 11(c) 
254  The best that the worried state can do is to „request consultation‟ with the flag state; this 
may have the incidental sanction of delaying the issue of the certificate. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             143 
 
themselves to flag of convenience (open registry) states which exercise little or no 
administrative  control.  The  risk  of  rogue  insurers  has  been  fairly  small  in  the 
experience with the CLC, where it is said that about 95% of the world‟s tanker fleet 
is entered with a member of the International Group.
255 The Club cover will be for a 
whole  range  of  risks  and  not  simply  for   pollution  so,  for  most  commercial 
shipowners, cover for bunker pollution will be a simple automatic addition to the 
normal cover. A P & I Club certificate is a reliable guarantee for states, but it 
remains to be seen whether other insurers arise to meet the demand of a market that 
may really want the certificate as a passport to enter foreign ports rather than for its 
insurance protection. If this practice develops, it could undermine the whole system 
underlying the IMO maritime liability conventions. 
 
10 Time Bar 
 
Like  the  CLC  1992,  there  is  a  time  bar  in  art  8  for  claims  within  the 
Convention. Claims must be brought within three years from the date of damage. It 
is possible that after a ship sinks oil escapes many years later.
256 There is therefore a 
backstop time bar of six years from the date of the incident causing the damage. 
„Incident‟ is defined  in art 1(8) to  mean an occurrence or series of occurrences 
having the same origin. This would typically refer to a grounding or collision. If 
there  is  a  series  of  occurrences,  e.g.  an  engine  failure  leading  a  day  later  to  a 
grounding, followed some weeks later by a sinking, and then leakage many years 
after that, the time bar clock starts from the date of the „first such occurrence‟. This 
would  presumably  be  the  engine  failure,  certainly  if  it  had  threatened  pollution 
damage.
257  
 
D   Australian Implementation of the Bunker Oil Convention 
 
1  The existing legislative regime 
 
While  bunker  spills  (from  non-tankers)  were  excluded  from  the  CLC/Fund 
regime, and also outside the HNS Convention, existing Australian legislation did  
 
                                                 
255  In LEG 80/4/2, 8 September 1999 the Clubs pointed out the problems which occurred 
with the insolvency of Ocean Marine Mutual, a Club which was not a member of the 
International Group. For competition reasons it was unlikely that there would have been 
agreement to recognise only International Group certificates. 
256  This is not fanciful. The battleship  Royal Oak, sunk in Scapa Flow in 1940 is still 
leaking bunker oil (although note that the Bunker Oil Convention could never apply to 
warships: see above Part III(C)(2)). It is partly because of the time bar problem that so 
much time and effort was expended after the Prestige casualty to remove oil that was 
physically remaining in the ship, on the basis that it constituted a „threat‟ and ought to 
be removed. The practice of the IOPC Fund is that such costs could only be recovered if 
reasonable and proportionate to the risk (see, IOPC Annual Report 2007, above n 3, 24, 
98, 106), and this should be the approach under the Bunker Oil Convention.  
257  Courts should be reluctant to accept that there was a causative „incident‟ more remote 
from the immediate danger to the ship, with the effect that the time limit expires earlier. 
Eg, a shipowner might (paradoxically) seek to say that the cause of the engine failure 
was an  earlier  management  decision  taken  months before  not  to  effect  repairs.  The 
better approach would be to take the proximate cause of loss, eg, the engine failure or 
grounding.  144  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
provide AMSA with a range of measures to prevent marine pollution, including that 
from bunkers, and to recover costs for clean up or prevention operations.
258    
AMSA has wide powers to do anything necessary to combat pollution of the 
marine environment in Australia‟s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
259 
Beyond that, the powers are more limited. Under the Protection of the Sea (Powers 
of Intervention) Act 1981 (Cth) (Intervention Act)
260 AMSA is able take action in 
respect of marine casualties on the high seas where there is a grave and imminent 
threat of pollution to the Australian coastline or its related interests.
261 Intervention 
for lesser threats can only occur if the vessel concerned is an A ustralian vessel.
262 
The intervention, in either case, is those measures necessary to prevent, mitigate or 
eliminate the threat.
263 Furthermore, under the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) 
Act 1981 (Cth) (Civil Liability Act 1981), AMSA may recover, as a debt due to the 
Commonwealth,  all  expenses  and  liabilities  arising  from  the  exercise  of  these 
powers from the owner of the ship concerned.
264 The section operates only where the 
CLC does not apply.
265 However, not only is the shipowner‟s liability limited by 
reference to the ship‟s tonnage, but it can also raise the defences in art 3(2) of the 
CLC.
266 
Whereas Part IV of the Civil Liability Act 1981 provides a mechanism for 
AMSA to recover all expenses and liabilities arising from the exercise of the powers 
conferred by the Intervention Act, Part IVA of the Civil Liability Act 1981 provides 
AMSA with more general powers to recover any loss, damage, costs or expenses 
incurred in preventing or mitigating or in attempting to prevent or mitigate any 
pollution damage, or threats of it.
267 These are potentially important provisions  
 
                                                 
258  Similarly, the UK Government introduced strict liability for bunker oil pollution in what 
is now the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK) s 154, and in s 192A (introduced by the 
Merchant  Shipping  and  Maritime  Security  Act  1997  (UK)  s  16)  produced  enabling 
powers to make insurance compulsory for ships visiting UK waters (see, N Gaskell 
annotations in, Current Law Statutes 1995, 1997). The only Regulations that have been 
issued (S.I. 1998 No. 209) were for fish factory ships, which had been a problem. There 
were no new powers for direct action against the insurer (cf above Part III(C)(9)).  
259  Australian Marine Safety Authority Act 1990 (Cth) ss 6(1)(a), 10(1). See, Davies and 
Dickey, above n 83, 595.  
260  The Intervention Act gave national effect to the  International Convention relating to 
Intervention  on  the  High  Seas  in  Cases  of  Oil  Pollution  Casualties  1969  (the 
Intervention Convention) and its 1973 Protocol, which were agreed, like the CLC, as 
part of the reaction to the Torrey Canyon sinking.  
261  Intervention Act ss 8-9.   
262  Intervention Act s 10(8). 
263  Intervention Act ss 8-10. 
264  Civil Liability Act 1981 (Cth) Part IV, s 20(1). The provision is really an add -on to the 
intervention powers and is not entirely apt as a mechanism for compensation for 
environmental damage. It is not clear if there is some restriction on the powers if there is 
no formal intervention, or if pollution occurs before the state intervenes, or whether it 
can actually cover clean up after an intervention (ie whether this is removing or 
destroying cargo). 
265  Civil Liability Act 1981 (Cth) Part IV, s 20(5). 
266  Civil Liability Act 1981 (Cth) Part IV, s 20(2). See above Part III(C)(4). 
267  Civil Liability Act 1981 (Cth) Part IVA, s 22A. It may have been assumed that s 22A 
was necessary because of the doubts about the scope of s 20, and s 22A would clearly 
cover clean up; but the un -amended s 22A might not have been appropriate to cover 
threat removal costs, such as the hiring to tugs to assist in a casualty before a ship sinks; 
this is not a theoretical possibility, as demonstrated by incidents such as the groundings 
of the Peacock, and the Bunga Teratai Satu, above Part I(E). See Glover, above n 56.  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             145 
 
which give protection to the Australian state in the event of, e.g. bunker pollution, 
but do not give rights to individual claimants. 
There were also two potential problems with the legislation. The first was that 
it did not require compulsory insurance for vessels entering Australia. To confront 
that problem, the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) 
created a new Part IIIA of the Civil Liability Act 1981, which required all ships (not 
covered by the CLC) of 400 gt or more and which are carrying oil as cargo or as 
bunkers to carry evidence of liability insurance when entering or leaving Australian 
ports.
268 The provision applied irrespective of the flag of the ship. There  were no 
specific provisions allowing for direct action against the insurer.
269 
The second problem with liability under the Civil Liability Act 1981 Part IV 
(and Part IVA) relates to limits of liability. There are similar liability defences under 
Part IV to  the CLC,
270  but s 20(3) allows a shipowner to limit liability. That 
provision does not itself set out what the limit is, but refers to the limit that is in 
force under „one or more international limitation conventions, being provisions in 
force in Australia‟.
271 The convention which currently applies in Australia is the 
LLMC 1996,
272 which does set out limits of liability. However, the application of the 
s 20 liability to the limits is not without difficulty.
273 Moreover, s 22A makes no 
specific reference to defences or limits. At first sight it might be thought that this 
means that there are no limits of liability at all under Part IVA, as opposed to Part 
IV, but the better explanation is that no reference to limitation is necessary in either 
Part, as the LLMC will apply by law anyway on its own terms.
274  
                                                 
268  A „relevant insurance certificate‟ is defined in s 19A, in general terms by reference to 
„prescribed information‟, which is defined in the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) 
Amendment Regulations 2001 (NO. 1) 2001 No. 56 (Cth) reg 11. In practice this will 
usually be a certificate of P & I Club entry. The Consequential Amendments Act 2008 
Sch 1 item 5 amended this provision so as to exclude its application where the Bunker 
Act applies.  
269  But see the Insurance Contracts Act 1984  (Cth) s 54. 
270  Civil Liability Act 1981 (Cth), Part IV, s 20(2). 
271  This wording was introduced by the  Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Amendment 
Act 2000 (Cth) so as replace an unusual „stand alone‟ limitation provision that was in s 
20(3) of the original 1981 Act (but which also had a fall back position which preserved 
any  system  of  limitation  within  the  Navigation  Act  1912  (Cth)  Part  VIII).  The 
replacement  wording  reference  to  multiple  conventions  was  presumably  necessary 
because, at the time of the 2000 amendments, Australia was a party to the LLMC 1976, 
but not yet a party to the LLMC 1996. See below Part III(E).  
272  See the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth), which entered into 
force on 13 May 2004. 
273  See below Part III(E). Section 20(3) strangely sets a test for breaking limits which is 
different to that in the LLMC and which is based on   the test in the  International 
Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships (1957 
Limitation Convention) which applied in Australia prior to the LLMC. The „actual fault 
or privity‟ test was itself derived from the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1894 and upon 
which there has been much litigation (and see Davies and Dickey, above n 83, Chap 16 
generally). Arguably, if the LLMC applies it ought to apply with its own limitation 
breaking  test  (art  4),  which  is  much  tougher  (and  Australia  might  be  obliged  in 
international  law  to  apply  the  LLMC  to  a  foreign  flag  ship).  For  other  limitation 
difficulties, which also arise under the Bunker Oil Convention, see below Part III(E)(3).  
274  Under the  Limitation  of  Liability  for  Maritime  Claims  Act  1989  (Cth).  Cf  the  EC 
Directive on Environmental Liability 2004/35/CE which requires „operators‟ to prevent 
imminent threats of environmental damage and to restore the environment. Authorities 
can recover costs, and these would be subject to limits, but where the shipowner (as 
operator) restores the environment itself it is not clear how, if at all, it can limit liability. 
There appears to be no obligation in Australian law for a shipowner to engage in clean 146  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
While  the  existing  legislation  does  provide  a  prevention  and  compensation 
regime for bunker pollution, the main advantage of implementing the Bunker Oil 
Convention  is  that  there  would  be  a  package  which  would  be  accepted 
internationally and, in particular, by shipowner interests and their P & I Clubs. This 
means  that  there  ought  not  to  be  any  difficulties  in  enforcing  an  internationally 
recognised  insurance  certificate,  and  there  would  be  inbuilt  mechanisms  for 
recognising and enforcing judgments. Moreover, rights could be given to individuals 
who suffer damage or economic loss, in addition to the state. The existing legislation 
does, however, leave a number of gaps in the prevention and compensation regime. 
For example, with respect to compensation for damage or cost caused by an incident 
involving the spill from a ship of hazardous or noxious substances (other than oil), 
while AMSA might be able to rely on the national measures contained in Parts IV 
and IVA of the Civil Liability Act 1981 to recover costs, individual claimants might 
have to resort to the inadequate common law remedies which existed at the time of 
the Torrey Canyon in 1967.
275 
 
2  The 2008 legislative regime 
 
Australia  gives  effect  to  the  Bunker  Oil  Convention  primarily  under  the 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 
(Cth) (the Bunker Act).
276 Entry into force for Australia will depend on its date of 
ratification, which is expected in early 2009.
277 As a matter of drafting technique, 
Australia has again taken the sensible course of, in effect, incorporating by reference 
as many of the original articles of the Convention as possible.
278  As such, those 
articles of the Convention which deal with the liability of the shipowne r for pollution 
damage and the making of claims directly against the insurer are incorporated 
directly into the Bunker Act.
279 That is, s 11 of the Bunker Act simply gives the 
force of law of the Commonwealth to: the strict liability regime established in art 3, 
including defences;
280 the joint and several liability of shipowners in an incident 
involving two vessel established in art 5;
281 the right of the shipowner to limit  
 
                                                                                                                      
up  operations  itself,  although  under  the  intervention  powers  (Intervention  Act  1981 
(Cth) s 11) it could be directed to take limited steps to reduce pollution, eg, by off-
loading cargo or bunkers.  
275 See below Part III(E). The remedies could involve claims in negligence, nuisance or 
trespass (eg, Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218) and low 
LLMC limits of liabilities. 
276 See also, the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability For Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) 
(Consequential Amendments) Act 2008 (Cth).   
277  Marine Order 16/2008, 3 September 2008.The Bunker Oil Convention will come into 
force  for  Australia  three  months  after  the  date  of  ratification.  See  Explanatory 
Memorandum, Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) 
Act 2008 (Cth) s 3. 
278 This can be compared very favourably with the UK  Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) 
(Bunkers  Convention)  Regulations  2006  (S.I.  No.1244),  which  are  an  example  of 
statutory redrafting of otherwise clear convention provisions in which the product is 
more difficult to understand than the original. 
279  No part of the Convention is in fact reproduced in the Act itself, which unfortunately 
means  that  reference  to  the  text  must  be  made  elsewhere  (eg,  online  at 
www.austlii.edu.au). 
280  See above Part III(C)(3) and (4). 
281  See above Part III(C)(1). Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             147 
 
liability established in art 6;
282 the imposition of a time bar established in art 8;
283 
and the right to take claim directly against the insurer established in art 7(10).
284  
Similarly, the definition of terms found in those articles, and which are not found in 
the Bunker Act itself, are not included in the definition section of the Act,
285 but 
incorporated  directly  from  the  definition  section  of  the  Convention.  Important 
definitions, such as the definition of „shipowner‟ or „bunker oil‟ have therefore not 
been included in the Bunker Act.
286 While perfectly logical, this does detract from 
the general user-friendliness of the legislation.
287   
The remaining articles of the Convention are dealt with in the Bunker Act in a 
manner which allows them to operate in Australia. For example, the scope of 
application of the Bunker Oil Convention as set out in art 2 i s not incorporated 
directly into the Bunker Act, but rather given effect in a manner which relates 
directly to Australia.
288 As such, s 7 of the Bunker Act provides that liability under 
the Convention applies to pollution damage occurring in Australia or its  EEZ and 
preventive measures, wherever they are taken, to prevent or minimise damage 
occurring in Australia or its EEZ.
289  The same applies with regard to ensuring that 
the Bunker Oil Convention (and the Bunker Act) do not overlap with the CLC (and 
its implementation in the Civil Liability Act 1981), as well as to the inclusion of 
government ships used for commercial purposes.
290 The greater part of the Bunker 
Act is devoted to art 7 of the Bunker Oil Convention, governing the insurance 
certificate relating to  liability for pollution damage, in a manner appropriate to 
Australia. In particular, the administrative detail concerning the issuing and checking 
of certificates by AMSA
291 is set out, as well as the creation of certain offences in 
relation to a failure to carry an appropriate certificate, and the powers of AMSA to 
detain ships in contravention of the Bunker Act. 
The administrative duties for issuing and checking certificates created in the 
Bunker Act, are set out largely by incorporating the detail of art 7 of the Bunker Oil 
Convention in an Australian context, and substantially replicate those duties already 
established by the Civil Liability Act 1981 (implementing the CLC).
292 AMSA is  
                                                 
282  See above Part III(C)(9) and below Part III(E). 
283  See above Part III(C)(10). 
284  See above Part III(C)(9). 
285  Bunker Act s 3. 
286  Definitions of terms found in the Act which are consistent with those in the Convention, 
are not repeated in the Bunker Act but incorporated directly from the Convention. For 
example,  the  term  „incident‟  is defined  in  the  Bunker  Act  s 3  as having  „the  same 
meaning as in the Bunker Oil Convention‟. 
287  It might have been more helpful for a reader to have the relevant text of the Convention 
as a schedule (eg, as with the Civil Liability Act). 
288  See above Part III(C)(6). 
289  The Bunker Act s 3 defines Australia, when used in a geographical sense (as it is here), 
to include the external territories. This definition o verrides that contained in the  Acts 
Interpretation  Act  1901  (Cth)  s  17(a)  so  as  to  include  all  external  territories.  
Explanatory  Memorandum,  Protection  of  the  Sea  (Civil  Liability  for  Bunker  Oil 
Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) s 3. Section 3 defines the EEZ as having the same 
meaning as in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth). The Bunker Act s 5 also 
provides that „[t]his Act extends to every external territory‟. 
290  The Bunker Act ss 8, 9, 12(2) & 12(3) giving effect to art 4 Bunker Oil Convention. See 
above Part III(C)(1). It appears that the Act has left unaffected the powers under Part 
IVA Civil Liability Act (Cth)1981, above n 267. 
291  As identified in the Bunker Act s 3.  
292  This includes the establishment of the application form and the detail  required in the 
insurance certificate (sec 18(3), (8), (9), giving effect to art 7(2),(7) 148  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
granted the power to issue insurance certificates, in relation both to ships registered 
in Australia and ships registered in a foreign country that are not a party to the 
Bunker  Oil  Convention,  if  it  is  satisfied  that  appropriate  insurance  cover  is 
maintained by the shipowner.
293 The Act also sets out when the certificate can be 
cancelled or ceases to be in force.
294  
The Bunker Act makes a failure to have an appropriate insurance certificate on 
board an Australian ship during its operation an offence of strict liability for the 
registered owner or master.
295 A similar offence is created for other ships entering or 
leaving a port or offshore facility in Australia.
296 It is also an offence for the master 
of the ship to fail to comply with a request from an Australian enforcement officer to 
produce an insurance certificate.
297 An enforcement officer also has the power to 
detain a vessel where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that at the time 
the vessel attempts to leave port, no appropriate insurance certificate for the ship was 
in force.
298 The detention may last until the certificate is produced or obtained.
299 All 
these offence are indictable offences and prosecutions may be brought at any time.
300 
 
 
                                                 
293  Bunker Act s 18(1),(6). The issuing (and cancellation) of certificates to government 
ships (whether federal or state or territory ships) is governed by s 19.  
294  Bunker Act s 24. The corresponding power to cancel is contained in s 22 (giving effect 
to Bunker Oil Convention art 3(c)), while the conditions upon which the certificate 
automatically ceases to be in force is set out in s 23. Applications may be made to th e 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of decisions to refuse to issues a certificate 
under s 18(7) or to cancel a certificate under s 22(1).  
295  Bunker Act s 17(1), (2). The maximum penalty for this offence (and that in s 16) is 500 
penalty  units  (A $55,000  for  an  individual  and  A$275,000  for  a  body  corporate). 
Explanatory  Memorandum,  Protection  of  the  Sea  (Civil  Liability  for  Bunker  Oil 
Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) 11-12. Section 15 sets out, in a tabular form, what 
constitutes an appropriate certificate for a ship, effectively dividing vessels into those 
registered in Australia, those registered in a foreign state (both State Party and non-party 
to  the  Bunker  Oil  Convention)  and  state  owned  vessels  (Commonwealth,  State  or 
Territory and foreign).  
296  Bunker Act s 18. In both cases, the Bunker Act allows for the maintenance of electronic 
certificates rather than paper certificates on board the ship subject to the conditions laid 
down in art 7(13) of the Bunker Oil Convention. Bunker Act ss 16(3), 17(3), 20(4). 
297  Bunker Act s 20. The maximum penalty for this offence is 20 penalty units (A$2,200 for 
an  individual  and  A$11,000  for  a  body  corporate):  Explanatory  Memorandum, 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) 
14. See s 20(4) in relation to electronic certificates. Australia had pressed for a wide use 
of  such  certificates  and  achieved  amendments  in  what  is  now  art  7(13):  see 
LEG/CONF.12/13, 12 February 2001. 
298  Bunker Act s 21(1). An enforcement officer i ncludes a Customs officer, a surveyor 
appointed under the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) or a person prescribed by the regulations 
that may be established to give effect to the Bunker Oil Convention: Bunker Act ss 3, 
27. The latter will only occur where there is no Customs officer or surveyor available, 
and  will  usually  be  someone  who  holds  the  position  of  harbour  master  or  similar 
position: Explanatory Memorandum, Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker 
Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) 4. 
299  Bunker Act s 21(2). It is an offence for a ship detained under s 21 to leave the port 
before being released. The registered owner and master of the ship are jointly liable for 
a strict liability offence to a maximum penalty of 2,000 penalty units (A$220,000 for an 
individual  and  A$1,100,000  for  a  body  corporate):  Explanatory  Memorandum, 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) 
14. 
300  Bunker Act ss 16(4), 17(4), 21(5), 25. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             149 
 
The  Bunker  Act  further  addresses  those  issues  peculiar  to  Australia  as  a 
federation, in particular the ability of the States to make law in relation to bunker oil 
pollution, as well as addressing the jurisdictional regime created in art 9 and 10 of 
the Bunker Oil Convention. By virtue of the external affairs power of the Australian 
Constitution,  the  Commonwealth  has  the  power  to  give  effect  to  international 
conventions, such as the Bunker Oil Convention, and has plenary powers to legislate 
in  respect  of  the  territorial  sea.
301  Nevertheless,  the  Offshore  Constitutional 
Settlement provided for the States to exercise jurisdiction over a 3nm sea adjacent to 
its coast. In relation to this division of powers to shipping, the Navigation Act 1912 
(Cth)  sets  out  the  jurisdictional  competencies  of  the  States  and  Commonwealth. 
Section 10 of the Bunker Act therefore gives effect to the ability of the States to 
legislate  in  relation  to  the  Bunker  Oil  Convention  if  the  State  wishes  to  do  so. 
Mirroring  to  a  large  extent  the  mechanism  for  differentiating  between  the 
Commonwealth‟s  and  State‟s  powers  in  the  Navigation  Act  1912  (Cth),  s  10 
provides that in relation to domestic voyage ships,
302 the Bunker Act will not apply 
where the State or Territory has given effect to those articles that would have been 
given effect to by way of s 11 of the Bunker Act in its own legislation.
303 Similarly s 
14 of the Bunker Act a llows for the States and Territories to issues insurance 
certificates giving effect to art 7(1), (2) and (4) of the Bunker Oil Convention.  
Furthermore, s 27 of the Bunker Act provides for the adoption of regulations to 
give effect to art 10 of the Bunker O il Convention, which itself provides for the 
enforcement and recognition of judgments obtained in a State Party which has 
jurisdiction by way of art 9 of the Convention; that is, where an incident has caused 
pollution damage or required preventative measures in that state‟s territorial sea or 
EEZ. Where such a judgment is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review, was 
not obtained by fraud, and where the defendant was given reasonable notice and a 
fair opportunity to present his or her case, the Bunker Act provides for the adoption 
of regulations conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Court of Australia as well as the 
Supreme  Courts  of  the  States  and  Territories  in  relation  to  the  recognition  and 
enforcement of those judgments.
304   
In order to integrate the liability regime created in the Bunker Act with the 
existing liability regimes, the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution  Damage)  (Consequential  Amendments)  Act  2008  (Cth)  (Consequential 
Amendments Act 2008) was adopted. To ensure that Part IIIA of the Civil Liability 
Act does not overlap with the liability regime created in the Bunker Act, it provides 
for an amendment of s 19B(1) of the Civil Liability Act 1981 which excludes the 
insurance requirements provided for in the Bunker Act from the Civil Liability Act 
1981. In effect this means that ships of between 400-1,000 gt will require insurance 
under Part IIIA of the Civil Liability Act rather than under the Bunker Act.  
The Consequential Amendments Act 2008 also provides for a similar exclusion 
of  the  liability  created  in  the  Bunker  Act  from  the  Intervention  Act.
305  Some 
difficulties arise, however, in this regard. Schedule 1 item 6 of the Consequential   
                                                 
301  Constitution s 51(xxix). See generally Davies and Dickey above n 83, 13-36.  
302  This is defined „as a ship that is (a) a trading ship proceeding on a voyage other than an 
overseas voyage or an inter-State voyage; or (b) an Australian fishing vessel proceeding 
on a voyage other than an overseas voyage‟, and mirrors Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) s 2. 
Furthermore,  the  terms  „Australian  fishing  vessel‟,  „inter-State  voyage‟  and  „trading 
ship‟ are defined by reference to the definitions contained in the Navigation Act 1912 
(Cth) in Bunker Act s10(4). 
303  That is Bunker Oil Convention arts 3, 5, 6, 7(10), 8. 
304  Bunker Act s 27. 
305  Consequential Amendments Act 2008 Sch 1 item 6.  150  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
Amendments Act 2008 inserts a new s17A(5A) in the Intervention Act to ensure that 
claims can be made under the Bunker Oil Convention even if AMSA has given a 
direction to a shipowner (e.g. to sail away). The provision seems designed to avoid 
any argument under s 17A of Intervention Act that there is an automatic defence to 
civil proceedings following a direction. The Bunker Oil Convention provides its own 
grounds of liability which do not require fault, and which have limited defences, e.g. 
for circumstances caused partly as a result of state action.
306 It should be noted that a 
direction under the Intervention Act is unlikely to be a defence under art 3(3), but 
there might be a defence under art 3(4), if the shipowner can prove that pollution 
was wholly or partially caused by the fault of the person suffering the damage. 
Where, e.g. AMSA is claiming clean up costs, the shipowner would have to show 
that it was negligent in giving a direction. That negligence would have to be judged 
in the context of the exercise of intervention powers. Thus, AMSA might order a 
grounded ship to be moved,  knowing that some bunkers would leak, but with the 
aim of trying to avoid a bigger discharge. Under s 17A of the Intervention Act 
AMSA has a defence to civil action for actions authorised by the Act, but that 
presumably does not extend to actions not autho rised by the Act, e.g. where the 
exercise of the powers was excessive or unnecessary. The point is not entirely clear 
as s 17A does refer to „an act done or omitted to be done‟, but it does continue „in the 
exercise of any power conferred‟ by the Act.
307 In the case of an AMSA direction 
which  in  some  way  caused  or  contributed  to  pollution  damage  by  third  party 
claimants (e.g. fishing or tourism claimants), there  would be no defence for the 
shipowner.
308  
 
E   Limitation of liability 
 
From the genesis of the Bunker Oil Convention it was recognised that there 
should not be strict liability without a corresponding financial limit to that liability, 
but the question was what form that limit should take. The problem was that when 
the general convention on limitation, the LLMC 1976, was revised in 1996, it made 
no allowance for a future bunker convention with its own separate limits.
309 In order 
to avoid a conflict of conventions, there would need to have been yet another 
amendment to the LLMC, which would have been politically unacceptable so soon 
after its 1996 revision. For that reason, the earliest draft of a free standing bunker 
convention merely made a rather vague reference to a shipowner being allowed to 
limit „in accordance with the applicable international convention or the national law‟ 
of the place of damage.
310  This formulation was liable to give rise to a great many 
uncertainties,
311 partly because of the variety of regimes that might apply. By 1997, 
                                                 
306  See above Part III(C)(4). 
307  And the interpretation that there could be liability is supported by the fact that under the 
Intervention Convention arts V and VI there is state liability if powers are exercised 
unreasonably, or disproportionately. 
308  Although it might possible have a recourse action against AMSA for exceeding its 
powers, as suggested above. 
309  The LLMC 1996 allowed for the HNS Convention 1996 (which was agreed at the same 
diplomatic conference) to have free-standing limits. 
310  See eg, LEG 73/12/1, 12 September 1995. Slight changes were proposed in LEG 74/4/1, 
9 August 1996. 
311  Many of which were highlighted by the CMI i n LEG 74/4/2, 9 August 1996; some of 
these will be examined below in Part III(E)(3).  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             151 
 
the suggestion was being made that it might be better to tie the bunker convention to 
a specific limitation regime.
312  
The 77
th  Session  of  the  IMO  Legal  Committee  in  1998  decided  that  there 
should be no stand alone limits and that liability for bunker pollution should be 
subject to limitation of liability by reference to the LLMC 1996.
313 This reflected the 
idea that there should be some sort of limit, rather than unlimited liability, and based 
on the most recent instrument. But there was then the difficult question of „linkage‟, 
as some states might want to be a party to the Bunker Oil Convention but not the 
LLMC 1996. Two options were suggested, one of which merely „called up‟ (i.e. 
referred to) the LLMC 1996, and the other which reproduced the exact limits from 
the LLMC 1996 into the bunkers instrument.
314 There was no support for the second 
option but the complexities of these solutions were becoming apparent and Australia 
led a Working Group to consider them.
315 This acknowledged the need to avoid 
strict liability without limitation and suggested that the Preamble reflect  this.
316 It 
also identified that there needed to be two references to limitation, one concerning 
liability and the other relating to the level of compulsory insurance. A new draft art 6 
was introduced at the 79th Session in April 1999 which was in effect a  simple 
statement preserving existing rights.
317  With one minor addition, this draft was 
eventually adopted in art 6; 
 
Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of the shipowner and the person or 
persons providing insurance or other financial security to limit liability under any 
applicable national or international regime, such as the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, as amended.
318  
 
This is an unusual, and perhaps unfortunate, provision for a number of reasons. 
It allows a State Party, in effect, to choose which limitation regime to apply. For 
shipowners, they may face no limits at all in some states.
319 In Australia, art 6 has 
been enacted unamended, and therefore Australian law applies the amended version 
of the LLMC, namely the LLMC 1996.
320 
The decision to have linkage has the potential to create many problems of 
interpretation,
321  with the result that certain bunker pollution claims may not be 
subject to limitation at all, or that the precise extent of the insurer‟s direct liability is 
left in some doubt. However, we will first consider the level of limits of liability that 
might apply.  
 
                                                 
312  See LEG 76/4/1, 8 August 1997, which suggested using either the LLMC 1996, or some 
rewording of the CLC limitation provisions. These two options were then more formally 
proposed in LEG 77/6/1, 13 February 1998, and a third one was raised, namely of 
inserting stand alone limits. 
313  See LEG 77/11, 28 April 1998, 19. 
314  Thus seeking to avoid a conflict by having identical provisions: see LEG 78/5/2, 14 
August 1998, 8-9.  
315  See LEG 78/11, 2 November 1998, 17-18, LEG 78/5/3, 18 September 1998. 
316  See LEG 78/WP.4, 21 October 1998. See now, Recital 5 of the Preamble. 
317  See LEG 79/6/1, 12 February 1999. 
318  Emphasis added. 
319  Although the diplomatic conference adopted Resolution 1 calling on states to accept the 
LLMC 1996, and to denounce the LLMC 1976 and the 1957 Limitation Convention. 
320  See, Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth). For choice of forum 
issues, see below Part III(E)(5) and Part III(F). 
321  See below Part III(E)(3)-(5). The analysis which follows is often rather technical but, 
unfortunately, is necessary to unravel the complexities of linkage. 152  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
1  Level of LLMC limits for bunker pollution claims  
 
The  following  two  tables  illustrate  the  limitation  funds  which  might  be 
available in respect of bunker pollution.
322 The limits are shown not only under the 
LLMC 1996 art 6, which applies in Australia, but also under the LLMC 1976, in 
order to show how low the limits might be in states such as Singapore, India, or 
Vanuatu.
323  
Table 7 considers the limits for four ships of different sizes. Table 8 shows 
limitation calculations for real ships which caused or threatened pollution damage in 
Australia and were discussed in Part I(C), above.
324  
 
Table 7: LLMC art 6: limits for ships of four different sizes    
Ship 
name 
Ship Size
325  LLMC Regime  SDR limit  A$ limit
326 
N/A  Any ship of up 
to 2,000 gt
327 
LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
1,000,000 sdr 
417,500 sdr 
A$ 1,777,600  
A$ 742,148 
N/A  5,000 gt   LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
2,200.000 sdr 
918,500 sdr 
A$ 3,910,720  
A$ 1,632,726 
N/A  10,000 gt   LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
4,200,000 sdr 
1,713,500 sdr 
A$ 7,465,920  
A$ 3,117,022 
N/A  80,000 gt   LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
26,200,000 sdr 
10,923,500 sdr 
A$ 46,573,120  
A$ 19,417,614 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
322  For  further  explanations  and  examples  of  limitation  of  liability  calculations,  see 
generally,  Nicholas  Gaskell,  „Appendix  17:  Limitation  of  Liability  and  Division  of 
Loss‟ in Simon Gault (ed), Marsden on Collisions at Sea (13
th ed, 2003) 828. 
323  See also Part III(E)(5) and Part III(F)  for possible attempts by shipowners to use the 
lower limits. 
324  Again, the figures are meant to be illustrative, only, as the information on tonnages 
cannot be guaranteed: it has been compiled where possible from information in AMSA 
or ATSB reports, or verified as far as possible from the Equasis database, or from other 
websites. It was not possible to find gross tonnages for older ships which are not on the 
Equasis database, eg, Anro Asia, Korean Star, Nella Dan, Sygna. Many websites give 
only the deadweight tonnages and these are not the ones used for limitation purposes. 
The  correct  tonnages  are  the  gross  tonnages  under  the  International  Convention  on 
Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969: see LLMC 1996 art 6(5).  
325  The limits are those under art 6(1)(b) of the LLMC. These are limits applicable for 
claims „other than for loss of life or personal injury‟. Into this category  fall  all the 
„other‟  claims,  including  bunker  pollution  as  well  as  all  other  property  claims.  See 
further,  Gaskell,  above  n  322,  828  and  the  text  following  Tables  7  and  8  for 
explanations. 
326  Calculations made on the basis  of a conversion rate of 1 sdr =A$1.7776: taken on a 
random conversion date of 14 January 2008 (see above n 70). At 6 October 2008 1 sdr 
was worth A$1.9666. 
327  Note that the LLMC allows states to set lower limits for ships of 0-299gt. Australia has 
not taken advantage of this provision, although the UK, for instance, has set the limits 
for such ships at half Convention rates (see the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Sch 7, Part 
II, para 5).  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             153 
 
Table 8: LLMC art 6: limits for particular incidents off the Australian 
coast
328  
Ship name  Ship 
Size  
LLMC 
Regime  
SDR limit  A$ limit 
Iron Baron  21,975 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
8,990,000 sdr 
3,753,325 sdr 
A$ 15,980,624  
A$ 6,671,911 
Sanko 
Harvest 
19,340 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
7,936,000 sdr 
3,313,280 sdr 
A$ 14,107,034  
A$ 5,889,687 
Pacific Quest  31,403 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
12,620,900 sdr 
5,268,875 sdr 
A$ 22,434,912  
A$ 9,365,952 
Pax Phoenix  28,021 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
11,408,400 sdr 
4,763,007 sdr 
A$ 20,279,572  
A$ 8,466,721 
Al Qurain   28,484 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
11,593,600 sdr 
4,840,328 sdr 
A$ 20,608,783  
A$ 8,604,167 
Bunga 
Teratai Satu 
21,339 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
8,735,600 sdr 
3,647,113 sdr 
A$ 15,528,403  
A$ 6,483,108 
Pasha Bulker  40,042 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
15,212,600 sdr 
6,348,750 sdr 
A$ 27,041,918  
A$ 11,285,538 
Global Peace  67,727 gt  LLMC 1996 
LLMC 1976 
23,518,100 sdr  
9,809,375 sdr 
A$ 41,805,775  
A$ 17,437,145 
 
The significance of the figures is that these are the funds available to cover all 
non-injury/death claims against the global fund in art 6(1)(b) of LLMC in respect of 
a distinct occasion (i.e. a particular incident).
329 For convenience, the art 6(1)(b) 
limits can be described as  „property‟ limits (this is perhaps more comprehensible 
than „other‟ limits). The application of these LLMC property limits could be quite 
unattractive  to  a  state‟s  national  interest  if  it  was  faced  with  a  large  clean-up 
operation,  especially  involving  smaller  ships.  That  is  because,  on  the  above 
calculations, not only may the property limits be rather low to cover some bunker 
pollution  claims,  but  these  sums  also  have  to  be  shared  with  other  property 
claimants.  
Thus, a 5,000 gt ship will have a limit of about A$3.9m and a 10,000 gt ship 
about  A$7.5m.  At  first  sight,  the  limits  available  under  Table  8  for  particular 
incidents off Australia might seem to be perfectly adequate for clean-up. However, 
in the case of the Iron Baron, for example, she was carrying a cargo 24,000 tonnes 
of  manganese  ore  and  any  cargo  claim  against  the  shipowner  would  also  have 
competed for  the art 6(1)(b) limits. The  container  ship  MSC  Napoli (53,409 gt) 
which sank in January 2007 off the south coast of the UK with 3,000 tonnes of 
bunkers  reputedly  on  board  would  have  a  limit  of  about  A$34m.  These  figures 
would also have to cover any claims in respect of hazardous and noxious substances 
within the 158 containers reputed to have been on board. This is because the HNS  
                                                 
328  See above Part I(C). Note that these figures are not what the limits were on the date of 
the actual incidents, but merely examples of what they would have been on the day of 
calculation (14 January 2008). See also, above n 326, for the basis of the calculations. 
329  The inclusion of bunker pollution claims within the LLMC „other‟ category could also 
affect personal claimants if there were a large number of death claims under LLMC art 
6(1), and these needed to spill over to share the pot of funds under LLMC art 6(2). In 
these circumstances the pot of funds, however small, would be relatively diminished by 
reason of the bunker pollution claims. 154  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
Convention, with its stand alone limits, is not yet in force.
330 The cargo remaining on 
board (over 2,300 containers) had been estimated to have a value of over US$100 
million. Even assuming that cargo claims were also subject to limits under the 
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules,
331 it can be seen that such claims could swamp the 
limitation fund and reduce proportionately the amounts available for bunker claims. 
Moreover, if there had been a collision, there would also have been the claims from 
the other ship for hull and cargo damage.
332 Bunker and chemical spillage claims, it 
should be recalled, could cover both clean up  and economic losses: it is the latter 
which have proved to be the most costly in recent oil tanker disasters.
333 
It is difficult to know what are likely to be the reasonable costs of bunker clean 
up in a more complex case, or what the potential economic losses might be for a 
major spill on the Great Barrier Reef. The costs of an incident will depend as much 
on circumstances and location as on quantities of fuel.
334 The AMSA figures show, 
for example, that for the Peacock even a threat removal operation (with no spillage 
and clean up at all) cost some A$800,000. It may be that the LLMC 1996 limits 
above are adequate to provide protection for most bunker incidents, especially for 
larger ships. It could also be that they are inadequate for small ships, or where there 
are sinkings of larger ships combined with complex property claims. The LLMC 
limits are unlikely to be increased for many years. 
 
2  „Breaking‟ limitation  
 
It is usual, where maritime liability is limited (under the LLMC or directly in 
the CLC 1992, or HNS Convention) for there to be a provision under which the 
shipowner can be deprived of the right to limit. The test for „breaking‟ limits in art 4 
of the LLMC states that: 
 
A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the loss 
resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such 
loss, or recklessly and with knowledge: that such loss would probably result. 
                                                 
330  See above Part III(A). If and when the HNS Convention comes into force, LLMC 1996 
states such as Australia will trigger a reservation under art 18(1)(b) (inserted by art 7 of 
the LLMC Protocol 1996), which gives the right to exclude claims for damage „within 
the meaning‟ of the HNS Convention. It is arguable that this right could be exercised 
even now, prior to the entry into force of the Convention, because the quoted wording 
makes no reference to the HNS Convention being in force. If this is correct, a state 
could in effect remove any existing right to limit for hazardous and noxious substance 
claims falling within the 1996 Convention. The more obvious intention of the provision 
(which  mirrors art 3(b) dealing  with the CLC), is simply that the HNS Convention 
should deal with liability and limitation, when in force, but prior to that the LLMC 
would apply. However, it is submitted that the wording does not preclude the alternative 
interpretation given above.  
331  In Australia under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth). 
332  The MSC  Napoli  was itself  said  to  be  worth  about  US$40  million.  Further,  if  that 
collision also involved an innocent chemical tanker, it is likely that all the considerable 
claims relating to chemical pollution could also fall within the LLMC 1996 limits of the 
first ship (assuming that the claimants could show negligence and satisfy remoteness 
issues). 
333  See above Part II(A). 
334  An Australian submission to the diplomatic conference noted that one uninsured fishing 
vessel of 385 gt was carrying 400 tonnes of bunkers and required clean up costs of 
NZ$1.4m; see LEG/CONF. 12/6, 18 January 2001. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             155 
 
The exact working of the breaking limitation test is beyond this article,
335 but it 
can be said that the test is deliberately difficult to satisfy and requires, in the case of 
a corporate defendant, the relevant intentional or reckless behaviour to be at  a 
relatively senior level in management. It is not enough to show intent or recklessness 
of, say, the master or crew. In the rare circumstance that a claimant can show an 
appropriate  act  or  omission  at  the  right  corporate  level,  the  person  claiming 
limitation will not be entitled to limit.  
This may seem like a good, if difficult, tactic for a claimant, but there is a 
catch. It is possible that the same acts and omissions might also constitute „wilful 
misconduct‟ under the insurance policy.
336 As already noted,
337 this is a defence 
which is allowed to the insurer under the direct action provision, art 7(10) of the 
Bunker Oil Convention. Unless the shipowner has independent assets, it may be that 
the claimant obtains nothing. Where the claimant has sued the bareb oat charterer, 
manager or operator under the Bunker Oil Convention, it seems that it is necessary 
to look for the level of misconduct within the corporate structure of that particular 
defendant in order to break the LLMC limits.
338 
 
3  Are bunker pollution claims limitable within LLMC? 
 
A preliminary question, however, is whether all categories of bunker pollution 
claim  will  fall  within art 2(1) of  LLMC 1976 and 1996.
339 Article 2(1) gives a 
shipowner the right to limit liability in respect of certain listed claim s: if a claim does 
not fall within these categories, it is not subject to limits. There are recognised 
difficulties in fitting all bunker pollution claims within the LLMC categories.
340 
Those categories potentially relevant to bunker pollution are as follows :  
 
(a) claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss of or damage 
to property (including damage to harbour works, basins and waterways and 
aids to navigation), occurring on board or in direct connection with the 
operation of the ship or with salvage operations, and consequential loss 
resulting there from; 
 
(c) claims in respect of other loss resulting from  infringement of rights 
other  than  contractual  rights,  occurring  in  direct  connection  with  the 
operation of the ship or salvage operations; 
 
(d) claims in respect of the raising, removal, destruction or the rendering 
harmless  of  a  ship  which  is  sunk,  wrecked,  stranded  or  abandoned, 
including anything that is or has been on board such ship;  
 
 
 
                                                 
335  Cf Nicholas Gaskell, Regina Asariotis and Yvonne Baatz, Bills of Lading: Law and 
Contracts (2000), 519-522; Davies and Dickey, above n 83, 468.   
336  See Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth) s 66. 
337  See above Part III(C)(9). 
338  Cf Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd v Hapag-Lloyd AG (The Encounter Bay) [1998] NSWSC 
644. 
339  This provision clarified and extended art 1 of the 1957 Limitation Convention, in 
particular by breaking up what were three long convoluted paragraphs into the six that 
are now present.  
340  See LEG 74/4/2, 9 August 1996. 156  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
(e) claims in respect of the removal, destruction or the rendering harmless 
of the cargo of the ship;  
 
(f) claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of measures 
taken in order to avert or minimise loss for which the person liable may 
limit  his  liability  in  accordance  with  this  Convention,  and  further  loss 
caused by such measures.
341 
 
(a) Property Damage 
 
Where there is physical damage to property caused by bunkers, as well as any 
lost profits, the claim by its owners will clearly be limitable under art 2(1)(a).
342 This 
would extend, for instance, to actual damage to machinery, e.g. harbour facilities and 
desalination intakes.  How far can the wording naturally extend to cleaning up 
bunker oil from property, where there is mere fouling, rather than separate physical 
damage? It would seem artificial to say that it is not property damage where a ship‟s 
hull (otherwise undamaged) has to be cleaned,
343 and in the case of fouled fishing 
nets it is usually impossible or impractical to clean them. However, the position is 
less clear where there is bunker oil on the surface of the sea, or washed up on a 
beach or reef. It might be said that „real property‟ has been damaged, but the context 
does not suggest that this is a natural reading. It is noticeable that the bracketed 
reference specifically includes „basins and  waterways‟,  which are a form of real 
property in one sense, but the paragraph is more naturally considering events such as 
collisions with the physical structures themselves.  
Where there are clean up operations by the state there are real doubts as to 
whether they fall within sub-paragraph (a). The problem had been recognised by the 
UK Government even prior to the enactment of the Bunker Oil Convention
344 and it 
had been persuaded
345 that it would be wrong to have unlimited strict liability, and 
so enacted s168 of the  Merchant Shipping Act 1995.
346 This is a rather curious 
„deeming‟ provision which now states that for the purposes of UK law, any liability 
incurred for bunker pollution claims shall be deemed to be a liability to damages 
within the LLMC 1996 art 2(1)(a). This would seem to have put beyond doubt in 
UK law that all claims within the Bunker Oil Convention are subject to limitation of 
liability.  The  deeming  provision  has  not  been  copied  in  Australia.  The  doubts 
therefore remain whether sub-paragraph (a) covers pure clean up claims and are to 
some extent reinforced by  the existence of separate  sub-paragraphs, (e) and (d), 
which more naturally cover clean up.
347 
                                                 
341  Emphasis added. 
342  Personal injury and death claims  from contamination  would also fall under this 
provision. 
343  See eg, the clean up costs to ships caused by the Global Peace discharge in 2006, above 
n 49. A fouled ship might well be prevented from entering ports.  
344  The  issue  only  became  apparent  when  th e  Government  introduced  the  Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995 (UK) s 154, in order to create strict liability for bunker pollution 
damage in national law.  
345  After consultation with the shipping and insurance interests, including the British 
Maritime Law Association. 
346  As amended by S.I. 2006 No.1244, reg 22. 
347  Where there is doubt as to whether a claim falls into a limitable category, courts have 
generally taken a strict approach against allowing limitation: see eg:  Owners  of  the 
Motor Vessel  v  NV  Bureau  Wijsmuller: The  Tojo  Maru  [1972]  AC  242;  Barameda 
Enterprises Pty. Ltd. v Ronald Patrick O’Conner and KFV Fisheries (Qld) Pty. Ltd. 
(The Tiruna) [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 666 (Full Court, Supreme Court Qld).  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             157 
 
Economic loss claims by fishing and tourist industries (unrelated to damage to 
any owned property) are a normal category of recovery following pollution spills.
348 
It is possible that these economic loss claims might fall within art 2(1)(a) in so far as 
they  are  „claims  in  respect  of  …damage  to  property…and  consequential  loss 
resulting therefrom‟. The difficulty  is twofold. First, there  may be  no „property‟ 
damaged apart from the sea itself, or beaches (which leads back to the „real property‟ 
discussion above). Secondly, a more natural reading of the provision is that it refers 
to the consequential loss of the person  whose property  has been damaged. That 
would not usually apply to the hotelier, unless perhaps it owned a jetty or beach. In 
1976, it might have been thought unlikely that economic losses were recoverable at 
all in law unless they were made by the property owner, and so it might be assumed 
that there was little need to draft a wide limitation provision to cover a liability that 
was not thought to exist. 
 
(b) Infringement of rights. 
 
The  precise  scope  of  art  2(1)(c),  which  also  appeared  in  the  Limitation 
Convention  1957  has  never  been  entirely  clear.
349  There  has  to  be  „other  loss‟, 
presumably loss not within sub-paragraph (a).
350 The exclusion of contractual claims 
indicates that the sub-paragraph can encompass tortious claims, or those arising in a 
quasi tortious way as a result of a statutory liability such as that under the Bunker Oil 
Convention. The chapeau to art 2(1) states that claims within the list are subject to 
limitation of liability „whatever the basis of liability‟. The omission of the word 
„damage‟, appearing in paragraph (a), indicates that it is dealing with financial loss 
of some kind, rather than physical loss or damage. Financial loss could presumably 
extend to the costs of a clean-up operation. Moreover, it has been held in Australia 
that the expression can cover wreck removal expenses.
351 It is submitted that the sub-
paragraph is probably sufficiently wide to cover pollution damage clean up claims 
within the Bunker Oil Convention if they are not covered elsewhere in art 2(1)(a). 
Although  the  expression  „consequential  loss‟  is  not  used,  it  is  also  tentatively 
submitted that it can extend to economic losses in the tourist or fishing industries. In 
all these cases there is loss „occurring in direct connection with the operation of the 
ship‟,  as  bunkers  are  by  definition  used  to  operate  the  ship.  The  difficulty  in 
interpreting sub-paragraph (c) in this way is that it becomes so wide that it does 
almost operate as a catch all provision, which could arguably cover sub-paragraphs  
 
 
                                                 
348  These are regularly allowed by the IOPC Fund in oil tanker cases, see above Part I(D) 
and Part III(C)(5). 
349  Patrick Griggs, Richard Williams and Jeremy Farr, Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims (4
th ed. 2005) 22. Simon Gault (ed), Marsden on Collisions at Sea (13
th ed, 
2003) 594-6. 
350  Or sub-paragraph (b) which deals with delay claims, and would not normally be 
relevant to bunker claims. Sub-paragraph (c)‟s positioning as a paragraph in the middle 
of a longer list suggests that it is not meant to be an ejuisdem generis, or a general 
sweeping up, provision for the whole of art 2(1), but the cross reference („other loss‟) 
must be taken to refer to the preceding two sub-paragraphs. Perhaps too much should 
not be read into the positioning of sub-paragraph (c) as it is really derived from the 
breaking up of art 1(b) of the Limitation Convention 1957 and that is the order which 
appeared there.  
351  See,  The  Tiruna  [1987]  2  Lloyd's  Rep.  666  (Full  Court,  Supreme  Court  Qld),  per 
McPherson J, 687. 158  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
(d) and (e) and make them irrelevant. This does not accord with the drafting history 
as the infringement of rights provision appeared in the Limitation Convention 1957, 
and yet the LLMC 1976 specifically added sub-paragraphs (d) and (e). This could 
only have been done if they were not already covered, or possibly for the avoidance 
of doubt. It may be that it is necessary to consider sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) as not 
overlapping with sub-paragraph (c), so that they are definitive in their own right; i.e. 
for matters which are specifically covered, or apparently excluded, they should not 
be supplemented by another provision such as sub-paragraph (c).  
 
(c) Rendering harmless of anything on board ships.  
 
The Limitation Convention 1957 dealt with wreck removal, but was less clear 
about the contents of a ship (e.g. cargo or bunkers). The LLMC provisions in sub-
paragraphs (d) and (e) were deliberately extended to clarify the position and have 
generally been thought apt to cover most pollution claims not falling  within the 
LLMC art 3 (the exception for oil pollution damage under the CLC).
352 Thus, where 
the claim is for clean-up costs, it would most naturally fall to be limited (if at all) 
under art 2(1)(d)
353  as  there  would  be  a  „rendering  harmless‟  of  the  contents 
(including bunkers) of a ship which has been involved in a casualty. 
However, a close reading shows that there may well be circumstances where 
typical pollution damage claims are not covered by art 2(1)(d). Although the words 
„a ship which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned‟ are apt to describe most 
casualties, they would not appear to cover operational discharges in which there is 
no physical disaster to the ship, e.g. while taking on bunkers.
354 There may even be 
cases of casualties to the ship, in which it suffers physical damage, that do not fall 
within the quoted words, e.g. where there is not a total loss. Thus, a minor collision 
that does not lead to a sinking would not appear to be covered by art 2(1)(d). A 
minor grounding could result in the same sort of physical damage, with a spill, but it 
is not clear if it  would fall  within the expression „stranded‟. The latter  suggests 
something more drastic where a ship grounds and is stuck (at least for a considerable 
period of time), rather than a case of a ship which runs over a reef and then floats 
clear.
355 
In addition to those noted above, there is also the question of economic loss 
claims by the tourism and fishing industries; are these claims within art 2(1)(d), e.g. 
if there is bunker pollution from a wreck? The actual clean up costs (e.g. by AMSA) 
are claims in respect of the „rendering harmless‟ of the bunkers on board the ship. 
But the lost income or profits do not easily connect with the rendering harmless, 
except e.g. where the loss of fishery results from contamination caused by the clean 
up measures, such as where chemical dispersants have been used. Lost profits of a 
hotel may result from tourists being put off by the original pollution rather than the 
efforts  to  render  it  harmless.  Moreover,  in  this  case,  the  claims  are  more  of  a 
„consequential loss resulting therefrom‟ and yet these words do not appear in sub-
paragraph (d) although they do in (a).Claims to avert or minimise loss 
  
                                                 
352  Griggs et.al, above n 352, 22-4. 
353  Art 2(1)(e) would not be relevant to bunkers as it refers to the rendering harmless of the 
„cargo‟ of a ship, and bunkers are not considered as cargo. 
354  For example cases such as The Wagon Mound (No.1) [1961] AC 388, and see above n 
50. The ITOPF figures suggest that this form of operational error is a cause of some 
minor spills: see IOPC <http://www.iopcfund.org/>, at 28 September 2008. 
355  And see the examples above n 49, above n 50. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             159 
 
Article 2(1)(f) might also seem, at first sight, to cover clean up costs if there is 
a doubt as to whether they fall within sub-paragraph (a), or (d). Assuming that a 
shipowner is the „person liable‟ (under the Bunker Oil Convention), there could be 
claims by, say, AMSA, to avert or minimise loss (e.g. pollution damage). But the 
loss has to be one for which the shipowner „may limit his liability in accordance with 
this Convention‟. In other words, the shipowner must be able to limit its liability 
under  a  different  sub-paragraph  of  art  2(1):  sub-paragraph  (f)  does  not  allow 
limitation for mitigation claims per se, but only if there is a right to limit already 
under sub-paragraphs (a) to (e).  
 
(d) Conclusion 
 
The result of this analysis of art 2(1) is that it is not possible to state simply that 
all claims under the Bunker Oil Convention are, or are not, automatically subject to 
limitation of liability under the LLMC 1996.
356 It is possible that there may be an 
element of overlap so that some claims might fall under one or more sub-paragraphs. 
It will be a matter of interpretation whether provis ions are meant to be mutually 
exclusive; this may well be the case for coastal clean -up operations falling within 
sub-paragraph (d), but are not intended to fall under sub-paragraph (a). The approach 
of the courts has been, and ought to continue to be, for the shipowner to bring itself 
strictly within the terms of art 2.
357 If there is any doubt, or if there is a claim which 
is clearly not within the provision, then the shipowner is unable to limit.
358 Unless 
sub-paragraph (c) is given a wide meaning, some bunker claims may not fall within 
any of the paragraphs.  
All this discussion must be read, however, in the context of the LLMC opt -out. 
 
4  LLMC opt-out 
 
If the discussion about the interpretation of art 2(1) of the LLMC, above, is 
correct, it may be that some bunker claims in some states may be unlimited in any 
event. Even though many pollution damage claims under the Bunker Oil Convention 
would be limitable under the LLMC art 2(1), art 18(1) of LLMC 1976/1996 gave 
states the right to opt-out of limitation under art 2(1)(d) and (e), but not art 2(a).The 
main reason for the power was to enable states to remove limits for wreck raising, 
largely as that has been thought to be an area of particular concern to governments 
and had been outside limitation for some time.
359 In the present context, the effect of 
an opt-out will mean that claims within art 2(1)(d) are positively not capable of 
limitation. Thus, many bunker pollution clean -up claims could not be limited, 
although presumably property damage claims falling  solely within art 2(1)(a) are 
limitable, as would be economic loss claims if they fall solely in art 2(1)(c). It seems 
impossible to argue that, if there is an overlap between the various sub-paragraphs, 
the effect of a reservation in respect of sub-paragraph (d) is to leave unaffected a 
right to limit for identical claims because they might happen to fall within one of the      
                                                                                                                                
                                                 
356  Moreover, states not party to LLMC 1976 or 1996 might well have provisions which 
themselves do not cover bunker pollution damage at all. 
357  See,  The  Tiruna  [1987]  2  Lloyd's  Rep.  666  (Full  Court,  Supreme  Court  Qld),  per 
McPherson J, 683. 
358  Although in bunker cases courts should take note of the Preamble and Conference 
Resolution 1: see above Part III(E). 
359  For example under the 1957 Limitation Convention. 160  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
other sub-paragraphs. This would make a nonsense of the reservation; it also lends 
some  support  to  the  argument  that  the  various  sub-paragraphs  are  mutually 
exclusive.
360 
There is a real policy decision here for states when enacting the Bunker Oil 
Convention, as non-shipowning states with vulnerable coastlines will consider that it 
is in their interest to have unlimited liability for bunker claims. Yet, in principle, 
there has always been a good argument that unlimited liability is not appropriate (or 
is unfair) where there is an imposed regime of strict liability. Even prior to the 
Bunker Oil Convention, Australia had already exercised this right of reservation 
under both the LLMC 1976 and 1996, internationally
361 and in the  Limitation of 
Liability  for  Maritime  Claims  Act  1989  (Cth),  s  6.  This  approach  is  entirely 
justifiable for a potential coastal state victim, and the consequence in Australian 
limitation law is that the ability of a shipowner to limit liability for bunker pollution 
claims may be more apparent than real.
362 While AMSA‟s clean up costs (e.g. after a 
major stranding) will usually not be subject to limits (because of the sub-paragraph 
(d) opt-out), it may be that other claims in Australia (e.g. for economic loss) would 
still be limited (e.g. under sub-paragraphs (a) or (c)). For states, this might be a 
satisfactory compromise. 
 
5  Direct Action and Limitation  
 
However, after all this, unlimited liability may still be a chimera in practice 
where the defendant registered shipowner is a single ship company. It may have a 
theoretical unlimited liability, but few assets after a sinking; however, its insurer 
(e.g. the P & I Club) will not itself have unlimited liability.  
Because the Bunker Oil Convention does not have its own stand alone limits, 
the wording of the provisions on insurer liability are slightly different to those in the 
CLC, so care needs to be taken with their interpretation. The insurance certificate 
required under art 7(1) of the Bunker Oil Convention is up to „an amount calculated 
in accordance with the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
1976,  as  amended‟  (i.e.  the  LLMC  1996).
363  Article  7(10)  is  the  direct  action 
provision:  
 
Any claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly against 
the insurer or other person providing financial security for the registered owner‟s 
liability for pollution damage. In such a case the defendant may invoke the defences 
(other than bankruptcy or winding up of the shipowner) which the shipowner would  
 
                                                 
360  See,  The  Tiruna  [1987]  2  Lloyd's  Rep.  666  (Full  Court,  Supreme  Court  Qld)  per 
McPherson J, 687-8. 
361  The instrument of accession deposited for Australia 20 February 1991, declares that 
Australia  would not be bound by Article 2.1(d) and (e): see also, Australian Treaty 
Series 1991 No. 12, n 3. 
362  This  possibility  was  not  hinted  at  in  the  debates  or  Explanatory  Memorandum, 
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage) Act 2008 (Cth) s 
9, which merely refer deadpan to the applicable limits. It is assumed that the possibility 
of  unlimited  liability  for  bunker  pollution  clean-up  costs  within  art  2(1)(d)  was  by 
design, despite Australia‟s support in the drafting of the convention for limitation (cf 
LEG 94/12 31 October 2008, para 11). This contrasts with the UK position where the 
legislative intent of the „deeming‟ provision for sub-paragraph (a) would presumably be 
stronger than the reservation made to sub-paragraph (d): see above Part III(E)(3)(a).  
363  Under  CLC  1992  art  VII(1),  insurance  has to  be  maintained  „in  the  sums  fixed  by 
applying the limits of liability prescribed in Article V (1)‟.  Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             161 
 
have been entitled to invoke, including limitation pursuant to article 6. Furthermore, 
even if the shipowner is not entitled to limitation of liability according to article 6, 
the defendant may limit liability to an amount equal to the amount of the insurance 
or other financial security required to be maintained in accordance with paragraph 1. 
Moreover, the defendant may invoke the defence that the pollution damage resulted 
from the wilful misconduct of the shipowner, but the defendant shall not invoke any 
other  defence  which  the  defendant  might  have  been  entitled  to  invoke  in 
proceedings brought by the shipowner against the defendant. The defendant shall in 
any event have the right to require the shipowner to be joined in the proceedings. 
 
It is the emphasised words in the second sentence which differ from the CLC 
1992. Under the CLC, the insurer can establish a CLC limitation fund
364 and can rely 
on that limit, even if the shipowner is deprived of the right to limit as a result of 
intentional or reckless conduct.
365  It can be noted that the  wording of the third 
sentence of the Bunker Oil Convention art 7(10) is phrased more widely, as it allows 
the insurer to limit even if the shipowner cannot limit „according to art 6‟ generally. 
This is a necessary addition for insurers as, otherwise, they may have to face the 
argument that if the shipowner was not itself able to limit at all under art 6,
366 then 
there was no way that the insurer itself could have limited. It is inconceivable, as a 
matter of drafting, that it was intended that the liability of  the insurer under the 
insurance certificate was also to be unlimited on the basis that certain claims did not 
fall within art 2 of the LLMC.
367 For that reason, the wider language in art 7(10) is 
one that makes the liability of the insurer subject to a maxi mum exposure of the 
limits shown in Tables 7 and 8, above.  
There is one further ambiguity that arises from the linkage which art 6 of the 
Bunker Oil Convention makes between that Convention and the separate limitation 
regimes  „such  as‟  the  LLMC  1996.  The  second  sentence  of  the  Bunker  Oil 
Convention art 7(10) allows the insurer the same right to limit as the shipowner 
„pursuant to art 6‟. It follows that it is one of those regimes which will govern that 
limitation, including the constitution and the distribution of funds. If there are other 
claims on the LLMC 1996 fund then the bunker pollution claimants will have to 
share  rateably.
368  By  contrast,  the  third  sentence  of  art  7(10)  is  a  „long  stop‟ 
limitation provision of the Bunker Oil Convention itself, i.e. where for some reason 
the shipowner could not limit.
369 It cannot give the insurer a specific right to limit 
under the LLMC 1996 (for instance), as that would not be possible in international 
                                                 
364  Under CLC 1992 art V(11), „on the same conditions and having the same effect as if it 
were constituted by the owner…‟.   
365  See CLC 1992 art VII(8). There is a specific reference to art V(2), explained below Part 
III(E)(5). The second sentence of art V(11) emphasises the point: „Such a fund may be 
constituted even if, under the provisions of paragraph 2, the owner is not entitled to limit 
his liability, but its constitution shall in that case not prejudice the rights of any claimant 
against the owner.‟ 
366  For example for the reasons explained above in Part III(E) (3)  – (4) and not simply 
because of intentional or reckless conduct (as in Part III(E)(2) above).  
367  The linkage of the insurer‟s liability to a fixed limitation amount goes back to the CLC 
1969 and is repeated in the HNS Convention 1996, the Athens Convention 2002, and 
the Wreck Removal Convention 2007. It is part of the „package deal‟ that the Clubs 
agreed to issue complying insurance certificates, provided that they knew exactly what 
their exposure was. 
368  See the examples in Part III(E)(1)  above.  
369  For example, because there was no limitation regime applicable; or the claim did not fall 
exactly within the LLMC art 2(1); or there was an opt out from sub -paragraph 2(1)(d); 
or there was intent/recklessness within art 4. 162  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
law.
370 If this is right, it seems that the effect of this provision is, in effect, to give a 
stand-alone right to limit for the insurer, albeit as a default position if there is no 
separate right to limit; it would be unlike a claim against a shipowner (whose LLMC 
limits would be shared with other property claimants). If so, it would also seem to 
mean that an insurer who needed to rely on the third sentence of art 7(10) must make 
available under the insurance certificate the whole amount of the LLMC limit – even 
if it is also facing (indirectly as insurer) other claims against the shipowner (e.g. for 
property  damage).
371  Such  complications  of  interpretation  are  a  regrettable 
consequence  of  the  way  that  art  7(10)  was  patched  together,  with  the  precise 
consequences of linkage not being fully appreciated. An Australian court which had 
to  apply  both  the  Bunker  Oil  Convention  and  the  LLMC  1996  might  take  the 
pragmatic view that, as Australia has given the force of law to both, the two should 
be  read  together  so  that  the  insurer  would  limit  under  the  LLMC  1996  in  the 
ordinary way. Although this might come closer to the presumed intentions of the 
drafters, it could also reduce the funds available for compensation, and this ought to 
be a significant factor where there is doubt.   
Finally, it should also be recalled that claims may also be made under the 
Bunker Oil Convention against persons other than the registered shipowner.
372 In 
principle they are also entitled to limit under the LLMC
373 and, if the LLMC gives 
them the right to limit, their liability is aggregated with that of the regist ered 
shipowner (so the claimant cannot recover double the limitation amount). However, 
if, as explained above, there are claims not limitable under the LLMC, then these 
persons cannot limit; any more than could the shipowner. These persons are not 
obliged to carry insurance, however, but if they are solvent and/or insured their 
liability could be in addition to that of, say, the insurer liable under art 7(10) of the 
Bunker Oil Convention. To that extent, the absence of a second tier fund is to some 
extent remedied, and it may well be that limitation of liability is less of a problem 
than indicated by the discussion in Part III(E)(1). 
 
F    Liability and Limitation: Jurisdiction and Procedural Issues 
 
Under the Bunker Oil Convention art 9, substantive claims can only be brought 
in a State Party where pollution damage (or preventive measures) occurred, and 
under art 10 other State Parties shall recognise a final judgment.
374   
It  would  be  logical  for  liability  and  limitation  proceedings  to  be  brought 
together.  But because the Bunker Oil Convention art 6 refers limitation of liability 
to another instrument (in Australia, the LLMC 1996), it is necessary to consider the 
position under each instrument. Although Australia is a party to the LLMC 1996, it  
 
 
                                                 
370 The LLMC 1996 has its own amendment procedures and differing State Parties. Parties 
to  the  Bunker  Oil  Convention  could  agree  among  themselves that  they  would  limit 
rights under the LLMC in some way, but the difficulty would arise if an LLMC fund 
were constituted in another state party to LLMC where that state and other claimants 
were not party to the Bunker Oil Convention. The CLC 1992 is different because it has 
its own self contained limits and can give the insurer rights under those, independently 
of other limitation regimes.  
371 The aggregate amount of the insurer‟s liability for bunker pollution under art 7(10) could 
not exceed the LLMC limit, however (see LLMC 1996 arts 8, 9(3)). 
372  For example the bareboat charterer, manager or operator: see Part III(C)(7). 
373  LLMC, art 1. 
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does  not  automatically  follow  that  all  limitation  proceedings  may  take  place  in 
Australia.  
First, it is possible for a shipowner to claim to limit liability in another LLMC 
1996 State Party and establish a Fund there under art 11 of the LLMC 1996. That 
state will, under art 14, constitute and distribute the fund according to its law. In 
theory this limitation forum state might be one which allows a shipowner to limit for 
bunker clean up claims which are not limitable in Australia, e.g. because that state 
has not made the reservations in respect of art 2(1)(d) of the LLMC 1996. Australian 
claimants would then have to decide whether to proceed against the limitation fund 
so established, in which case they would be barred, under art 13(1) of the LLMC 
1996 from claiming against other assets of the shipowner. Under art 13(2) of the 
LLMC 1996, once a fund has been constituted in a State Party there are restrictions 
upon the arrest of other property of the shipowner.
375  
Secondly,  where  there  is  bunker  pollution  in  Australia  and  B unker  Oil 
Convention liability proceedings are brought here, it is possible that the shipowner 
might seek to establish a limitation fund in a state not party to the LLMC 1996, e.g. 
an LLMC 1976 state. It will be recalled that art 6 of the Bunker Oil Convention 
leaves unaffected the rights of shipowners and insurers to limit liability „under any 
applicable national or international regime‟.
376 In this instance, the Australian courts 
would not be bound by any of the Convention obligations in the LLMC 1996 to that 
other state and would have to apply normal principles of private international law in 
deciding whether to grant a stay in favour of those limitation proceedings – which 
could have a major effect for any Australian claimants.
377 It is extremely unlikely 
that any court faced with pollution damage in its territory would cede the limitation 
question  to  another  court  in  circumstances  where  there  was  no  international 
obligation to do so and where the limits available would be lower than those 
applicable in its own courts.
378  Without being unduly nationalistic, it would not be 
unreasonable  for  Australian  courts  to  lean  in  favour  of  having  liability  and 
jurisdictional issues relating to bunker pollution damage being heard together in 
Australia. There is a national a nd international interest in ensuring that pollution 
damage is properly remedied; the splitting of liability and limitation in the Bunker 
Oil Convention is something of an accident (or victim) of history; and this is not a 
usual battle between competing commercial parties and their insurers. 
                                                 
375  It is possible, but unlikely, that the registered shipowner has assets other than the ship in 
question which could be secured, partly because of the single ship company structure 
(and  for  arrest  generally,  see  the  Admiralty  Act  1988  (Cth)).  As  the  Bunker  Oil 
Convention  creates  liabilities  of  the  registered  shipowner  and  bareboat  charterers, 
managers and operators (see above Part III(C)(7)) it is possible that these persons may 
have assets in Australia that might be secured in some way. It would seem from art 
13(2) that an Australian court would not be bound to order a release in a case in which 
pollution damage occurred in Australia and a limitation fund was established in another 
State Party, unless that was a state where the ship had been arrested (art 13(2)(d)), or it 
was the port of discharge in respect of cargo damaged in the ship (art 13(2)(c)). 
376  Emphasis added. The LLMC 1996 is only given as an example in art 6, for the very 
reason that a state may be party to the Bunker Oil Convention, but not have ratified one 
of the other instruments.  
377  See above Part III(E)(1) for the lower limits under the LLMC 1976. Note als o that the 
limits could be even lower under the Limitation Convention 1957; for examples, see 
Gaskell, above n 324, 828.  
378  For a more extensive discussion of  forum non conveniens issues and the case law in 
England and elsewhere, see, Davies and Dickey, above n 83,477-9, and Griggs et al, 
above n 352, 457-8.   164  The University of Queensland Law Journal  2008 
 
IV   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The IMO Legal Committee has spent the last 25 years or so on completing the 
suite  of  conventions  (mainly  environmental)  of  which  the  Supplementary  Fund 
Protocol and Bunker Oil Convention form part. The Wreck Removal Convention 
2007, which was agreed on 18 May 2007, is almost the last part of this long term 
agenda  of  the  Committee  to  deal  with  the  questions  of  financial  security.
379  It 
remains to be seen whether Australia will ratify it, or the HNS Convention (when the 
latter is finally ready for ratification).  
Taken  together,  this  suite  of  maritime  liability  conventions  provides  an 
internationally accepted set of rules based on compulsory insurance to give some 
protection for states and the victims of pol lution. The claims handling practices 
developed by the IOPC Fund, in particular, are a model of how an international 
organisation can work in a pragmatic way. The experience gained there will be used 
directly under the Supplementary Fund Protocol. The latter will probably only have 
a limited membership and its upper limits will always be tested by new economic 
claims. Those administering the Funds should be challenged to concentrate more on 
response action and restoration measures, than economic losses.
380  
The mantra of the IMO Legal Committee when drafting the conventions has 
been  that  „the  perfect  is  the  enemy  of  the  good‟.  There  are  many  conceptual 
problems with a system that has grown incrementally. The STOPIA and TOPIA 
compromise is an example of an awkward international solution; but a common law 
lawyer recognises the result more than the form, and there are sometimes advantages 
to a „try it and see‟ approach, rather than one which aims for perfect drafting and 
conceptual  consistency.  International  compromises  are  often  frustrating,  and  the 
level of satisfaction may well be at the level of the lowest common denominator. It 
can be counted as a success that the IMO has been able to agree a Bunker Oil 
Convention after over 20 years of discussion. 
There are conceptual defects with the Bunker Oil Convention, in particular the 
absence  of  a  second  tier  fund  which  can  be  used  for  large  claims.  This  is  an 
incidental  result  of  not  locating  bunker  liability  in  the  CLC  1992  or  HNS 
Convention. Moreover, because the Bunker Oil Convention was agreed after the 
LLMC 1996, it was not possible either (i) to exempt it completely from the LLMC 
and, like the CLC, to provide its own separate limits, or (ii) to make specific stand-
alone bunker limits in the LLMC.
381 It may well be that the level of many bunker 
claims does not warrant the need for a second tier, but it is equally clear that the 
effect of art 6, on limitation is problematic.
382 There might be unlimited liability in 
theory in some cases, but this in practice will be restricted by the maximum liability 
of the insurer under the direct action provisions. The linkage of limits to the LLMC 
may well mean that pollution claimants have to share in a rather limited fund with   
 
                                                 
379  It  places  obligations  in  respect  of  the  reporting,  location,  marking  and  removal  of 
wrecks. Some of those obligations are placed on states, but there are a significant new 
series of obligations on shipowners. 
380  Louise  De  La  Fayette,  „New  Approaches  for  Addressing  Damage‟  (2005)  20 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 167, 168 
381  As was done for passenger claims: see LLMC 1996, art 7. 
382  Developing states, in particular, will have to pay particular attention when ratifying the 
convention to check that their national limitation system is adequate to cover potential 
losses. If they are a party to the LLMC, they should consider making a reservation under 
art 18(1) of LLMC 1976 or 1996 so that they can have no limits, or set their own limits, 
for the majority of clean up claims. Vol 27 (2)  Marine Pollution Damage in Australia                             165 
 
other commercial claimants, and this will lead to earlier, rather than later, pressure to 
increase  the  LLMC  limits  themselves.  The  decision  to  drop  the  concept  of 
channelling and to have a number of possible defendants, other than the registered 
shipowner, is partly explained by the uncertainty about whether the limits of liability 
will be sufficient. For most cases, there is no need to make others liable, even in the 
absence of a second tier, as there is the security of compulsory insurance of the 
registered shipowner. The undermining of the principle of „responder immunity‟ for 
salvors  is  particularly  unfortunate,  and  suits  against  charterers,  managers  and 
operators are likely to lead to complications and extra costs. 
It might be said that the Bunker Oil Convention was largely unnecessary as the 
vast majority of its provisions could have been enacted in national law; and there 
was no second tier fund which needed international cooperation. Further, states such 
as Australia had already created national provisions for recovery of clean up costs, 
and for compulsory insurance; they can also apply existing rules on limitation of 
liability. The advantage of an international solution is that a convention allows for a 
standard, internationally accepted, compulsory insurance certificate. It seems likely 
that further work, incrementalism again, will result in the production of a single 
insurance certificate for all liability Conventions.
383 The prospect of a single unified 
maritime liability regime seems to be a long way in the future, however. Despite 
this, the Bunker Oil Con vention (together with the Wreck Removal Convention 
2007)  are  highly  significant,  because  they  require  compulsory  insurance 
internationally – not simply for specialised ships such as oil tankers (CLC 1992) and 
chemical carriers (HNS Convention), but for most categories of commercial ships 
over 1000 gt (Bunker Oil  Convention ) or 300  gt (Wreck  Removal  Convention 
2007).  If  a  significant  number  of  states  accept  these  conventions,  a  majority  of 
commercial  ships  (including  larger  fishing  vessels)  will  be  forced  to  carry 
international insurance certificates – whatever their flag. From the point of view of 
international uniformity this is a good idea, particularly if the coverage is by the 
International Group of P & I Clubs which can reasonably be assumed to provide a 
reliable form of financial security.  
In the context of environmental protection as a whole, and the huge questions 
posed by climate change, the IMO maritime liability conventions are a side show, 
concentrating as they do on what happens after a casualty. Still, for Governments 
and others who suffer immediate harm, they perform a useful practical role. 
 
 
 
                                                 
383  A Resolution at the diplomatic conference for the Wreck Removal Convention 2007 
recommended that the IMO Legal Committee work on such a certificate (but see LEG 
94/12 31 October 2008, para 5.30 et seq for difficulties). A further Resolution called on 
States to further technical cooperation on dealing with bunker spills and implementing 
the Convention. 